International Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders

• Citation: 14 So. 148,32 Fla. 434
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL OCEAN TEL. CO. v. SAUNDERS.
• Decision Date: 28 November 1893
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

14 So. 148

32 Fla. 434

INTERNATIONAL OCEAN TEL. CO. v. SAUNDERS.

Florida Supreme Court

November 28, 1893

Appeal from circuit court, Brevard county; John D. Broome, Judge.

Action by Charles Saunders against the International Ocean Telegraph Company. Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. In an action sounding in tort, but for compensative damages for the breach of a contract by a telegraph company to promptly send or deliver a telegraphic message, mental pain and suffering is not an element of damage, for which a recovery can be had; and, where the failure of a telegraph company to promptly send or deliver a telegram according to its contract results in no other damage than mental pain and suffering the only recovery that can be had would be nominal damages or, at most, the price paid for the transmission of the message. Mabry, J., dissenting.

2. The person to whom a telegram is sent can maintain an action for whatever legal damage results to him from the negligence of the company in its transmission or delivery, where the message shows that he is interested in it, or that it is for his benefit, or that damage will result to him from such negligence.

COUNSEL John E. Hartridge and Jones & Atkinson, for appellant.

D. L Gaulden, for appellee.

OPINION

TAYLOR J.

The appellee sued the appellant, in case, for its alleged negligence in not promptly delivering to him a telegram transmitted over its line. The plaintiff recovered judgment for $1,200, and from such judgment the defendant company appeals.

The declaration is as follows:

'The plaintiff, Charles Saunders, by D. L. Gaulden, his attorney, sues the International Ocean Telegraph Company, for that, whereas the defendant, on the 4th day of October, A. D. 1890, was possessed of, and using, and operating a certain telegraph line extending from the city of Jacksonville, Duval county, state of Florida, to the town of Titusville, Brevard county, state of Florida. That said two places are distant from each other about 160 miles, and are connected by direct line of said defendant telegraph company and the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway. That plaintiff's wife, Alice J. Saunders, on the said 4th day of October, 1890, was seized with a mortal malady in the said city of Jacksonville, and that about the hour of seven o'clock on the morning of October 4, 1890, the superintendent of St. Luke's Hospital presented to the defendant the following message, to wit:

"Jacksonville, Fla., Oct. 4th, 1890. Charles Saunders, Titusville: Wife dying. Come at once, or send wishes by wire. [Signed] Superintendent St. Luke's Hospital.'

'That said message was accepted by the defendant for immediate transmission and delivery to him at Titusville at the full-rate charges or toll, and that through the gross, wanton, and reckless negligence of defendant, and in palpable violation of its duty, the message was held by the defendant, and not delivered to him, until about the hour of half-past nine o'clock on the night of the 6th day of October, A. D. 1890. That said message was received at said Titusville office on the morning of the 4th day of October, 1890, at half-past eight o'clock, but was not delivered to him for over sixty hours after the same was received at the Titusville office. That his said wife died in the city of Jacksonville on the 6th day of October, 1890, and hence said message was not delivered to him, or received by him, until ten and a half hours after his said wife's death. That there was only one train leaving Titusville each day, at the hour of nine o'clock A. M., for the city of Jacksonville, which said train arrived in Jacksonville at the hour of half past six o'clock P. M. That, had said message been delivered promptly, he could have arrived in Jacksonville on Saturday night, October 4, 1890. That, by reason of this negligence and breach of duty on the part of the defendant, he was prevented from telegraphing to said superintendent his wishes, and was prevented from attending his dying wife, and ministering to her in her last hours, and also from making desired preparations for her interment. That said message was sent by the superintendent of St. Luke's Hospital, and he paid defendant full rates or toll therefor, to wit, the sum of forty cents, at the Titusville office, and as said defendant failed to deliver said message promptly, and notified the said superintendent of St. Luke's Hospital that said message had not been delivered, and collected the sum of forty cents charges on said message, which said forty cents was charged to plaintiff by said superintendent, and which he had to pay, thereby entailing a loss of forty cents on this plaintiff. By reason of which said defaults, wrong, and negligence on the said defendant's part, plaintiff incurred a loss and damage of the said forty cents paid as aforesaid on account of the charges made and collected from said superintendent of St. Luke's Hospital, which plaintiff had to pay as a legitimate charge against him. And, besides this, the plaintiff suffered great damage by reason of said wrong and injury so done by the defendant to his affections and feelings; and the plaintiff then and there suffered great damage, in anguish and pain of mind, by reason of the said negligence and wrong so done him by defendant. That while his said wife was dying she was deprived of that care, attention, consideration, and consolation which she would have received but for said negligence of said defendant in failing to deliver said message promptly as aforesaid, and that by reason thereof he was damaged, in that he suffered great mortification, anguish, and pain of mind, and injury to his feelings and affections, in not being able to be with his said wife in her dying hours, and in not being able to make preparations for his wife's funeral and interment, all of which damaged plaintiff in the sum of $1,995,' etc.

At plaintiff's request the following instruction was given to the jury: 'If, from the evidence, you believe that the superintendent of St. Luke's Hospital sent the following message to the plaintiff: 'Wife dying. Come at once, or send wishes by wife,'--and said message was accepted by the defendant for transmission, and the toll or charges on same was paid to defendant, and this message was negligently delayed in delivery by defendant company, whereby plaintiff, Saunders, was prevented from attending his dying wife, and from making desired preparations for her funeral, the plaintiff, Saunders, would be entitled to recover for the wrong and injury done his feelings, and for the mental anguish and pain of mind suffered by him; and in making up your verdict you must take into consideration all the testimony, and fix his damages, if any, at such amount as you think, from the evidence, is just, reasonable, proper, and fair.' To this charge, exception was taken, and the error assigned thereon presents the real issue involved in the cause: Can an action be sustained, and can damages be admeasured, for the breach of a contract that results in mental suffering alone, without any accompanying physical injury or suffering, and without any concomitant damage to the person, character, reputation, or property?

The supreme court of Texas, in So Relle v. Telegraph Co., (decided in 1881,) 55 Tex. 308, a case in which the telegraph company negligently failed to promptly deliver a telegram informing plaintiff of the death of his mother, and summoning him to meet a conveyance at a certain point that night that would carry him to where the remains of his mother were, in time to attend the funeral, first led off with an affimative answer to the question. The court in that case asserts that it is the settled rule of law in that state that injury to the feelings, caused by the willful neglect or fault of another, constitutes such actual damages, for which a recovery may be had, and cites as authority for such assertion the cases of Hays v. Railroad Co., 46 Tex 279, and Railroad Co. v. Randall, 50 Tex. 261. In neither of these cases is the doctrine either settled or asserted that injury to the feelings, or mental suffering, alone, can be made the subject of a suit for compensative damages. The Case of Hays, supra, was against a railroad company for damages for wrongfully and forcibly ejecting the plaintiff from its passenger train in the presence of his wife and family, in which it was claimed that the ejectment was done in a rude and insulting manner, and by personal violence, resulting in injuries to plaintiff's clothing and bruises to his person. Exemplary or punitive damages were claimed, and the jury were instructed to estimate the actual damages by the 'injuries sustained by the plaintiff in his person, his estate, and his feelings,' and it was held that by this charge the subject of the amount of actual damages was fairly placed before the jury. But nowhere is it asserted that mental suffering alone can be made an independent basis for admeasuring damages. The case, like many others founded on tort that might be cited, simply holds that mental suffering or injured feelings may be taken into consideration as an element of damage, when coupled with or accompanied by substantive injury to the person or estate, upon the ground, as stated in the authorities, that in such cases the mental suffering growing out of and produced by the physical injury is so interwoven with the latter that it is impossible to consider the one without contemplating the other. City of Salina v. Trosper, 27 Kan. 544; Mulford v. Clewell, 21 Ohio St. 191; Canning v. Williamstown, 1 Cush. 451; Railroad Co. v. Stables, 62 Ill. 313; Johnson v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 6 Nev. 224; Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 9...