Intermountain Sports, Inc. v. DOT, 20031029-CA.
Decision Date | 12 November 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 20031029-CA.,20031029-CA. |
Citation | 103 P.3d 716,2004 UT App 405 |
Parties | INTERMOUNTAIN SPORTS, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and Murray City, Defendants and Appellees. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
B. Ray Zoll, Murray, and John Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Randy S. Hunter, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
Before BILLINGS, P.J., and DAVIS and GREENWOOD, JJ.
¶ 1 Intermountain Sports, Inc. (Intermountain) appeals the trial court's grant of Utah Department of Transportation's (UDOT) motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Intermountain argues that the trial court erred by granting UDOT's motion because Intermountain has alleged facts sufficient for both its inverse condemnation and its uniform operation of laws claims. We affirm.
¶ 2 Intermountain owned and operated a recreational vehicle sales business located at 4225 South 500 West in Murray, Utah, near the 4500 South off-ramp from Interstate 15 (I-15). Intermountain's business was accessible only from 500 West and not directly accessible from either I-15 or 4500 South.
¶ 3 From approximately July 1997 to May 2001, UDOT conducted a massive reconstruction of I-15 (I-15 reconstruction). During the I-15 reconstruction, UDOT periodically closed both the 4500 South off-ramp and 4500 South to eastbound and westbound traffic. However, UDOT did not perform work on 500 West, block or disrupt traffic on 500 West, or block direct access to Intermountain's business premises on 500 West.
¶ 4 Intermountain filed a complaint alleging six causes of action against UDOT, two of which are relevant to this appeal. First, Intermountain alleged that the I-15 reconstruction, and specifically, the closure of the 4500 South off-ramp and 4500 South, blocked Intermountain's "easement of access" to its business premises and that this constituted a "taking" under the Takings Clause of the Utah Constitution. In particular, Intermountain asserted that by "taking" its "easement of access," UDOT (1) "substantially and materially impaired [Intermountain's] right of access to the I-15 off-ramp at 4500 South and to 4500 South Street as well as [Intermountain's] customers' right of access to 4500 South Street and [Intermountain]"; (2) substantially diminished the value of Intermountain's property; and (3) damaged Intermountain's private property interest for a public use without just compensation.
¶ 5 Second, Intermountain alleged that access from I-15 to its property during the I-15 reconstruction involved a circuitous 2.5-mile loop making it difficult for potential customers driving on I-15 to reach Intermountain. Intermountain claimed that UDOT constructed this circuitous loop so that other businesses received the benefit of direct access to 4500 South off-ramp traffic and that UDOT refused to offer Intermountain a similar benefit, which violated the Utah Constitution's Uniform Operation of Laws provision.
¶ 6 UDOT filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the motion ruling that Intermountain failed to state a claim for either inverse condemnation or violation of uniform operation of laws. Intermountain appeals.
¶ 7 Intermountain argues that the trial court erred by granting UDOT's motion for judgment on the pleadings. "When reviewing a grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true; we then consider such allegations `and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 91,¶ 2, 991 P.2d 584 (citation omitted). "`[W]e affirm the grant of such motion only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged.'" Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
¶ 8 Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." Utah Const. art. I, § 22. " View Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, L.L.C., 2004 UT App 104, ¶ 35, 90 P.3d 1042 (quoting Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996)). Thus, in order to state an inverse condemnation claim, Intermountain must allege in its complaint a protectable property interest that has been taken or damaged by UDOT.
¶ 9 Intermountain's complaint repeatedly characterizes its relevant property interest as an "easement of access ... to the I-15 southbound off-ramp to 4500 South and to 4500 South Street." We agree with the trial court that temporary denial of access to property does not constitute a taking. See Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459, 465 (Utah 1989)
().
State v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107,¶ 14, 57 P.3d 1088 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1974)
( ); Hampton v. State Road Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708, 711 (1968) ( ); State Road Comm'n v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P.2d 276, 277 (1941) (McDonough, J., concurring) ().
¶ 11 While "[t]he kinds of property subject to the [eminent domain] right ... [are] practically unlimited," Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1990) ( )(quotations and citation omitted), we are unwilling to adopt the view that a business has a protectable property interest in the mere hope of future sales from passing traffic or that the rerouting of traffic constitutes a compensable taking under article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution. See Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 878 (Utah 1996) ().
¶ 12 Intermountain does not allege that UDOT performed reconstruction work on 500 West, blocked or disrupted traffic on 500 West, or blocked direct access to its business from 500 West. Because Intermountain does not have a protectable property interest in an "easement of access" to I-15 or 4500 South and because Intermountain was accessible from 500 West during the I-15 reconstruction, Intermountain has not stated an inverse condemnation claim. Therefore, we hold that Intermountain has failed to state a claim for inverse condemnation.
¶ 13 Intermountain argues that the trial court erred by dismissing its denial of uniform operation of laws claim. UDOT argues that Intermountain's complaint fails because (1) the uniform operation of laws clause is not a self-executing constitutional provision, and (2) even if the complaint properly stated a claim, monetary damages are not available as a remedy under the framework set forth in Spackman v. Board of Education, 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533. We hold that the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah Constitution is self-executing but that under the circumstances presented in this case, monetary damages are not available.
¶ 14 Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const. art. I, § 24. In Spackman, our supreme court provided guidance for determining whether a particular constitutional clause is self-executing and whether monetary damages are an available remedy for a violation of a self-executing constitutional provision. See 2000 UT 87 at ¶ 1, 16 P.3d 533. The court explained that "a self-executing constitutional clause is...
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