Iowa Public Service Co. v. Rhode
| Decision Date | 17 June 1941 |
| Docket Number | 45633. |
| Citation | 298 N.W. 794,230 Iowa 751 |
| Parties | IOWA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. v. RHODE et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Black Hawk County; R. W. Hasner, Judge.
Appeal from disallowance by the district court of the claim for unemployment benefits by Carl R. Rhode under the Iowa Unemployment Compensation Law.
Affirmed.
J Charles Crawley and Homer M. Lyon, both of Des Moines, and George Finch, of Sioux City, for appellants.
Swisher, Swisher & Cohrt, of Waterloo, and J. Dean Evans, of Sioux City, for appellee.
Claimant Carl R. Rhode was employed by appellee, Iowa Public Service Co., from October 10, 1938, to November 2, 1938, and again from on or about April 3, 1939, to November 7, 1939, on which date he voluntarily quit his job, without good cause attributable to appellee, in order to accept employment with the Viking Pump Co. His employment with the pump company terminated on December 30, 1939, due to lack of work. On November 9, 1939, appellee in accordance with the rules of the Iowa Unemployment Compensation Commission (herein referred to as the commission) gave notice to the commission that claimant had left its employment voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer. On January 5, 1940, claimant registered for employment and filed claim for unemployment compensation benefits, naming the Viking Pump Co. as his last employer, and stating that the termination of his employment was due to lack of work.
The claims deputy of the commission found that claimant's employment with the Viking Pump Co. removed any disqualification in connection with his quitting his employment with appellee, and allowed the claim. The Appeals Tribunal affirmed the deputy. This decision of the Appeals Tribunal was affirmed by the commission by a two to one vote of the commissioners, Chairman Claude M. Stanley of the commission dissenting. The decision of the commission appears to be based upon a somewhat different theory than that of the claims deputy and Appeals Tribunal, namely, that claimant by voluntarily quitting his job with appellee did not disqualify himself from receiving benefits, for the reason that his unemployment was due to lack of work and not to quitting his job with appellee. Upon appeal to the district court the majority decision of the commission was reversed, and claimant was held to be disqualified from receiving benefits. From this decision claimant and the commission have appealed to this court.
The single question presented by this controversy is the construction to be given section 1551.11, subd. A, Code 1939, a provision of the Iowa Unemployment Compensation Law, appearing in chapter 77.2, Code 1939, reading as follows:
It is the contention of appellant commission that notwithstanding the plain provision of section 1551.11, subd. A, a claimant is not disqualified from receiving benefits unless unemployment is caused by voluntarily leaving his work; that claimant's unemployment is not due to quitting his job with appellee but to lack of work. It is argued that the unemployment compensation law must be interpreted as an entirety and the above-quoted section construed as part of the whole. We are also told that the interpretation placed upon section 1551.11, subd. A, is irrational; that it destroys individual initiative, and that it defeats the objectives of the law as a whole.
We agree that the decision of the trial court must be affirmed.
It is doubtless true, as the commission argues, that in attempting to arrive at the correct interpretation of any provision of the law in question the court should consider the entire act and construe its various provisions in the light of their relation to the whole. This is a fundamental rule of statutory construction. Ahrweiler v. Board of Sup'rs, 226 Iowa 229, 231, 283 N.W. 889, 890; Drazich v. Hollowell, 207 Iowa 427, 429, 223 N.W 253. This rule is of little aid to the commission in the present controversy, however. Counsel have not pointed out, nor have we been able to find, any other provisions of the law which cast any doubt upon the plain and unambiguous meaning of the disqualifying section upon which appellee relies. It is suggested that section 1551.08 headed " Declaration Of State Public Policy" and which is a " guide for interpretation" of the law as a whole supports appellants' view of the construction that should be given 1551.11, subd. A. The particular language of 1551.08 relied upon is as follows: " The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this state require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the state, for the compulsory setting aside of...
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