Spackman Ex Rel. Spackman v. Board of Educ.

• Decision Date: 31 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 990553.,990553.
• Citation: 16 P.3d 533,2000 UT 87
• Parties: Jennifer SPACKMAN, By and Through her parents and guardians, Delbert and Laura SPACKMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE BOX ELDER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Richard Kimber, Martel Menlove, Kirk Allen, and Charles Woolums, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

16 P.3d 533

2000 UT 87

Jennifer SPACKMAN, By and Through her parents and guardians, Delbert and Laura SPACKMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE BOX ELDER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Richard Kimber, Martel Menlove, Kirk Allen, and Charles Woolums, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 990553.

Supreme Court of Utah.

October 31, 2000.

James R. Hasenyager, Ogden, Peter W. Summerill, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Brent A. Burnett, Renee Spooner, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants.

DURRANT, Justice:

¶ 1 Pursuant to rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Judge Tena Campbell presiding, certified the following question to the Utah Supreme Court:

Whether the Free and Equal Public Education Clause of the Utah Constitution (Art. X, § 1) and/or the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution (Art. I, § 7) are self-executing constitutional provisions that may be directly enforced without implementing legislation.

In light of the posture in which the case is presented, there are two evident components to the question: (1) whether the clauses are self-executing, and (2) if so, whether they may be enforced through a private suit for damages.¹ In regard to the first question, we answer in the affirmative as to both clauses. In regard to the second question, we provide the analytical framework to be used in resolving the issue.²

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 We state the facts as described by the Federal District Court in the order of certification. Those facts are drawn from the plaintiff's complaint. As stated in that complaint, in September 1996, ten-year-old Jennifer Spackman injured her right arm at home. At the time, she attended Park Valley School. In the weeks following the injury, a fellow student at Park Valley began assaulting Spackman, causing her further injury. As a result of these injuries, Spackman contracted fibrositis and fibromyalgia in her neck, shoulder, and right arm. In the ensuing months, Spackman had difficulty regularly attending school. She missed forty-six and one-half days of school between September 20, 1996, and January 1997. During this same period, Spackman's medical care providers notified Park Valley that Spackman needed special accommodations in order to attend school. Park Valley did not provide any of the suggested accommodations.

¶ 3 On January 17, 1997, Park Valley informed Spackman's parents that she would not be allowed to attend school. The school had not theretofore provided Spackman's parents any notice or opportunity for a hearing regarding this decision. Spackman returned to school eleven days later, January 28, 1997.

¶ 4 Spackman's parents filed suit on her behalf in the Federal District Court against the Box Elder Board of Education, Board Superintendents Richard Kimber and Martell Menlove, Park Valley Principal Brian Anderson, and School District officials Kirk Allen and Charles Wollums. Among other claims, Spackman seeks damages for alleged violations of the Open Education Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution.

¶ 5 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Spackman's state constitutional claims. Defendants argue that Spackman's claims should be dismissed because the Open Education Clause and the Due Process Clause are not self-executing clauses and thus cannot form the basis for a damages claim.

¶ 6 The Federal District Court determined that the state constitutional issues presented in defendants' motion to dismiss are unsettled under Utah law, and therefore certified the question to this court for resolution.

ANALYSIS

I. SELF-EXECUTING CLAUSES

¶ 7 In essence, a self-executing constitutional clause is one that can be judicially enforced without implementing legislation. To ascertain whether a particular clause is self-executing, we consider several factors. This court has stated as follows:

[a] constitutional provision is self-executing if it articulates a rule sufficient to give effect to the underlying rights and duties intended by the framers. In other words, courts may give effect to a provision without implementing legislation if the framers intended the provision to have immediate effect and if "no ancillary legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed...." Conversely, constitutional provisions are not self-executing if they merely indicate a general principle or line of policy without supplying the means for putting them into effect.

Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted).

¶ 8 In addition, a constitutional provision that prohibits certain government conduct generally qualifies as a self-executing clause "at least to the extent that courts may void incongruous legislation." Id. at 738 (citation omitted).

¶ 9 This court's use of the concept of self-executing constitutional provisions dates back at least to 1898, two years after the Utah Constitution took effect. See Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 228, 52 P. 382, 384 (1898). To date, this court has expressly found three constitutional provisions to be self-executing:³ (1) the former version of article XII, section 18, providing for the liability of bank stockholders,⁴ see Lynch v. Jacobsen, 55 Utah 129, 135-36, 184 P. 929, 932 (1919); (2) article I, section 22, the Takings Clause, see Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 630 (Utah 1990)

; and (3) article I, section 9, the Unnecessary Rigor/Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, see Bott, 922 P.2d at 737-38. We now determine whether the Due Process Clause and the Open Education Clause are also self-executing constitutional provisions.

A. The Due Process Clause

¶ 10 The Due Process Clause states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah Const. art. I, § 7. We hold that this clause is self-executing.

¶ 11 First, the clause is inarguably prohibitory. In fact, the Utah Constitution states that all of its provisions are "mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise." Id. art. I, § 26. There is no wording in the Due Process Clause constituting such a declaration.

¶ 12 Second, although the right to due process is expressed in relatively general terms, it is both judicially definable and enforceable. Indeed, this court has already defined and enforced the clause on numerous occasions without implementing legislation. See, e.g., State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271-72 (Utah 1988)

(invalidating certain statutory provisions on due process grounds); State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1218-19 (Utah 1987) (applying due process principles to an evidentiary issue); State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1371-72 (Utah 1986) (applying due process principles to challenged jury instructions); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Utah 1982) (applying due process principles to contempt proceedings).

¶ 13 Finally, the context in which the clause was adopted suggests the framers intended to constitutionalize existing concepts of due process rather than create a new provision requiring legislative implementation. For instance, prior to ratification of the constitution, territorial courts were already applying due process concepts. See People v. Hasbrouck, 11 Utah 291, 306, 39 P. 918, 922 (1895); Jensen v. Union Pac. Ry., 6 Utah 253, 255-57, 21 P. 994, 995 (1889). Furthermore, long before article I, section 7 came into existence, judicially defined due process principles were already firmly entrenched in the American legal landscape by virtue of the Magna Carta and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Jensen, 6 Utah at 255-56, 21 P. at 995 (noting that due process rights as stated in the "Great Charter" and the Fifth Amendment have "been the sheet-anchor of the liberty of the English-speaking people" for over 600 years).

B. The Open Education Clause

¶ 14 In pertinent part, the Open Education Clause requires that the public education system "shall be open to all children of the state." Utah Const. art. X, § 1. We hold that this provision is self-executing.

¶ 15 First, the clause is presumptively "mandatory and prohibitory" under article I, section 26. There is no wording in the Open Education Clause constituting a contrary declaration.

¶ 16 Second, the clause is judicially definable and enforceable absent enabling legislation. In fact, this court has already defined and applied the Open Education Clause. For example, in Logan City School District v. Kowallis, this court stated that

[t]he requirement that the schools must be open to all children of the state is a prohibition against any law or rule which would separate or divide the children of the state into classes or groups, and grant, allow, or provide one group or class educational privileges or advantages denied another. No child of school age, resident within the state, can be lawfully denied admission to the schools of the state because of race, color, location, religion, politics, or any other bar or barrier which may be set up which would deny to such child equality of educational opportunities or facilities with all other children of the state. This is a direction to the Legislature to provide a system of public schools to which all children of the state may be admitted. It is also a prohibition against the Legislature, or any other body, making any law or rule which would deny admission to, or exclude from, the public schools any child resident of the state, for any cause except the child's own conduct, behavior, or health. The schools are open to all children of the state when there are no restrictions on any child, children, or group of children which do not apply to all children in the state alike.

94 Utah 342, 347-48, 77 P.2d 348, 350-51 (1938).

¶ 17 Finally, certain historical facts strongly suggest that the constitutional framers intended that...