International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 01 April 1987
• Docket Number: 86-3623,No. 2202,AFL-CIO,P,Nos. 86-3926,No. 143,143,2202,s. 86-3926
• Citation: 813 F.2d 1038
• Parties: 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2102, 106 Lab.Cas. P 12,289 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,, and its affiliated District Lodge, and its affiliated Local Lodgelaintiffs-Appellants, v. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1038

813 F.2d 1038

125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2102, 106 Lab.Cas. P 12,289

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, and its affiliated District Lodge No. 143, and its affiliated Local Lodge No. 2202, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 86-3926, 86-3623.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 2, 1987.

Decided April 1, 1987.

David Campbell, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Valerie L. Hughes, Bellevue, Wash., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.

Before GOODWIN, SCHROEDER and FARRIS, Circuit Judges.

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and local affiliates (IAMA), appeal the dismissal of their action for want of jurisdiction. IAMA sued to enjoin Alaska Airlines, Inc. (Alaska), from implementing a bid and rehire plan adopted after a strike. In support of a motion for a preliminary injunction, IAMA argues that Alaska's plan was a per se violation of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") 45 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq. Holding that the dispute was preempted by the exclusive jurisdiction of the Systems Board of Adjustment, the district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and sua sponte dismissed the case.

IAMA represents two separate divisions of Alaska Airlines employees. One division represents clerical, office and professional employees and the other division represents mechanics and employees in related occupations. The two divisions have had separate collective bargaining agreements with Alaska for a number of years. The bargaining agreements of the two divisions expire at different times.

In December 1983, the mechanics' agreement was opened for negotiations through procedures required by 45 U.S.C. Sec. 156 of the RLA. After extended negotiations mediated by the National Mediation Board, the mechanics and Alaska were unable to agree on a new contract. On March 4, 1985, the mechanics called a strike. The strike was ultimately resolved by a back-to-work agreement which applied only to the mechanics' division.

Throughout the strike, the collective bargaining agreement of the clerical, office and professional workers with Alaska contained a "no-strike" clause prohibiting those employees from striking for the duration of their contract. During the course of the mechanics' strike, however, approximately 95 clerical, office and professional workers honored the mechanics' picket lines. Alaska hired replacement workers to fill the positions vacated by sympathy strikers. At the conclusion of the mechanics' strike, Alaska refused to rehire the clerical, office and professional sympathy strikers and rejected their offers to return to work.

Instead, Alaska established a recall plan under which priority for new jobs was given to employees who were hired as replacements and to clerical, office and professional employees who crossed the picket lines. A number of sympathy strikers have been denied recall, or if recalled, have been placed in jobs of lower status than they held before the strike.

IAMA alleges that various features of Alaska's recall plan violate the RLA. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Alaska's (1) hiring of permanent replacements, (2) grant of superseniority status to replacements, and (3) refusal to provide relevant information relating to outstanding contractual grievances, all violate the RLA. Alaska's counterclaim asserts that the sympathy strikers violated the "no-strike" clause of the agreement and accordingly were properly discharged and replaced.

The district court, 639 F.Supp. 100 (Wash.1986) denied IAMA's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is an issue of law appropriate for de novo review. Lord Jim's v. N.L.R.B., 772 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.1985).

The district court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because IAMA's claims involved a "minor dispute" subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the System Board of Adjustment.

The RLA is made applicable to the airline industry by 45 U.S.C. Secs. 181-187. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 685-89, 83 S.Ct. 956, 958-60, 10 L.Ed.2d 67 (1983). Case law tends to classify disputes that arise between carriers and employee unions under the RLA as either "major" or "minor." International Ass'n of Machinists v. Aloha Airlines, 776 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir.1985) (citing Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-28, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1289-92, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945)). Major disputes concern statutory rights, such as the right to form collective bargaining agreements or to seek to secure new rights and incorporate them into future agreements. Aloha Airlines, 776 F.2d at 815. Federal courts have jurisdiction to decide major disputes. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northwest Airlines, 673 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir.1982). Minor disputes, on the other hand, "concern the interpretation or application of collective bargaining agreements, and are resolved through binding arbitration before the System Board of Adjustment." Aloha Airlines, 776 F.2d at 815. Federal courts do not have jurisdiction to resolve minor disputes. Id.

Because this case does not involve a dispute over the formation of a collective bargaining agreement or efforts to secure new rights, IAMA understandably contends that the dispute is neither major nor minor, but involves violations of Section 2 of the RLA. ¹ 45 U.S.C. Sec. 152. The union argues that a statutory claim is not within the scope of the mandatory scheme for resolutions through arbitration. It cites several cases holding that in certain limited circumstances federal courts have jurisdiction over disputes arising from RLA violations whether the disputes are characterized as major or minor. See Burke v. Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.1970). See also, Northwest Airlines, 673 F.2d 700 (3d Cir.1982); Conrad...