International Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers Intern. Union

• Decision Date: 13 December 1988
• Citation: 551 A.2d 1356
• Parties: 115 Lab.Cas. P 56,258 INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY v. UNITED PAPERWORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1356

551 A.2d 1356

115 Lab.Cas. P 56,258

INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY v. UNITED PAPERWORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 6, 1988.

Decided Dec. 13, 1988.

S. Mason Pratt, Jr. (orally), James R. Erwin, Pierce, Atwood, Scribner, Allen, Smith & Lancaster, Portland, for plaintiff.

Patrick N. McTeague (orally), McTeague, Higbee, Libner, Reitman, Macadam & Case, Topsham, for defendants.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD and HORNBY, JJ.

CLIFFORD, Justice.

Defendants, United Paperworkers International Union (UPIU), Local 14 of the UPIU, Local 246 of the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers (IBF & O) (hereinafter collectively the "Unions") and union members Alan Farrington and Arthur Storer, appeal from an amended order of the Superior Court (Franklin County; Brody, C.J.), finding them in civil contempt for violating the court's preliminary injunction that prohibited certain conduct during a labor dispute with plaintiff, International Paper Company (IP). The Unions were fined $10,000 and the individual union members were given an opportunity to purge themselves of contempt by complying with the preliminary injunction and order. IP cross-appeals from the order of the Superior Court finding IP in contempt for violating the preliminary injunction. We reject IP's argument that the defendants' appeal is barred by the final judgment rule, and that our authority to review the proceedings below is otherwise limited by 14 M.R.S.A. § 252 (Supp.1987) to questions of jurisdiction. We conclude that the Unions' appeal of the order imposing the $10,000 fine already paid to IP and distributed to third parties is moot, we vacate the Storer adjudication, and affirm the order below in all other respects.

On June 16, 1987, the UPIU and IBF & O went on strike at IP's Androscoggin paper mill (hereinafter "Mill") in Jay. ¹ The strikers set up picket lines around the Mill and IP soon began hiring replacement workers. On June 29, 1987, the Superior Court granted IP's request for a temporary restraining order against the Unions and their members, enjoining conduct that interfered with free passage to and from the Mill, and enjoining other unlawful conduct in connection with the strike. The Superior Court later issued a preliminary injunction that prohibited, inter alia, the Unions and their members from blocking traffic on access roads to the Mill, establishing more than a specified number of pickets at entrances to the Mill, carrying firearms in the vicinity of the Mill and assaulting, threatening, following or otherwise harassing employees, prospective employees, customers, suppliers and others wishing to do business with IP. The preliminary injunction also prohibited IP, its employees and prospective employees from threatening, assaulting or harassing the defendants in connection with their strike activities, carrying firearms in the vicinity of the Mill and driving in a dangerous manner through any entrance to the Mill.

As the strike entered its second month and as tensions between IP and the Unions mounted, IP filed a verified complaint, later amended, seeking orders of civil contempt against the Unions, ² two union officers and several individual union members. IP also applied for an order to show cause for civil and criminal contempt against the same entities and individuals. The Unions also sought civil contempt and criminal contempt orders and supplemental relief against IP and various IP employees. No order to show cause or notice of any kind under M.R.Crim.P. 42 was issued by the court for criminal contempt.

After a hearing on the requests for civil contempt orders, the Superior Court issued an order in November of 1987 with respect to the civil contempt charges against IP, the IP employees, the Unions and certain union members. ³ The complaints against the IP employees were either voluntarily dismissed by the Unions or were found by the court to be without sufficient merit to justify a finding of contempt. The court found IP in civil contempt for several "relatively minor" violations of the court's preliminary injunction and ordered IP to inform employees and prospective employees of the requirements of the injunction and to advise its employees that the company would not tolerate any violations of the injunction.

The court, in its amended order, found the UPIU, Local 14 of the UPIU, Local 246 of the IBF & O, and four individual union members, including Farrington and Storer, in civil contempt of the preliminary injunction. The individuals were provided with the opportunity to purge themselves of contempt by complying with the injunction and order. The allegations of civil contempt against the remaining individually-named union members, with one exception, a case separated at trial, were dismissed, and no findings were made or sanctions imposed against the IBF & O. The hearing justice ordered the Unions to "discourage their members from the types of [strike-related] confrontations which have occurred in the past" and fined the Unions $10,000, ordering the money to be paid directly to IP for distribution as restitution to third-party victims of strike-related property damage. The Unions, without seeking a stay of the fine, paid the $10,000 fine to IP and ultimately agreed to a payment schedule prepared by IP for payment of the money to third parties. The hearing justice denied the Unions' motion for a new hearing. The Unions, Farrington and Storer appealed and IP later cross-appealed.

I.

IP argues that the order finding IP and the Unions in civil contempt does not amount to a final judgment because it does not resolve or dispose of the criminal contempt charges arising out of the same series of events that led to the civil contempt findings. ⁴ The final judgment rule applies to orders issued as a result of contempt proceedings, see Planning Bd. v. Michaud, 435 A.2d 742, 743 (Me.1981), and we conclude that the order appealed from here constitutes a final judgment.

In order for an appeal to be cognizable, it must be from a final judgment and not be interlocutory. In re Erica B., 520 A.2d 342, 343 (Me.1987). See 2 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 173.5, at 490-91 (2d ed. 1970). An appeal is final, as opposed to interlocutory, when "1) the trial court's action fully decides and disposes of the whole matter leaving nothing further for the consideration and judgment of the trial court, and 2) no subsequent proceedings in the case will render the appellate court's decision immaterial." Erica B., 520 A.2d at 343-44; Allen v. Cole Realty, Inc., 325 A.2d 19, 21 (Me.1974).

Although civil and criminal contempt orders were sought by IP, the proceedings for civil and criminal contempt are fundamentally different. A civil contempt proceeding is a remedial action brought to benefit another party. Wells v. State, 474 A.2d 846, 850 (Me.1984). An essential element of the civil contempt order is the opportunity to purge oneself of contempt by satisfying the court order or judgment not complied with previously. Id.; Meyer v. Meyer, 414 A.2d 236, 239 (Me.1980).

The purpose of criminal contempt, in contrast, is to punish an affront to the dignity and authority of the court. The sanctions arising from criminal contempt are determinate and there is no right to purge. Wells, 474 A.2d at 851. In addition, in criminal contempt proceedings, there are constitutional implications not present in civil contempt proceedings. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201-02, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1481-82, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968); 2 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 42.5, at 42-8--42-10 (1987); Comment, Criminal Contempt in Maine: Constitutionally Protected or Neglected? 34 Me.L.Rev. 407 (1982).

The procedure for criminal contempt is governed by M.R.Crim.P. 42. Prosecution for criminal contempt cannot commence without the court issuing the required notice. A party litigant may only request that criminal contempt proceedings be initiated. Except for conduct occurring in the presence of the court, governed by M.R.Crim.P. 42(a), a criminal contempt proceeding is initiated by the court giving the proper notice, either orally in open court, or by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. M.R.Crim.P. 42(b). ⁵ No such notice was given here, and no criminal contempt proceeding was initiated, and none remains pending for imminent decision. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that initiation of a criminal contempt proceeding is contemplated or at all likely. Nothing remains pending in the Superior Court except a remote possibility that a criminal contempt proceeding, different in standard of proof, procedural safeguards and available sanctions, may be initiated. Even if the court should subsequently initiate a criminal contempt proceeding, because of the different standard of proof required for criminal contempt, our decision in the instant appeal will not be rendered immaterial. Erica B., 520 A.2d at 344. To deny the individual defendants their right to appeal the civil contempt orders because the trial court did not initiate criminal contempt proceedings would be to apply inappropriately the final judgment rule to deny defendants their right to appeal the adjudication of civil contempt.

II.

IP further contends that our review of the Superior Court order is restricted by 14 M.R.S.A. § 252 (Supp.1987) to the limited question of jurisdiction. ⁶ Because the apparent restriction on our appellate jurisdiction in section 252 is inconsistent with the Law Court's comprehensive appellate jurisdiction as set out in the statutes, and with the rules of procedure governing civil appeals, we conclude that our review of appeals in civil contempt matters is not so limited.

4 M.R.S.A. § 57 (Supp.1988) grants to the Law Court jurisdiction to hear cases such as the instant case, and we have described that jurisdiction as "comprehensive and unrestricted." Dow v....