International Ladies' G. W. L. U., Etc. v. Dorothy F. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 June 1936
• Docket Number: No. 10046.,10046.
• Citation: 95 S.W.2d 1346
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 123 et al. v. DOROTHY FROCKS CO.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

95 S.W.2d 1346

INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 123 et al. v. DOROTHY FROCKS CO.

No. 10046.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

June 11, 1936.

Rehearing Denied July 15, 1936.

Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; S. G. Tayloe, Judge.

Suit by the Dorothy Frocks Company against the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Local Union No. 123, and others. From a judgment granting a temporary injunction, the defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Leonard Brown and Maxwell Burket, both of San Antonio, and Robert Lee Guthrie, of Dallas, for appellants.

Sylvan Lang and Morris Wise, both of San Antonio, for appellee.

BOBBITT, Justice.

This suit grows out of a labor dispute between Dorothy Frocks Company, a corporation of San Antonio, Tex., appellee here, and a majority of its employees, who are members of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Local Union No. 123, and others, appellants in this appeal.

On the 6th day of May, 1936, 54 out of 68 total employees of appellee corporation, a manufacturer of ladies' dresses, went out on strike, and among other things began picketing appellee company and to carry placards, accusing the company of unfair labor practices. On May 11, thereafter, appellee applied to and obtained from the judge of the Forty-Fifth district court of Bexar county, Tex., a temporary restraining order against the said local union and members thereof, enjoining them from injuring the property of appellee. On May 13, thereafter, the same court granted a temporary injunction against appellants; the order therein providing substantially as follows:

Appellants were enjoined from (1) injuring the property of appellee or the operation of its business in any manner; (2) injuring any of the officers, agents, or employees of appellee, and from threatening to inflict and attempting to inflict any of said injuries; (3) assembling, congregating, or remaining at or near the place of business of appellee company; (4) establishing pickets at or near appellee's place of business, except and subject to the following limitations and exceptions:

Appellants were permitted to have (a) only three representatives or pickets at appellee's place of business; (b) such pickets or representatives are not permitted to carry banners or placards; (c) one of said pickets is permitted to be placed on the outside and near each of the three entrances of appellee's place of business; (d) said pickets are permitted to peaceably and quietly enter into conversation with any of appellee's employees, but such conversations are to be conducted without threats or any manner of intimidation; (e) the names of each such pickets must be furnished to appellee company for the day that they are assigned for duty, and not more than three persons shall be assigned for picket service for any one day; (f) such pickets are authorized to induce, by peaceable and lawful means, any person to refuse to accept employment with appellee; and to induce and attempt to induce any employee of appellee to quit or discontinue such employment.

Such injunction order further provides that any person conducting picket duty, as above stipulated, is recognized as possessing the lawful right to perform the acts as authorized, by peaceable and lawful means; and in like manner, such legal right is thereby recognized on the part of each of the persons subject to the order, who may not be active on picket duty, provided such right is exercised at places other than at or near appellee's premises.

It is from such injunction and order that both appellants and appellees have perfected appeals to this court; each having filed an appeal bond and each presenting assignments and propositions complaining of the action of the trial court, as will be hereinafter discussed.

The injunction order is temporary only. The case has not been developed or tried on its merits. No findings of facts were requested by the parties or filed by the court. The trial court heard testimony from both parties before the order was entered. Many witnesses appeared for each of the parties, and the testimony is conflicting and disputed on most of the issues raised by the pleadings. The petition, filed and sworn to by appellee asking for the injunction, was denied under oath by appellants.

The court below was called upon to act in an emergency, without time or opportunity to hear the parties at length on the merits of the case. It is undisputed that prior to the entry of the injunction order there were fights, riots, and other serious difficulties between union and nonunion employees of the appellee company, and that the manager of appellee participated in or was involved in such fights and riots. Several persons were arrested. The police were often called and required in large numbers at appellee's place of business to protect lives and property. It is clear that not only were workers and strikers injured in the riots and fights, but that in some instances the police themselves were assaulted at and around the manufacturing plant of appellee.

Without regard to the origin of or responsibility for the differences between the parties, it was the duty of the court, pending a determination of the case on its merits, to preserve, as far as possible, the rights of all parties. Furthermore, it was the duty of the court to take such action and enter such orders, as under the particular facts and circumstances were necessary and proper, to protect life and property at and around the premises owned by appellee and where appellants were employed, both as to the litigants as well as others whose rights are shown by the record to have been transgressed.

We have carefully reviewed the record as presented, and it seems clear that the trial judge, through the entry of the temporary order herein, has undertaken to preserve the rights of all the parties pending the trial of the case on its merits. The question of whether he should grant any relief herein, as well as the form and extent of any such temporary emergency order, was necessarily addressed to his sound judgment and discretion, to be exercised under the law and the particular facts, necessities, dangers, and circumstances as they existed and were presented. Clearly, his action should not be disturbed by this court, unless he has abused that discretion. We do not find such to be the case. The trial judge heard all the evidence as submitted. He saw and heard the witnesses as they testified. The issues were strongly disputed and the testimony conflicting.

Appellants contend that the trial court abused his discretion in granting the injunction in the first place, and in restricting the actions of appellants in respect to picketing and in the carrying of placards giving expression to their views and contentions against their employer. We find it our duty to overrule appellants' assignment in all such respects, and to hold that under the record and the peculiar facts of this case, and the grave emergency existing, no abuse of discretion has been shown.

Appellee also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant an injunction against appellants completely preventing any picketing; and by cross-assignments of error ask this court to issue its order to that effect; this, as contended by appellee, on the ground that the strike was called and is prosecuted for an unlawful or...