Iowa Coal Washing Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 19 October 1926
• Docket Number: No. 37499.,37499.
• Parties: IOWA COAL WASHING CO. v. CONSOLIDATION COAL CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

210 N.W. 440

IOWA COAL WASHING CO.

v.CONSOLIDATION COAL CO.

No. 37499.^a1

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 19, 1926.

Appeal from District Court, Munroe County; D. M. Anderson, Judge.

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of a written contract. The defendant moved to strike certain allegations from the petition and the amendments thereto, and from the rulings favorable to the defendant the plaintiff appeals. The opinion recites the essential pleaded facts. Affirmed.Devitt & Eichhorn, of Oskaloosa, Bates & Dashiell, of Albia, and Preston & Preston, of Oskaloosa, for appellant.

Mabry & Mabry, of Albia, Adams & Hise, of Des Moines, and Samuel H. Cady, of Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

DE GRAFF, C. J.

It is to be observed that this cause comes to this court not upon evidence, but upon the pleadings of the plaintiff and the rulings of the trial court in sustaining the motions of the defendant to strike certain allegations from the petition and amendments thereto.

It appears from the petition, filed September 13, 1922, that the plaintiff and the defendant are Iowa corporations, both of whom are engaged in handling the products of coal mines, and that on the 9th day of October, 1911, a written contract between the two corporations was duly executed and signed.

In the consideration of the questions presented on this appeal, the material provisions of the pleaded contract are as follows:

“That in consideration of the mutual agreements hereinafter contained, the parties agree as follows:

First. The coal company agrees to sell to the washing company and the washing company agrees to take from the coal company all fine screenings produced by the said coal company at its mines during a period of ten (10) years from and after the first day of April, A. D. 1912.

Second. The washing company agrees to pay the coal company for all coal sold it hereunder, on or before the 20th of each month for coal delivered during the preceding month, at the following rates: * * * For the purposes of this contract, all coal passing through a three-quarter inch bar screen, or a one and one-quarter inch perforated shaker screen, shall be called ‘screenings'; and all coal passing through a one and three-eighths inch bar screen and over a three-quarter inch bar screen, or through a one and three-eighths inch shaker screen and over a one and one-quarter inch shaker screen, shall be called nut coal.

Third. The coal company agrees to deliver the said coal to the washing company f. o. b. cars at the mine; and the washing company agrees to take the coal so delivered, and to cause the same to be transported to its plant, paying therefor all switching and freight rates in accordance with regularly published tariffs.”

The original petition alleges that the defendant coal company from the date of the commencement of said contract to December 1, 1919, delivered to the plaintiff, in compliance with the terms of the written contract, all fine screenings produced by the defendant coal company and accepted in payment therefor the prices for the same, as agreed upon in said contract; that subsequently to December, 1919, until April 1, 1922, the date when said contract expired, the defendant coal company in violation of its contract failed, neglected, and refused to deliver to the plaintiff all of the fine screenings produced at the mines of the said coal company. It is upon this failure that the damages of plaintiff are predicated.

It is also alleged in the original petition that on the 9th day of October, 1911, at which time the said written contract was executed:

“The defendant coal company had reason to suppose and know, and did in fact know, that the plaintiff, the Iowa Coal Washing Company, understood said contract to require said defendant to screen all the coal mined by said Consolidation Coal Company, and to deliver all fine screenings produced by said company at its mines during the term of said contract of said plaintiff at the prices fixed in said contract.”

On October 6, 1922, the defendant filed its motion for more specific statement in that the plaintiff should be required to state who the representatives of the coal company are or were, who “did in fact know” that the plaintiff company understood said contract to require said defendant to screen all coal mined, etc., and to state the date when said understanding was had and the substance thereof, and also that the plaintiff be required to state the name of the persons representing the plaintiff company, who “understood said contract to require said defendant to screen all coal, etc., the date when such understanding was had and the substance thereof.”

On February 24, 1923, the plaintiff, in response to defendant's motion for more specific statement, filed an amendment to its petition and did name the parties, both on the part of the defendant and the plaintiff, who, it is claimed, did possess the knowledge and understanding, as alleged; and that the substance of said understanding was that said contract required the defendant to screen all the coal mined by the coal company, and to deliver all fine screenings produced by said company at its mines during the term of said contract to this plaintiff.

On March 15, 1923, the defendant filed a motion to strike the allegations contained in the original petition relative to the knowledge and understanding on the part of the defendant coal company that it was to screen all coal mined by said company and to deliver all fine screenings produced at its mines to the plaintiff, and also moved to strike all of plaintiff's amendment to the petition, and as grounds therefor stated that:

“All of the said allegations are irrelevant, redundant, and immaterial, and...