Iowa Cord Tire Co. v. Babbitt
Decision Date | 13 March 1923 |
Docket Number | 35095 |
Citation | 192 N.W. 431,195 Iowa 922 |
Parties | IOWA CORD TIRE COMPANY, Appellant, v. VANCE J. BABBITT, Appellee |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Winnebago District Court.--JOSEPH J. CLARK and M. F EDWARDS, Judges.
TWO actions are consolidated and submitted together. One is an appeal from a judgment by default. The other is an appeal from an order of the district court refusing to vacate and set aside the said default in said original action.--Affirmed on both appeals.
Affirmed on both appeals.
Chester J. Eller, Tom Boynton, and L. E. Francis, for appellant.
Thompson Loth & Lowe, for appellee.
I.
On or about March 13, 1919, the appellee subscribed for certain shares of stock in the appellant company. The subscription was obtained by one of the stock salesmen of the appellant. Said subscription contract was as follows:
On the back of said stock subscription appeared the following, in writing:
About one year after the execution of said contract, the appellee notified the appellant that he was dissatisfied with his stock subscription, and demanded a return of the $ 600 he had paid under said written contract. Correspondence was had between the parties and their attorneys, which will be referred to more in detail hereafter. Subsequently, action was commenced by the appellee, to recover the said sum of $ 600, with interest. Service of the original notice in said action was accepted by the appellant. The petition was duly filed, and judgment was obtained by default in said proceeding on the 12th day of September, 1921, said judgment being entered for the said sum of $ 600, with interest and the costs of said action. No exceptions were taken by the appellant to the judgment. No motion was made for a new trial, no evidence was preserved of record of the trial of said action, and no bill of exceptions was filed in said cause. The appeal is from the judgment so entered by default. The court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the defendant in said action. No irregularity is claimed in regard to the jurisdiction of the court. Matters are now urged on appeal which might have been urged by way of defense to the appellee's claim in said action, but these matters cannot now be considered by us in this appeal. The petition stated a cause of action. The original notice was in proper form, and duly served in proper time. The trial court found the proof sufficient to sustain the allegations of the petition, and entered judgment accordingly. We cannot review such judgment so entered by default, where no bill of exceptions has been filed, no evidence preserved, and where the proceedings are all regular, and within the jurisdiction of the court. Until the judgment so entered is vacated or set aside by proper proceeding, it must stand as a verity. Belknap v. Belknap, 154 Iowa 213, 134 N.W. 734.
II. Appellant, however, sought to set aside said judgment by default, by a petition filed in the lower court. An order was entered by which the court refused to vacate and set aside said judgment. This brings to our consideration the second proposition involved in the consideration of these cases.
As previously noted, the stock contract was entered into on March 13, 1919. On March 2, 1920, the appellee wrote a letter to the appellant, referring to the subscription for stock and expressing his dissatisfaction therewith, and requesting a remittance for the amount paid by him. On March 6, 1920, the appellant replied to said letter, refusing to recognize the conditions claimed by the appellee, and claiming that appellant had paid a commission to the salesman on said sale, and refusing to recognize any obligation under the written contract indorsed on the subscription. On March 8th, the appellee replied to this letter, threatening to commence action against the appellant. Other correspondence passed between the parties, and on January 7, 1921, the attorneys for the appellee wrote the appellant in regard to said matter, and correspondence was thereafter exchanged between the counsel for the appellant and counsel for the appellee. This correspondence was quite extensive, and it appears therefrom that the attorneys discussed the facts and the law pertinent to the matter in hand, and exchanged briefs on the subject. On March 8, 1921, counsel for appellee sent an original notice to counsel for the appellant, with the request that the latter obtain an acceptance of service thereon. It appears also that there was a conference between the attorney for the appellant and the attorney for the appellee at Des Moines, in April, 1921, at which time counsel for the appellant delivered the said original notice to counsel for the appellee, service of said notice at said time having been duly accepted by the appellant. The petition in said action had been filed March 11, 1921. On April 26, 1921, counsel for appellee wrote counsel for appellant as follows:
Other correspondence passed between the attorneys for the parties, in the months of April, May, and June of 1921, and on July 28, 1921, the attorneys for the appellee wrote to the attorney for the appellant as follows:
On August 5, 1921, the attorney for the appellant replied to said letters, as follows:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial