Interstate Iron & Steel Co. v. City of East Chicago
| Decision Date | 12 March 1918 |
| Docket Number | No. 23002.,23002. |
| Citation | 187 Ind. 506,118 N.E. 958 |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | INTERSTATE IRON & STEEL CO. v. CITY OF EAST CHICAGO et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Porter County; H. H. Loring, Judge.
Suit by the Interstate Iron & Steel Company against the City of East Chicago and others. From a judgment of the City on its cross-complaint, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
William J. Whinery, of Hammond, and John D. Kennedy, of East Chicago, Ind., for appellant. B. D. L. Glazebrook, of Indiana Harbor, N. A. Hembroff and A. Ottenheimer, both of East Chicago, Ind., and Lincoln V. Cravens, of Hammond, for appellees.
Appellant sought to quiet its title to real estate against an easement for a public street. Appellee city of East Chicago filed a cross-complaint to quite title to the easement. The Lake county council, the board of commissioner, and the Hammond, Whiting & East Chicago Railway Company are also appellees, and all answered except the railway company, which was defaulted. Trial by jury, verdict for city of East Chicago on its cross-complaint, and judgment quieting title to the easement.
[1] Answers were general denial and several paragraphs of special answer. Much space is used in the briefs on both sides in discussing rulings on demurrers to these special answers. Inasmuch as the cause was tried and the evidence is here, it does not matter how the court ruled on these demurrers or whether it ruled at all. It has been the law of this state for at least 75 years that in quite title suits all defenses are admissible under general denial. Therefore the questions discussed in this case must arise, if at all, on motion for new trial. Hence we shall examine such questions as are properly presented by this motion.
On August 11, 1908, the East Chicago Company the then owner of the land in question, presented to the common council of East Chicago officers. It was approved August 13, 1908, and duly recorded on August 13, 1908. This plat represented a strip of ground named 141st street, running east and west across the land in question. Previous to this, on August 7, 1908, the East Chicago Company deeded to the public for street purposes the same strip of ground, which deed was accepted by the common council of the city of East Chicago, and was recorded August 13, 1908. Afterwards, on September 3, 1908, March 27, 1909, and June 30, 1909, the East Chicago Company deeded to appellant the land over which the easement in question runs.
In the year 1912 the board of public works of the city of East Chicago, desiring to open the street in question, condemned a strip of appellant's ground adjacent to 141st street, to make it uniform in width, and awarded appellant $1,200 damages. Appellant appealed to the superior court, and was awarded $900 more. The city paid to the clerk of the court $2,100, together with interest and costs.
[2] Appellant objects to the plat because it represents 141st street and parts of cross streets and nothing more except the tract of land, and cites cases concerning annexations of platted and unplatted land adjacent to cities and towns. This wholly aside from the question. The land was not being annexed, but was a part of the city of East Chicago. This was a plat of 141st street within the meaning of section 8900, Burns 1914.
[3] Appellant also subjects to the deed and the plat for the reason that it is not shown that the officers of the East Chicago Company had authority to execute them. Acts done by a corporation which presuppose the existence of other acts to make them legally operative are presumptive proofs of the latter. It would be a harsh and inconvenient rule to hold otherwise. Section 725 (6th Ed.) Cook's Corporations; U. S. Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, L. Ed. 552; 10 Cyc. 1003. If appellant's last contention were to prevail, it proved no title to the land in question, for its deeds from the East Chicago Company are subject to this contended infirmity.
[4] It is also insisted appellant that the approval of the plat by the common council of the city of East Chicago is not an acceptance of the 141st street designated thereon. Under sections 8900 and 8901, Burns 1914, the proprietor who plats a street and acknowledges the plat and has it approved and recorded grants to the municipality, in...
To continue reading
Request your trial