Iowa Cent. Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Review of Eliot Tp.

• Citation: 176 Iowa 131,157 N.W. 731
• Decision Date: 05 May 1916
• Docket Number: No. 29733.,29733.
• Parties: IOWA CENT. RY. CO. v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF ELIOT TP., LOUISA COUNTY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

176 Iowa 131

157 N.W. 731

IOWA CENT. RY. CO.

v.BOARD OF REVIEW OF ELIOT TP., LOUISA COUNTY.

No. 29733.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 5, 1916.

Appeal from District Court, Louisa County; W. S. Withrow, Judge.

In 1911 appellant was the owner of a certain bridge across the Mississippi river extending from a point in Eliot township, Louisa county, Iowa, to a point in the city of Keithsburg, Ill. A portion of this bridge, being within the limits of the above-named township, is taxable in Iowa under the statute. The assessor for Eliot township fixed the value of that portion of the bridge taxable in Iowa at $800,000. The railway company appeared before the board of review of Eliot township and objected to the valuation fixed by the assessor, and this valuation was by the board of review reduced to $400,000. From this the company appealed to the district court, and after trial in that court, the valuation of the bridge was fixed at $335,000. The railway company, deeming this valuation too great as compared with the valuations placed upon other property, has appealed to this court from that part of the decree which fixes the valuation for purposes of taxation at the last-named figure. The district court found the value of the entire bridge across the river to be $570,000. It fixed the value of that portion of the bridge lying west of the middle of the main channel of the river, and therefore taxable in Iowa, at $502,000. The court found that as a matter of law the railway company should be taxed upon that part of its bridge which is taxable in Iowa in the proportion that is applied to property for purposes of taxation in the taxing district in which said property is situated. A further statement of the facts appears in the opinion. Reversed.W. H. Bremner and F. M. Miner, both of Minneapolis, Minn., and Burrell & Devitt, of Oskaloosa, for appellant.

W. E. Blake, of Burlington, and H. O. Weaver, of Wapello, for appellee.

PRESTON, J.

No complaint is made by the appellant of the finding of the court as to the true value of that portion of the bridge located in Iowa. Defendants have not appealed therefrom, and no question is raised as to the correctness of that finding, and the record does not contain all the evidence upon that point.

At the trial in the district court the appellant offered evidence for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which other property in Eliot township and in Louisa county generally was assessed. This evidence consisted of the testimony of witnesses as to the actual value of certain tracts of land located in Eliot township and other townships in Louisa county; the assessor's records, showing the assessed value of such tracts of land; general testimony from those who were in a position to know as to the general basis upon which valuations for purposes of taxation were fixed throughout Eliot township and Louisa county generally as compared with true values. The values given by witnesses were as of January 1, 1911.

It is contended by appellant that in fixing the value for purposes of taxation at $335,000, which is 66.73 per cent. of its true value, while lands constitute 86.2 per cent. in value of the total property assessed in the township in which the property under consideration is located, and other lands in the county were assessed at 37.55 per cent. of their true value, and that the taxable value of all property in the township and county was 40.6 per cent., is to cast upon appellant an unjust burden of taxation, and that its property was assessed higher proportionately than other property in the county.

[1] 1. There is no controversy between counsel as to the law of the case. Section 1342 of the Code provides that:

“* * * All railway bridges across the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, and grain elevators, shall be subject to assessment and taxation on the same basis as property of individuals in the several counties where situated.”

And article 8, § 2, of the Constitution of Iowa provides that the property of all corporations for pecuniary profit shall be subject to taxation the same as that of individuals. Other articles of the Constitution and the decisions of the court are that taxes must be uniform and must not be imposed alone or unequally upon particular individuals or classes. The paramount object which the law seeks to insure in distributing the burdens of taxation is equality, and, although the property of a taxpayer is assessed at less than its true value, nevertheless, if it is assessed higher proportionately than other property, he has a just cause of complaint. It is hardly necessary to cite authorities upon this proposition, but see Burnham v. Barber, 70 Iowa, 87, 30 N. W. 20;Barz v. Board of Equalization, 133 Iowa, 563, 111 N. W. 41;Reiniger v. Board of Review, 157 Iowa, 193, 138 N. W. 399.

Appellant contends that the facts in the case at bar bring it within the rule laid down in the cases before referred to, and that, although it concedes that the value placed upon its property by the lower court, for assessment purposes, is less than the actual value thereof, nevertheless it is aggrieved and entitled to a further reduction in such valuation, because it is not assessed upon the same basis as other property, and because the assessed valuation as fixed by the court is higher proportionately to the true valuation than the assessed valuations of other property.

As stated, appellant contends that as to lands the average percentage which the assessed value is of the true value is 37.55, this being the percentage which the total assessed value of all the tracts is of the total true value of all the tracts, and that the percentage for all property, including farm lands, other real estate and personal property, is 40.6 per cent.

[2] 2. Counsel discuss the question, and it is a material inquiry in the case as to whether the bridge in question is real estate and whether it should be assessed upon the same basis as other lands and real estate in the county, or whether it should be assessed upon the basis of all property in the district or county. Appellant argues that the bridge is real property and that, as farm lands constitute 86.2 per cent. of the total property in the district, and that if 86.2 per cent. of all the property is valued at 37.55 per cent. of its true value, then an unjust burden is cast upon appellant if its property is assessed at a greater ratio. On this point appellee argues that, under the statute before quoted, bridges over this river are not classed as real estate nor as personal property, but as bridges; that the statute does not read that bridges shall be subject to assessment and taxation on the same...