International Hodcarriers Local No. 1282 v. Cone-Huddleston, Inc.

• Citation: 406 S.W.2d 366,241 Ark. 140
• Decision Date: 03 October 1966
• Docket Number: INC,No. 5--3929,CONE-HUDDLESTO,5--3929
• Parties: , 63 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2291, 54 Lab.Cas. P 11,501 INTERNATIONAL HODCARRIERS LOCAL NO. 1282 et al., Appellants, v., Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas

Page 366

406 S.W.2d 366

241 Ark. 140, 63 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2291,

54 Lab.Cas. P 11,501

INTERNATIONAL HODCARRIERS LOCAL NO. 1282 et al., Appellants, v. CONE-HUDDLESTON, INC., Appellee.

No. 5--3929.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Oct. 3, 1966.

H. Clay Robinson, Little Rock, for appellants.

Lightle & Tedder, Searcy, for appellee.

BLAND, Justice.

The question to be determined by this appeal is whether the White County Chancery Court had jurisdiction to enter an injunction against appellant, or was original and exclusive jurisdiction in the National Labor Relations Board.

Appellee was a general contractor and had contracted to construct the White County Hospital at Searcy, Arkansas. The building of the hospital was to be financed by the sale of bonds in the amount of $600,000.00 by White County and matching Federal funds. After construction was commenced and on or about October 22, 1965 appellants demanded that appellee execute a contract negotiated between the Associated General Contractors, Arkansas Chapter, and appellants and pay the wage scale set out therein. The appellee refused to do this and on or about October 29, 1965 appellants established pickets on the project and construction ceased. The next day appellee obtained a temporary restraining order on the ground that the picketing was in violation of Arkansas' 'right-to-work law' (Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81--201 to 81--203 (Repl. 1960) and Amendment 34 of the Arkansas Constitution). Appellants filed a motion to dissolve the temporary order and the cause was heard on November 7, 1965. Under the evidence adduced at the hearing the chancellor found that the court had jurisdiction to grant an injunction to prevent a violation of the Arkansas 'right-to-work law' and against picketing to obtain an unlawful objective. The court further found that the purpose of the picketing was to coerce appellee to sign a union contract and to coerce its employees to join appellant's union. The temporary order was made permanent, however, the chancellor dissolved the restraining order allowing picketing as a means of informing the public that appellee was paying substandard wages. From this holding appellant has appealed.

It was stipulated that appellee had an inflow and/or outflow of materials or services in interstate commerce of $50,000.00, or more than sufficient to put it under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 601 (1957). Other testimony in the record is immaterial since the only issue is jurisdiction.

Appellants contend that the conduct in dispute and the parties are subject to the exclusive and primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and that the White County Chancery Court was thus without jurisdiction, relying on such authorities as Mitcham v. Ark-La Construction Co., 239 Ark. 1162, 397 S.W.2d 789, decided by this court on December 20, 1965; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, etc. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959); Local #438 Construction & General Laborers Union, AFL-CIO v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 83 S.Ct. 531, 9 L.Ed.2d 514 (1963).

In the Mitcham v. Ark-La Construction Co. case, supra, which was decided subsequent to the decree of the White County Chancery Court, we held that where the activity was arguably within the compass of § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the state courts were without jurisdiction to act. Citing San Diego Building Trades Council, etc. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959) and Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union #1264 v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 85 S.Ct. 876, 13 L.Ed.2d 789 (1965). In the case of Local #438, Construction & General Laborers Union, AFL-CIO v. Curry, supra, the employer brought an action in a Georgia State Court seeking an injunction against the union, alleging that the union was picketing for the purpose of coercing the employer into hiring only union labor in violation of the Georgia 'right-to-work' statute. The union argued that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction. On appeal the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding:

'* * * The allegations of the complaint, as well as the findings of the Georgia Supreme Court, made out at least an arguable violaion of § 8(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b). Consequently, the state court had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or to adjudicate this controversy, which lay within the exclusive powers of the National Labor Relations Board. * * * Nor...