Interstate Stock-Yards Co. v. Indianapolis U. Ry. Co.

Decision Date27 January 1900
Docket Number9,789.
Citation99 F. 472
PartiesINTERSTATE STOCK-YARDS CO. v. INDIANAPOLIS U. RY. CO. et al.
CourtUnited States Circuit Court, District of Indiana

Ferdinand Winter, for complainant.

Baker &amp Daniels, Morris, Newberger & Curtis, W. A. Ketcham, John B Cockrum, Miller, Elam & Fesler, John G. Williams, Samuel O Pickens, and E. C. Field, for defendants.

BAKER District Judge.

This is a suit by the Interstate Stock-Yards Company against the Indianapolis Union Railway Company, the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, the Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, the Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Railway Company, the Cincinnati, Hamilton & Indianapolis Railroad Company, the Lake Erie & Railway Company, the Indiana, Decatur & Western Railway Company, the Peoria & Eastern Railway Company, and Volney T. Malott, as receiver of the Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad Company, charging each with unlawful discrimination against the complainant in the transportation of interstate commerce by refusing to deliver at its switch live stock in car-load lots consigned to it from other states for delivery at its stock yards in the city of Indianapolis, and to receive for shipment live stock in car-load lots to be transported and delivered to consignees in other states than the state of Indiana. On the filing and presentation of the bill of complainant duly verified, a temporary restraining order was entered, enjoining such alleged discrimination until the further order of the court, and a day was fixed for hearing the complainant's application to enter an order of injunction for the like purpose, to continue in force until the final determination of the suit. This application has been heard on the verified bill of complaint, the verified answers of certain of the defendants, and on numerous affidavits filed by the respective parties. The application, broadly stated, presents only two questions: First. Is the cause of action exhibited in the bill of complaint within the jurisdiction of this court? Second. Under the facts and law of the case, is it shown that the unlawful discrimination complained of exists or is threatened?

The defendants claim that the Indianapolis Union Railway Company, if not an absolutely indispensable party, is at least a necessary party, and, being within the jurisdiction of the court, must be made a party; and because it is a corporation created under the laws of the state of Indiana, and its railroad is located and operated exclusively within the county of Marion, in this state, that it is not engaged in interstate commerce, within the true construction of the interstate commerce act, and is, therefore, subject only to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state for the redress of the grievances complained of. All the parties defendant except the Union Railway Company are confessedly common carriers of interstate commerce, and no question is made but that this court has jurisdiction over them, unless such jurisdiction is ousted because the Union Railway Company is a necessary or indispensable party over which the court has no jurisdiction because it is not engaged in interstate business. If the Indianapolis Union Railway Company is a necessary party, without the presence of which a decree cannot be rendered against the other defendants without prejudice to their substantial rights, then it would be the duty of the court to dissolve the restraining order, to overrule the application for a temporary injunction, and to dismiss the bill. The Indianapolis Union Railway Company is a corporation organized under an act of the general assembly of the state of Indiana for the incorporation of union railway companies approved March 2, 1885, and as such it has constructed, and now owns in the city of Indianapolis a system of railways, side tracks, and switches connected in or near said city with the above-named railroads, operated, respectively, by said railroad companies and Volney T. Malott, as receiver. The Belt Railroad & Stock-Yards Company is a consolidated corporation, the constituent members of which are the Belt Railroad & Stock-Yards Company and the Belt Railroad Company of Indianapolis, which were incorporated under the general laws of the state of Indiana for the incorporation of railroad companies, for the special purpose, stated in the articles of incorporation, of providing a convenient method for the transportation and transfer of freight and stock across, through, into, and around the city of Indianapolis, and to effect the speedy and economical exchange of such cars between all the railroads entering or passing through said city, and for the erection and maintenance of ample stock yards for the accommodation of all the live stock that may be brought into or pass through said city. The Belt Railroad & Stock-Yards Company, whose name, until changed by the decree of the Marion circuit court of the state of Indiana, was the Union Railroad Transfer & Stock-Yards Company, immediately upon its incorporation applied to the common council of the city of Indianapolis for assistance to the extent of $500,000 of the bonds of the city in the construction of the railroad proposed to be constructed by it, namely, a railroad extending around the city, and connecting by means of side tracks and switches with all the railroads which entered the city, and also with the railway of the Indianapolis Union Railway Company, and with the manufacturing and other establishments and places of business in or near the city, whereby through freight trains and cars being transported upon any of the railroads entering the city could be carried around the city, and all freight sent to or by persons, firms, or corporations at their places of business connected by switches with the Belt Railroad could be directly delivered upon or received from said switches; and, to induce the city to give such assistance, said company proposed in writing to the common council of the city, if it would extend such assistance, that it would construct said railroad, together with all necessary and proper switch connections with other railroads crossed by it, and with permission to manufacturers and others to connect with it by switches and side tracks; which said proposition was accepted by an ordinance adopted by the common council of the city, and the bonds of the city to the above-named amount were issued to the Belt Railroad Company, whereby it was enabled to construct its railroad. The fourth section of this ordinance which was accepted by the Belt Railroad Company is as follows:

'Sec. 4. The said Union Railroad Transfer & Stock-Yards Company (whose name was thereafter changed by decree of court to the Belt Railroad & Stock-Yards Company) shall extend to all persons doing business on or along the line of said railroad full facilities to connect switches with the said road, and shall carry and transport freight to and from such switches at rates per car not exceeding that charged by said company for transporting through freight of a like class and character over said road.

By an act of the legislature of this state approved March 2, 1877, the foregoing ordinance was enacted into law, the fourth section of which act is in the identical language of the fourth section of said ordinance. The switch connections now owned and used by the complainant were connected with the Belt railroad in or about the year 1880 under and pursuant to the foregoing ordinance and statute. The act of March 2, 1885, under which authorized it to lease and operate the Belt Railroad, provided as follows:

'Sec. 11. Any such union railway company may by agreement in writing with any railroad company, not being one of said proprietary companies and owning or operating a railroad which extends to, into or through, or near the town or city in or near which such union railroad is or may be situated, admit said last mentioned railroad company to the use of the tracks, side tracks, switches, depots, depot grounds, yards, sheds and other structures or railroad facilities and appliances (including the use of its belt railroad facilities, if any) during such time, on such terms and conditions, and for such compensation or rent as may be agreed upon. The right of any associate company to continue in the use and enjoyment of the property and facilities of the union company may be made to depend upon the faithful performance of such terms and conditions by such associate company as may be inserted in said agreement. The companies which may be so admitted are herein designated as associate companies: provided, that no such associate company shall be admitted to the use of the property and facilities of such union railway company except upon the unanimous vote of the directors of such union company.'

The thirteenth and fourteenth sections of the act provide that in case other railroad companies are admitted to the use of the railroad and other property of the Union Railway Company, a board of managers shall be appointed, composed of one representative selected by each railroad having such use, to whom it shall be competent to delegate so much of the authority, power, and jurisdiction of the board of directors as may be agreed upon. The seventeenth section provides that any agreement entered into before the taking effect of the act for the use of such property by other railroad companies shall have the same force and effect, and be as valid and binding, as if it had been made after the taking effect of the act. By the last preceding section the so-called 'reorganization agreement' of October 17, 1882, was ratified and confirmed. The fifth and sixth clauses of this agreement provide for an appraisement of the value of all the property, including the lease of the Belt...

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5 cases
  • Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Central Stockyards Co.
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    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • November 15, 1906
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  • St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Dixie Cotton Oil Company
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    • Arkansas Supreme Court
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    ...N.W. 1102. A railroad can not legally deny to one shipper switch connections or service which it affords to others similarly situated. 99 F. 472-481; 74 Kan. 808; 211 U.S. 3. Order 825 is valid, citing all the provisions of our statutes. 4. Review the points and authorities cited by appella......
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    ...inf. v. Railroad, 176 Mo. 713. See McNeill v. Railroad, 202 U.S. 559; Wilson Produce Co. v. Railroad, 14 I. C. C. 173; Interstate Stock Yards Co. v. Railroad, 99 F. 472. V. Reynolds for respondent. (1) It is presumed that the Legislature intended to impart to its enactments such a meaning a......
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    • October 31, 1938
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