Iowa Elec. Co. v. State Bd. of Control
| Decision Date | 07 April 1936 |
| Docket Number | 42959. |
| Citation | 266 N.W. 543,221 Iowa 1050 |
| Parties | IOWA ELECTRIC CO. v. STATE BOARD OF CONTROL et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Jones County; John T. Moffit, Judge.
Action in equity to quiet title to and place plaintiff in immediate possession of certain real estate. Defendants appeared specially to question the jurisdiction of the court. Hearing was had upon special appearance and same was overruled and defendants given time to plead. From the court's order overruling their special appearance, the defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Edward L. O'Connor, Atty. Gen., and Lehan T. Ryan, Asst. Atty Gen., for appellants.
C. E Richmann, of Cedar Rapids, and Maher & Mullen, of Fort Dodge for appellee.
In this action plaintiff filed its petition in the district court of Jones county, Iowa, alleging, in substance, that it is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Iowa that the defendants O. H. Michael, E. H. Felton, and Harry C. White are duly appointed, qualified, and acting members of the state board of control, and constitute all of the members of such board; that the defendant W. H. Frazer is the duly appointed, qualified, and acting warden of the Men's Reformatory of the state of Iowa; that the plaintiff is the owner of certain land described in said petition and is entitled to the immediate possession thereof; that the defendants, and each of them, claim some right, title, and interest in and to said land, have entered into the possession thereof, and refuse to deliver and are wrongfully withholding such possession from plaintiff. Attached to the petition was an abstract showing plaintiff's title. The prayer asked for judgment against the defendants, for the possession of the premises described, for costs of the action, that the right, title, and interest of the plaintiff be established and quieted as against the adverse claims of the defendants, and that a writ of possession issue directing the sheriff to put the plaintiff in possession of said land.
To this petition the defendants appeared specially, and stated that the action showed on its face that it is a suit against the state of Iowa in its sovereign capacity and cannot be maintained, and that the court has no jurisdiction over the defendants. A hearing was had on such special appearance, at which the defendants introduced evidence as to negotiations between plaintiff and defendants, as shown by letters and telegrams, and extending over the period from January 30, 1928, to June 27, 1931. Following this hearing the trial court entered an order overruling the defendants' special appearance and giving the defendants fifteen days to further plead. From this order, the defendants appeal.
The only question, therefore, presented by this appeal is the correctness of the trial court's ruling on the special appearance. The appellants' special appearance called the trial court's attention to their claim that the petition on its face showed that this action is against the state of Iowa in its sovereign capacity. The evidence introduced, all of which was by the appellants, showed that on January 30, 1928, the Iowa Electric Company wrote to the state board of control stating its intention to build a dam on land owned by it, that this dam would probably cause land owned by the state in connection with the Men's Reformatory at Anamosa to be overflowed, and the electric company offered to exchange some of its land for land owned by the state, on condition that it be given an easement to overflow a certain portion of the land proposed to be conveyed to the state. This letter also contained a proposal of the electric company to rent certain land to the state. These negotiations continued through the year 1928, and the evidence indicates that the parties finally arrived at a basis upon which the proposed exchange of lands would be carried out. On March 6, 1929, the Iowa Electric Company wrote a letter to the state board of control and sent to it a copy of a plat showing the lands involved, a form of deed, and an overflow grant, and stated that abstracts of title were being prepared and as soon as ready these would be submitted. This letter asked that the board of control look over the conveyances and give the electric company its approval or comments on same as soon as possible. While there was some further correspondence between the electric company and the board of control during the year 1930, this correspondence seems to have reference merely to the rental of 25 acres of land by the warden of the state reformatory from the electric company, and the evidence does not show that these 25 acres are a part of the land involved in this action. The last of the correspondence, shown by the evidence, is contained in a letter sent by the electric company to the state board of control under date of June 27, 1931. This letter refers to a letter of the board of control under date of June 22d, which letter is not in evidence. In this letter of the electric company, which was signed by Oliver Longueville, he states that about two years previously he had forwarded to the board of control all of the papers, blueprints, and contracts pertaining to the matter and had received word from the board of control that these matters had been referred to the department of justice for approval. He further states that the electric company would like to get the matter straightened up, that he believed that the state employees at Anamosa started work on this land in the spring of 1928, that he was informed that the electric company had continued to pay taxes on the land, although the state was using it, and concluded by saying that the electric company would like to get the matter disposed of so as to save the item of taxes.
All of this evidence was objected to on the ground that it did not raise any issue as to the court's jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; that the court's jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit must be determined wholly from the issues presented on the face of the plaintiff's petition, and not through the introduction of any evidence touching upon the merits of the case; that the evidence offered, consisting of the correspondence between the parties, is not material to any of the issues presented by the defendants' special appearance, and is material only on the merits of the case.
It is contended by the appellants that the defendants here, who are members of the state board of control and the warden of the Men's Reformatory, respectively, are an arm or agency of the state; that the acts which the petition alleges were done by appellants were done as such officers or agency of the state; and that the title to and possession of the premises involved in this action are the title and possession of the state.
The doctrine that a state cannot be sued in its sovereign capacity is so well settled that it requires neither discussion nor citation of authorities. The difficulty is in determining whether the things of which complaint is made in the petition were done by the appellants in their capacity as officers of and as an agency of the state, and under the authority possessed by them as such officers and agency. Numerous cases may be cited in which actions done by state officers and agencies have been held to be the acts of the state, and that a suit against such officers and agencies could not be maintained because it was an action against the state. It does not follow, however, that every action in which state officers or the members of a state agency are named as defendants, and designated by their official title, is an action against the state. There appears to have been some confusion in the earlier cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, in regard to the effect of designating or failing to designate the parties who were made defendants as officers or agents of the government. In the case of Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S. ) 738, 6 L.Ed. 204, some of the language used by Chief Justice Marshall might be taken as indicating that the question of jurisdiction would depend upon the designation of the parties in the record. In Pennoyer et al. v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 11 S.Ct. 699, 702, 35 L.Ed. 363, however, that court, in referring to the doctrine here under consideration and to the statements of Chief Justice Marshall in the Osborn Case, said:
" The principle stated by Chief Justice Marshall, in that case, that, ‘ in all cases where jurisdiction depends on the party, it is the party named in the record,’ and that ‘ the eleventh amendment is limited to those suits in which the state is a party to the record,’ has been qualified to a certain degree in some of the subsequent decisions of this court; and now it is the settled doctrine of this court that the question whether a suit is within the prohibition of the eleventh amendment is not always determined by reference to the nominal parties on the record, as the court will look behind and through the nominal parties on the record to ascertain who are the real parties to the suit."
It is now well settled that the fact that officers or agents of a state are named as defendants does not necessarily clothe them with the immunity of the state. The case of United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 1 S.Ct. 240, 257, 27 L.Ed 171, is perhaps the leading case on this question. In that case suit was instituted against one Kaufman and one Strong, who, acting under what was supposed to be a valid authority, held possession of certain real estate in Virginia known as Arlington, on which was located a national cemetery and military station. Lee brought an action in ejectment in the circuit court of Virginia. As soon as the declaration was filed...
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