Iowa Wesleyan College v. Knight
Decision Date | 02 April 1929 |
Docket Number | 38983 |
Citation | 224 N.W. 502,207 Iowa 1238 |
Parties | IOWA WESLEYAN COLLEGE, Appellant, v. O. N. KNIGHT, County Treasurer, Appellee |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Henry District Court.--OSCAR HALE, Judge.
Suit in equity against the defendant, as county treasurer, to enjoin a proposed tax sale of certain real estate owned by the plaintiff, as an "educational institution." The defendant filed an equitable demurrer to the petition, in the form of a motion to dismiss. This motion was sustained by the district court, and the plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
McCoid McCoid & McCoid, for appellant.
Leo V Collins, for appellee.
I.
It appears from the petition that the plaintiff is an "educational institution," within the meaning of that statute which pertains to the taxation of real estate and to exemptions therefrom. Its petition is in two counts. In the first count it avers that it is the owner of certain real estate acquired by it on January 11, 1924; that such real estate was exempt from taxation, under Section 6944, Code of 1924; that, on September 8, 1924, the board of supervisors of Henry County levied a tax thereon, without authority or right so to do; that the defendant has advertised said property for sale at tax sale because of failure of plaintiff to pay the tax, and intends to sell the same. Injunction is prayed.
Section 6944 enumerates in 21 paragraphs property which is exempt from taxation. Paragraph 11 of such enumeration is as follows:
The property in question is a town lot, and is located within the township of Mt. Pleasant, in Henry County. The plaintiff avers that its real property in said township is less than 160 acres. Its averments bring it within the terms of Section 6944.
We are not advised of the specific ground upon which the demurrer was predicated or sustained. Appellee has filed no argument here. We surmise the seat of trouble to be in the fact that the property had been assessed as against plaintiff's grantor on January 1, 1924, and that the levy of September 8, 1924, was made pursuant to such assessment. If we are correct in this surmise, then the question arising is whether such prior assessment to the then owner is operative to defeat the exemption of the plaintiff, to which it would otherwise be entitled. The assessment did not create a tax, nor did it create a lien upon the real estate. The plaintiff took a warranty deed for the property on January 11th, and duly filed the same for record. Surely the assessment did not operate as a breach of the grantor's covenant of warranty....
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