International Paper Co. v. State

• Decision Date: 26 December 1968
• Citation: 248 A.2d 749
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY et al. v. STATE of Maine.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 749

248 A.2d 749

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY et al. v. STATE of Maine.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 26, 1968.

Pierce, Atwood, Scribner, Allen & McKusick, by Ralph I. Lancaster, Jr., Portland, for plaintiffs.

Paul G. Creteau, Maine State Highway Commission, Augusta, for defendant.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, MARDEN and DUFRESNE, JJ.

WEBBER, Justice.

The State Highway Commission condemned approximately 746 acres of plaintiffs' land for highway purposes. The highway as constructed passed through and divided the township owned by plaintiffs and comprising 23,538 acres of timberland. It is not disputed on appeal that the highway is of the non-access type where it abuts land of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs therefore claim the value of the property actually taken plus severance damage as to the rest. Defendant's appeal is from a jury verdict awarding plaintiffs the sum of $65,000.

The statement of points on appeal, not abandoned, raise the following issues for determination:

1. Whether the Court erred in permitting Morris Wing to testify in regard to market value and damages, and in refusing to strike his testimony.

Mr. Wing is the 'Regional Manager of Woodlands' for plaintiff International Paper Company with responsibility for the supervision of more than a million acres of timberland in three states. He was permitted over objection to express his opinion with respect to the fair market value of the entire tract before and after the taking. In the course of a careful examination, both direct and cross, he displayed qualifications derived from training and experience that would enable him to form an expert opinion with respect to the value of timberlands. He was intimately acquainted with the land in question and was familiar with the market for timberlands in Maine and with comparable sales of large timberland properties. His capacity as an expert witness was not unlike that of the shareholder of plaintiff corporation in F. X. Bilodeau Realty, Inc. v. Lewiston Urban Renew. Authority (1968) 237 A.2d 398 (Me.), and that of the president of the plaintiff corporation in Knox Lime Company v. Maine State Highway Comm. (1967) 230 A.2d 814, 827 (Me.). In each of these cases the witness satisfied the requirements of special knowledge and experience entirely apart from his capacity as owner or officer of the claimant company. The determination of admissibility is within the sound discretion of the presiding Justice and on the basis of the qualification evidence here presented there was no abuse of that discretion. The weight to be given to the opinion of the expert witness is for the jury, and this jury was so instructed.

The motion to strike all of Mr. Wing's testimony made at the close thereof was predicated on his use of a stumpage 'inventory' maintained by International. Since the same issue is raised with respect to the testimony of witness Richard Sawyer, discussion of the point is deferred. Suffice it to say that the value placed by Mr. Wing on stumpage was only one factor used by him in his determination of the fair market value of plaintiffs' land.

2. Whether the Court erred in allowing Richard Sawyer to testify in regard to market value and damages and in refusing to strike his testimony.

Mr. Sawyer's qualifications as an appraiser of timberlands and as an expert witness with respect to their fair market value are not challenged. What is asserted here by the State is that the witness improperly relied on hearsay information in forming his opinion and that he erroneously employed what the State describes as a 'multiplication method' to arrive at the fair market value of the land.

The evidence discloses that although he did not 'cruise' the area, he spent one day and part of another inspecting it; that he had available and made use of the right-of-way plans of the taking area, aerial photographs, forest growth type maps, and U.S. Geodetic Survey topographical maps; and that he had a cruise made of the 'taking area' for his use. He was familiar with the market for timber in the area and obtained information from buyers and sellers with respect to comparable sales. The State's primary attack on his testimony stems from his use of International's stumpage 'inventory' to which we have already referred. This 'inventory' began with a cruise of the area made by employees of the 'forest engineer department' of International in 1949. The cruise information was checked against aerial photographs made annually and the remeasuring of plots every five years. The amount of cut was scaled on the ground year by year. By estimating growth and subtracting the cut, International was able to maintain a current 'inventory' of both growing and merchantable stumpage. The witness, having determined from an examination of the market that there is an identifiable relationship between the value of the standing timber on timberland and the fair market value of the land as enhanced by the timber, used the 'inventory' as one factor in arriving at fair market value of the land. Although the 'inventory' information was hearsay and not itself admissible on direct examination in proof of value, it was a proper matter for consideration by the expert in forming his own opinion of market value of the land.

In Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority (1967) 235 A.2d 295, 300 (Me.) we said:

'The opinion of an expert is not necessarily rendered inadmissible or incompetent because it may be based on knowledge of facts gained from hearsay sources. Any expert worthy of the name must of necessity assimilate prior learning derived from the experiences of others. As an expert witness he draws upon various sources of information whose credibility or trustworthiness he must determine in the light of his expertness. It would completely frustrate the use of expert witnesses if they were obliged to substantiate each single factor upon which their ultimate opinion must depend upon firsthand personal knowledge or personal experience. If some of the expert's factual information is derived from sources fairly trustworthy though hearsay and he has as such the ability to coordinate and evaluate that information with all the other facts in his possession secured through personal observation, the trial court may in the exercise of a sound discretion permit the expert's ultimate opinion to be considered by the jury.' (Emphasis supplied)

So also we said in Knox Lime Company, supra at page 827 of 230 A.2d, 'While as we have said, a valuation based upon a multiplication of these elements is so speculative that it must be rejected, such facts themselves may be considered by the knowledgeable expert and by the court and jury, as may any advantageous or disadvantageous situations as to production...