International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2479 v. Thorpe, 53953

• Decision Date: 28 July 1981
• Docket Number: No. 53953,53953
• Citation: 1981 OK 95,632 P.2d 408
• Parties: The INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 2479, Appellant, v. Gene THORPE, City Manager of Ponca City, Oklahoma and City Commissioners of the City of Ponca City, Oklahoma and the City of Ponca City, Oklahoma, Appellees.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 408

632 P.2d 408

1981 OK 95

The INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 2479, Appellant, v. Gene THORPE, City Manager of Ponca City, Oklahoma and City

Commissioners of the City of Ponca City, Oklahoma

and the City of Ponca City, Oklahoma, Appellees.

No. 53953.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

July 28, 1981.

Appeal from the District Court of Kay County; Lowell Doggett, District judge.

Appellant appeals from district court denial of writ of mandamus against City Manager to compel City Manager to negotiate with Appellant Bargaining Agent in open session, under the Oklahoma Open Meeting Law.

AFFIRMED.

Catherine Gatchell Naifeh, Moore, Foster, Woods & Gatchell, Oklahoma City, for appellant.

C. Marland Johnson, Ponca City, for appellees.

DOOLIN, Justice.

We are called upon today to resolve the issue of whether collective bargaining negotiations between a City Manager and the Firefighters Local fall within the Oklahoma Open Meeting Law. ¹ We hold that these negotiations do not fall within the Open Meeting Law.

The firefighters' bargaining agent (Bargaining Agent) insisted that the negotiations be open to the public, while the City Manager refused to meet and confer in an open meeting. The City Manager had no authority to make binding agreements without consulting the City Council, nor did the Bargaining Agent have authority to make such an agreement without Union membership approval. The Bargaining Agent filed an application in the district court for issuance of Alternative Writs of Mandamus against the City Manager, the Board of City Commissioners and the City of Ponca City to require them or their individual designee to conduct collective bargaining negotiation sessions with the recognized bargaining agent in open meeting. The district judge refused to grant the writ against the City Manager, but granted the writs against the Board of City Commissioners and the City of Ponca City if the sessions were conducted by more than one member of the Board of City Commissioners, or more than one designated representative of the Board. It is from the denial of the writ against the City Manager that the Bargaining Agent appeals.

The trial court relied heavily on an Oklahoma Attorney General's Opinion which, in considering a situation identical to the case at bar, held that the City Manager was not a committee, task force or study group within the meaning of 25 O.S.Supp.1977 § 304, ² and therefore was free to negotiate in closed sessions. Attorney General's Opinion 77-260 states:

From a reading of the foregoing definitions contained in the Oklahoma Open Meeting Act (25 O.S.Supp.1977 § 304), it is obvious that a "public body" is considered to be made up of more than one individual person, and that "meetings" referred to in the Act encompass meetings wherein a majority of the members of a public body are personally together. Thus an individual city manager or his or her individual designee would not appear to be a "public body" within the meaning of the Act, nor would collective bargaining sessions between an individual city manager or his or her designee, and the representatives of employees would not be "meetings" within the contemplation of the Act.

It would, therefore, follow that collective bargaining negotiation sessions held only between a city manager, or his or her designee, and the representatives of employees would not be "meetings of a public body" within the purview of the Oklahoma Open Meeting Act.

Bargaining Agent contends that the Attorney General erroneously focused on the composition of the negotiating group and defined the group as one public official, ignoring the employees' bargaining agent. We believe Bargaining Agent is correct, and that the opinion erroneously failed to consider the private individuals who were involved in the bargaining process. But we decline to turn our discussion on this point.

Whether the individuals who composed the group were private citizens or public officials or employees has not been a distinguishing factor in previous cases. ³ The key consideration should be the public nature of the work of the group. The municipality is statutorily obligated to engage in fact-finding and negotiations with the representatives of the firefighters. ⁴

The usual meaning of the words "committees," "task forces" and "study groups" denotes a group of individuals, working together on a specific project or general goal. We hold that the City Manager and the Bargaining Agent negotiating together are clearly included as a committee, task force or study group. Although this may not be what is traditionally thought of as a committee, task force or study group, clearly the function of the meetings between the City Manager and the Bargaining Agent is the same as that of meetings of more traditional committees, task forces, or study groups.

The Open Meeting Law, because it is enacted for the public's benefit, is to be construed liberally in favor of the public. ⁵

Bargaining Agent urges that this situation falls within the rule announced in Sanders v. Benton. ⁶ Sanders involved a Citizen's Advisory Committee which was to furnish information, evaluations and recommendations to the Board of Corrections for a proposed location of a Community Treatment Center. This Court held that Oklahoma's pre-1977 Open Meeting Law (25 O.S.1971 § 201) did not encompass the Sanders situation, because the Committee had no decision-making authority, either actual or de facto. Sanders holds:

Where a parent entity, coming within the purview of § 201 as a matter of law, establishes a subordinate entity and such subordinate entity and subordinate entity's authority is derived solely through its parent entity, the question of whether the subordinate entity may also come within the purview of § 201 depends upon the purpose for which it was established and the responsibilities it exercises. If the subordinate entity in the performance of its assigned duties and responsibilities exercises actual or de facto decision-making authority, it...