International Investors Life Ins. Co., Inc. v. Utrecht

• Decision Date: 01 April 1976
• Docket Number: No. 18811,18811
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. Bettie P. UTRECHT and Candice A. Utrecht, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 397

536 S.W.2d 397

INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. Bettie P. UTRECHT and Candice A. Utrecht, Appellees.

No. 18811.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,

Dallas.

April 1, 1976.

Franklin H. Perry, Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons, Dallas, for appellant.

William M. Hayner, Flagg, Cooper, Hayner, Miller, Long & Owen, Dallas, for appellees.

AKIN, Justice.

The question presented is whether drowning is included within an accidental death benefit rider to an insurance policy excluding the following risks: 'Suffocation, strangulation, or smothering when such death occurs prior to the policy anniversary nearest the insured's fourth birthday.'

Plaintiffs Bettie and Candice Utrecht sued International Life Insurance Company for benefits under an accidental death rider to a life insurance policy on Alexander S. Utrecht, who drowned March 14, 1974, at age three years, five months. The death certificate stated that the death was by asphyxia, due to drowning. The defendant paid the face amount of $10,000 to plaintiffs on the basic policy but denied liability under the accidental death double indemnity rider. The defendant contended that drowning was a risk within the exclusion for 'suffocation, strangulation, or smothering' and, therefore, not covered by the rider. Plaintiffs argued that drowning is not synonymous with suffocation in the commonly understood meaning of the two words. Alternately, plaintiffs contend that the language in the exclusionary clause is ambiguous and, consequently, should be construed against the defendant who chose the words in the exclusionary clause. The trial court held this language ambiguous and, accordingly, rendered judgment against the insurance company, which appeals. We agree that this language is ambiguous and, accordingly, affirm the judgment.

A contract is ambiguous when application of rules of construction leaves it uncertain which of the two meanings is proper. Coker v. Travelers Insurance Co., 533 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas, 1976); Wynnewood State Bank v. Embrey, 451 S.W.2d 930 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law for the court's determination. Brown v. Payne, 142 Tex. 102, 176 S.W.2d 306 (1943).

The pertinent language of the accidental death benefit rider is as follows:

For purposes of this agreement accidental death shall mean death which (a) results directly and independently of all other causes from accidental bodily injury, (b) occurs within 90 days after the date such injury was sustained, and (c) is not a direct or indirect result of one or more of the following causes, Which are risks not assumed:

(8) Suffocation, strangulation, or smothering when suchdeath occurs prior to the Policy anniversary nearest the Insured's fourth birthday. (Emphasis added.)

Defendant resorts to the dictionary to support its contention that drowning was excluded. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2520 (2d ed. 1941) defines 'suffocate' as: 'To kill by stopping respiration, as by strangling or asphyxiation . . . To compress so as to impede or prevent respiration . . . To extinguish or destroy by, or as by, deprivation of air.' The word 'drown' defined in this dictionary is: 'To be Suffocated in water or other liquid; to sink and perish in water.' (Emphasis added.) Thus, as defendant argues, since the insured drowned and because drowning is defined as 'suffocated in water,' it could reasonably be included within the definition of suffocation. Consequently, defendant contends that drowning is an excluded risk. Defendant further argues that the words 'strangulation and smothering,' although used in conjunction with the word 'suffocation,' are mere surplusage since they are included within the definition of suffocation.

On the other hand, plaintiff contends that the average person does not understand 'suffocation' to include 'drowning,' and that the exclusion should be interpreted in accordance with this more popular interpretation under the rule that insurance contracts should be construed most favorably to the insured.

We agree with plaintiff that the exclusion is ambiguous and, regardless of medical technicalities, to the average person 'suffocation' does not include 'drowning.' Cf. De La Cruz v. Combined American Insurance Co., 527 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 'Drowning' connotes something more than exhaustion of the oxygen supply. It means death resulting from inhalation of water or some other fluid into the lungs. 'Suffocation,' on the other hand, is ordinarilly understood to mean death resulting from exhaustion of the supply of breathable air in an enclosed space. In our opinion, the ordinary person purchasing such an insurance policy would not think of absence of oxygen in the lungs as the immediate physiological cause of death, but rather...