International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northwest Airlines

• Decision Date: 18 July 1962
• Docket Number: No. 16696.,16696.
• Citation: 304 F.2d 206
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, AFL-CIO, and its Northwest District Lodge No. 143, et al., Appellants, v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

304 F.2d 206 (1962)

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, AFL-CIO, and its Northwest District Lodge No. 143, et al., Appellants, v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Appellee.

No. 16696.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

June 19, 1962.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 1962.

Solly Robins of Robins, Davis & Lyons, St. Paul, Minn., for appellant.

Henry Halladay, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee; Bernard G. Heinzen and Dorsey, Owen, Barber, Marquart & Windhorst, Minneapolis, Minn., were with him on the brief.

Before SANBORN, VAN OOSTERHOUT and MATTHES, Circuit Judges.

VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judge.

Defendants have appealed from an order entered by the District Court on January 27, 1961, granting plaintiff a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from engaging in or inducing a strike or other concerted refusal on the part of plant maintenance mechanics and janitors to perform services at plaintiff's main base at Wold-Chamberlain Field in Hennepin County, Minnesota.

This appeal was originally submitted on February 28, 1961. Decision was deferred in the belief that the controversy between the parties might be settled through negotiation, adjustment or mediation.¹

By per curiam opinion filed on April 5, 1962, we set this case for reargument on May 7, 1962, and requested counsel to give us further information and assistance upon the following issues:

1. Whether a preliminary injunction is presently needed as an aid to enforce compliance with the adjustment procedure of the Railway Labor Act.

2. The steps taken to secure administrative relief and whether attempts to secure said relief are exhausted and whether an injunction may be granted in event the administrative remedies have not been exhausted.

3. Whether the injunction granted was too broad and was in excess of the jurisdiction and discretion of the court.

The plaintiff is an interstate and international common carrier by air, with its principal office and place of business at St. Paul, Minnesota. It is subject to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-188. The defendants are International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO (hereinafter called "IAM"), a labor union, its Northwest District Lodge No. 143, Arthur C. Pedersen, General Chairman of the Lodge, and Lowell J. Heinemann, its Assistant General Chairman, representatives of IAM and of the Plant Maintenance Mechanics and Janitors in the employ of the plaintiff.

IAM represents, for purposes of collective bargaining, various crafts or classes of plaintiff's employees, including Flight Engineers and Mechanics and Related Personnel. It deals with plaintiff through Northwest District Lodge No. 143. The plaintiff has a contract with its Flight Engineers and a separate contract with its Mechanics and Related Personnel, which include Boiler Operators and Janitors. Both contracts were negotiated by IAM through Northwest District Lodge No. 143. The latter contract is known as "the Mechanics' Agreement". The Mechanics' Agreement, in force at the time this action was commenced, January 18, 1961, contained a no-strike clause reading as follows (Article XXV, paragraph (k)):

"(k) It is understood and agreed that the Company will not lock out any employee covered hereby, and the Union will not authorize or take part in any strike or picketing of Company premises during the life of this Agreement until the procedures for settling disputes as provided herein and as provided by the Railway Labor Act have been exhausted."

The Agreement also provided (Article II, paragraph (b)):

"(b) The Union agrees all employees covered by this Agreement shall be governed by Company rules, regulations, and orders issued by properly designated authorities of the Company which are not in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, * * *."

The Agreement contained detailed machinery for the settlement of disputes arising out of grievances or the interpretation or application of the Agreement, with an ultimate appeal to a System Board of Adjustment.

The Flight Engineers employed by the plaintiff and represented by IAM and Northwest District Lodge No. 143 were in January 1961 on a strike against the plaintiff. It appears such strike grew out of a major labor dispute and that the strike occurred after the mediation remedies provided by the Air Carrier Amendments had been exhausted. The right of the Flight Engineers to strike is not here challenged.

Defendant Pedersen, ostensibly on behalf of the Flight Engineers in furtherance of their strike, on January 16, 1961, placed pickets at the plaintiff's facilities at Wold-Chamberlain Field. The picket line was maintained on a twenty-four hour basis, and was so placed that the Boiler Operators in coming to work would have to cross the picket line. There was no violence on the picket line.

While the Flight Engineers and the Boiler Operators had the same union representative, each group operated under a separate contract. The Flight Engineers' dispute was in no sense a problem of the Boiler Operators.

The Boiler Operators refused to cross the picket line. Such refusal left only one licensed supervisor at the base to operate the extensive heating equipment. Heat in January is essential to prevent substantial damage to plaintiff's plant and to keep water lines necessary for fire prevention from freezing. It was beyond the capabilities of the single supervisor to operate the heating equipment continuously. Defendants claim that the Boiler Operators' refusal to cross the Flight Engineers' picket line was based upon the individual decision of each employee. Plaintiff claims and the court found such refusal to be concerted action induced by the defendants. There is substantial evidence to support such finding. We do not regard this finding to be controlling, since 29 U.S. C.A. § 104 proscribes injunctive relief:

"* * * in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute * * * from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:

"(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment; * * *."

Defendants as a basis for reversal urge that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S. C.A. § 101 et seq., prohibits the District Court from exercising jurisdiction through the use of the injunctive process. The Norris-LaGuardia Act does strictly limit the jurisdiction of courts to grant injunctive relief in labor disputes. In Marine Cooks & Stewards, AFL v. Panama Steamship Co., Ltd., 362 U.S. 365, 369, 80 S.Ct. 779, 4 L.Ed.2d 797, the Supreme Court, in speaking of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, states:

"That Act\'s language is broad. The language is broad because Congress was intent upon taking the federal courts out of the labor injunction business except in the very limited circumstances left open for federal jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The history and background that led Congress to take this view have been adverted to in a number of prior opinions of this Court in which we refused to give the Act narrow interpretations that would have restored many labor dispute controversies to the courts."

To like effect see Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & North Western R. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 335, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 774.

Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 108 provides:

"No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration."

The question of whether the labor dispute here is minor or major may be of some significance in determining what administrative remedies are available.²

As pointed out in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-28, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886, substantial differences in procedures exist in the handling of major and minor disputes. Major disputes are to be settled only by processes of non-compulsory adjustment through mediation and conciliation. Major disputes result when there is disagreement in the bargaining process for a new contract, while a minor dispute arises over the interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation.

We agree with the trial court that the dispute here presented is a minor dispute. The contract interpretation issue presented is whether the Boiler Operators upon demand of their employers that they perform their duties are obligated under their existing contract to cross the picket line established by the Flight Engineers. The Boiler Operators are covered by the Mechanics and Related Personnel contract. Such contract contains a no-strike and no-lockout clause but does not deal specifically with the problem of whether the covered personnel are required to cross a picket line established in connection with a strike, not their own, in order to perform work.

The Railway Labor Act contemplates compulsory arbitration of minor disputes. That such is the case is clearly demonstrated by the opinion of the Supreme Court in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622. In that case the Supreme Court discusses the Railway Labor Act and its legislative history. The Court states, 353 U.S. at page 39, 77 S.Ct. at page 640;

"This record is convincing that there was general understanding between both the supporters and the opponents of the 1934 amendment that the provisions dealing with the Adjustment Board were to be considered as compulsory arbitration in this limited field. Our reading of the Act is therefore confirmed, not rebutted, by the legislative history."

In the case just cited the railroad, before seeking the injunction, had filed grievances with the Adjustment Board. The...