Iowa Securities Co. v. Barrett
| Decision Date | 14 April 1930 |
| Docket Number | 40145 |
| Citation | 230 N.W. 528,210 Iowa 53 |
| Parties | IOWA SECURITIES COMPANY, Appellee, v. FLORENCE L. BARRETT et al., Defendants; H. J. PFEIFFER, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Black Hawk District Court.--H. B. BOIES, Judge.
Action in equity, to quiet the title to real estate and to determine the priority between tax sales for general taxes and tax sales for special assessments. The court found for the holder of the tax deed issued for general taxes. The facts appear in the opinion.
Affirmed.
Merner & Merner and Pike, Sias & Zimmerman, for H. J. Pfeiffer appellant.
J. D Liffring and W. P. Jensen, for Iowa Securities Company appellee.
John W. Gwynne, for Black Hawk County, defendant.
On December 22, 1926, the plaintiff filed in the Black Hawk County district court a petition in equity, asserting the ownership to certain real estate in Parkside Addition to the City of Waterloo, under a certain tax deed issued by the treasurer of Black Hawk County, March 4, 1925, which said deed was issued in pursuance to a tax sale for the unpaid general taxes for the years 1918, 1919, and 1920, the sale having been held on the 5th day of December, 1921. The defendant Pfeiffer answered, alleging, in substance, that he, on January 18, 1926, became the purchaser of the same property, describing it, at a tax sale thereof, for unpaid installments of special paving and sewer assessments for the years 1921, 1922, 1923, and 1924; that, on May 26, 1926, the said defendant paid the delinquent subsequent general taxes of 1925 on said real estate. The defendant further answers:
"That, on and prior to October 22, 1917, and December 22, 1919, respectively, the said special paving and sewer assessments against said Lot No. One, for nonpayment of which said lot was sold to this defendant, and long prior to the date of the sale of said lot on December 5, 1921, to the plaintiff for the nonpayment of the ordinary taxes, became and were a lien upon said lot by the filing of the necessary papers and certificates of assessment in the offices of the auditor and treasurer of Black Hawk County, Iowa, as provided by law."
The defendant Pfeiffer then alleges that, by virtue of the issuance of a treasurer's certificate of purchase, on January 18, 1926, to him, and the payment by him of the subsequent taxes of 1925, he has a superior interest and lien in and upon said real estate, subject only to the owner's right of redemption, as provided by law. Later, the said Pfeiffer filed a cross-petition against his codefendants Black Hawk County, Iowa, and Madigan, county treasurer, alleging that he became the purchaser of the property described on January 18, 1926, for $ 55, and that, on May 26, 1926, he paid the treasurer of Black Hawk County the subsequent taxes for 1925, amounting to $ 10.85; also alleging that the plaintiff, the Iowa Securities Company, claims ownership by reason of the purchase of the property at general tax sale. The prayer of the cross-petition is as follows:
"Wherefore, the defendant, H. J. Pfeiffer, prays that, in the event the court finds that the said tax sale certificate of said Lot No. One, in Block No. Two, in Parkside Addition to Waterloo, Iowa, issued to this defendant by said Black Hawk County, Iowa, and Ed Madigan, county treasurer thereof, under date of January 18, 1926, is invalid and of no effect as against the plaintiff, that this defendant have judgment against said Black Hawk County, Iowa, and Ed Madigan, as treasurer thereof, for the amount of fifty-five dollars ($ 55.00), with interest thereon from January 10, 1926, and for the further sum of ten and 85/100 dollars, being the amount of delinquent subsequent general taxes paid by this defendant, with interest thereon from March 26, 1926, and that this defendant have such other and further relief as may be just and equitable in the premises."
On January 7, 1929, the plaintiff filed a reply, containing, among other things, the allegation that plaintiff had tendered to the defendant and to the county auditor of Black Hawk County, Iowa, the amount necessary to redeem from the sale of said general taxes, 1925, and "that due tender of said amount has been made, and further, that plaintiff now brings said amount into court, and makes tender thereof."
Later, the defendant Pfeiffer filed an amendment to his answer, in the following words and figures:
"That the said tax deed to the plaintiff was also based upon and issued in pursuance of a tax sale of said premises for three unpaid installments of special paving and sewer taxes theretofore assessed and levied against the said premises and payable in the years 1918, 1919, and 1920."
The parties filed an agreed statement of facts, from which it appears that the plaintiff holds a tax deed on a sale held December 5, 1921, for general taxes for the years 1918, 1919, and 1920, which tax deed was issued March 4, 1925; that this sale also included five of the seven paving assessments levied on the property in question on November 13, 1917, and three of the installments of sewer special assessment levied January 29, 1920. On the other hand, Pfeiffer, appellant, on January 18, 1926, bought four unpaid installments of paving and sewer taxes for the years 1921, 1922, 1923, and 1924, the paving assessments having been levied November 13, 1917, and the sewer assessment having been levied January 29, 1920. It appears that Pfeiffer paid the general taxes of 1925.
The court found for the plaintiff and against the defendants, expressly adjudging that, as against the claims of the plaintiff, the certain tax certificate issued by Black Hawk County, Iowa, to the defendant Pfeiffer "is hereby canceled and declared to be of no effect." The court further found for the cross-petitioner, Pfeiffer, as against Black Hawk County, Iowa, rendering judgment in his favor in the amount of $ 65.05, being the sum of $ 55 with interest from January 18, 1926. The defendant Pfeiffer only appeals.
I. As having a bearing on the legislative intent with which the statutes necessarily interpreted in the decision of this case were passed, attention is called to the manner in which, by other sections of the statute, holders of special assessment liens are cared for.
Section 6039 of the Code of 1927, passed in 1924, found in Chapter 308 of the 1927 Code, pertaining to street improvements, sewers, and special assessments, reads as follows:
"At any such sale, where bonds have been issued in anticipation of such special taxes and interest, the city may be a purchaser, and be entitled to all the rights of purchasers at tax sales."
It will be seen by this section that, at any sale of property for the collection of special assessments levied for street improvements or sewers, in cases where bonds have been issued in anticipation of such special taxes and interest, the city may protect itself by becoming a purchaser, with all the rights of purchasers at tax sale.
Section 6041 of the Code of 1927, found in the same chapter, and passed in the same year, provides as follows:
"Any holder of any special assessment certificate against a lot or parcel of ground, or any holder of a bond payable in whole or in part out of a special assessment against any lot or parcel of ground, or any city or town within which such lot or parcel of ground is situated, which lot or parcel of ground has been sold for taxes, either general or special, shall be entitled to an assignment of any certificate of tax sale of said property for any general taxes or special taxes thereon, upon tender to the holder or to the county auditor of the amount to which the holder of the tax sale certificate would be entitled in case of redemption."
This statute gives material protection in connection with special assessments by enabling the holder of any special assessment certificate to secure an assignment of any certificate of tax sale for general taxes. The forty-second general assembly by Chapter 154 of its proceedings amended said Section 6041 of the Code by inserting therein the words "or any city or town within which such lot or parcel of ground is situated," now appearing in said section as above quoted.
II. The main question in this case relates to the priority of a tax sale for general or ordinary taxes, and a tax deed issued thereon, over a special assessment levied prior to the tax sale, installments of which did not fall due until after the tax sale for general taxes.
Section 6008 of the Code of 1927, found in Chapter 308, pertaining to street improvements, sewers, and special assessments, contains the following:
"Thereupon all special taxes for the cost thereof, or any part of said cost, which are to be assessed and levied against real property, or any railway or street railway, together with all interest and penalties on all of said assessments, shall become and remain a lien...
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