Irvin v. Green Wise Homes, LLC, 022421 TNCIV, M2019-02232-COA-R3-CV
| Opinion Judge | KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE |
| Party Name | DEBRA A. IRVIN v. GREEN WISE HOMES, LLC ET AL. |
| Attorney | Charles Walker, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Green Wise Homes, LLC. Eugene N. Bulso, Jr. and Paul J. Krog, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Debra A. Irvin. Thor Y. Urness and Caroline D. Spore, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Eugene N. Bulso, Jr. and Paul J. Krog. Jon ... |
| Judge Panel | Kristi M. Davis, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. Michael Swiney, C.J., and John W. McClarty, J., joined. |
| Case Date | February 24, 2021 |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Session September 2, 2020
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 19-470-IV Russell T. Perkins, Chancellor
Debra A. Irvin ("Plaintiff" or "Appellee") filed a complaint in 2019 alleging real estate fraud against numerous parties. Several defendants, including Green Wise Homes, LLC ("Green Wise"), asserted various counterclaims against Plaintiff and her attorneys, which the trial court dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court then awarded attorney's fees to Plaintiff against Green Wise pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119. Green Wise appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment Affirmed; Case Remanded
Charles Walker, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Green Wise Homes, LLC. Eugene N. Bulso, Jr. and Paul J. Krog, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Debra A. Irvin.
Thor Y. Urness and Caroline D. Spore, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Eugene N. Bulso, Jr. and Paul J. Krog.
Jon Paul Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Kristi M. Davis, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. Michael Swiney, C.J., and John W. McClarty, J., joined.
OPINION
KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE
Background
This case began as a dispute over purported real estate fraud, but it has become a dispute over attorney's fees. On April 4, 2019, Appellee filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (the "trial court"), essentially alleging she had been defrauded into signing over her home to Green Wise via quitclaim deed. The named defendants were Charles Walker, Jon Paul Johnson, Green Wise, Julie Coone, James Brett, and Nationwide Investments, LLC.[1] The attorneys representing Appellee, Eugene N. Bulso, Jr. and Paul J. Krog, later filed liens lis pendens on several properties owned by Green Wise.
Mr. Walker and Mr. Johnson filed answers to the complaint on May 6, 2019, each asserting three counterclaims against Appellee: intentional interference with business relationships, tortious interference with contracts, and "attempted acts of terrorism." Mr. Walker and Mr. Johnson also named as third-party defendants both of Appellee's attorneys (together, "Third-Party Defendants") in their individual capacity.
On May 11, 2019, Mr. Walker filed a notice of removal to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee (the "bankruptcy court"). Mr. Walker had previously declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy and sought to have that case reopened on the basis that the action in the trial court was somehow related to the closed Chapter 11 case. The trial court therefore entered a stay of the proceedings in its court on May 13, 2019. In the meantime, Green Wise filed its answer to Appellee's complaint on May 12, 2019, in the bankruptcy court action. Green Wise also asserted a counterclaim against Appellee, as well as various claims against Third-Party Defendants, averring that they had wrongfully placed the liens lis pendens on Green Wise's real properties. On May 23, 2019, the bankruptcy court stayed the proceedings in its court in light of a motion to remand filed by Appellee.
The bankruptcy court ultimately declined to reopen Mr. Walker's bankruptcy action, and the case was remanded back to the trial court on July 2, 2019. On July 15, 2019, Appellee filed a motion to lift the trial court's stay, and the trial court entered an order dissolving the stay on August 1, 2019. Appellee then filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit as to all of her claims against Green Wise, Mr. Walker, and Mr. Johnson on August 16, 2019. However, the counterclaims and third-party claims asserted by Green Wise and the other defendants were still pending. Accordingly, Appellee and Third-Party
Defendants each filed Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motions to dismiss all claims against them, alleging that Green Wise, Mr. Walker, and Mr. Johnson failed to state any claims for which relief could be granted. Both Appellee and Third-Party Defendants also requested their attorney's fees from Green Wise, Mr. Walker, and Mr. Johnson pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c). Green Wise responded to the motions by both Appellee and Third-Party Defendants but made no argument regarding the applicability of section 20-12-119(c). Rather, in its response to the motions, Green Wise raised only substantive arguments regarding its allegation that Appellee and Third-Party Defendants wrongfully placed the liens lis pendens on Green Wise's real properties.
The trial court held a hearing on all pending motions on September 13, 2019. Although there is no transcript of this hearing in the record, it is undisputed that the trial court ruled that all of the claims asserted by Mr. Walker, Mr. Johnson, and Green Wise should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12.02(6). Almost immediately after the hearing, however, Green Wise filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit as to all of its claims. On September 16, 2019 the trial court entered a detailed final order granting the motions to dismiss. On the same day, the trial court entered another order declining to allow Green Wise to take a voluntary nonsuit because the trial court had already ruled Green Wise's claims would be dismissed by the time the notice of nonsuit was filed.
In its final order, the trial court dismissed all claims asserted by Mr. Walker, Mr. Johnson, and Green Wise, and awarded both Appellee and Third-Party Defendants their respective attorney's fees against Mr. Walker pursuant to section 20-12-119(c). The trial court also awarded Third-Party Defendants and Appellee their respective attorney's fees associated with the motions to dismiss the claims filed by Green Wise.2 Finally, although it dismissed all of his claims, the trial court declined to assess any attorney's fees against Mr. Johnson because Mr. Johnson was purportedly pro se throughout the case.
Green Wise filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment on October 15, 2019. Green Wise argued that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Appellee and Third-Party Defendants, asserting for the first time that because Green Wise's claims were made while the case was removed to bankruptcy court, the trial court violated general principles of comity by relying on a Tennessee statute to award attorney's fees. Green Wise also argued that section 20-12-119(c) could not apply to the motions to dismiss filed by Appellee and Third-Party Defendants because Green Wise filed its counterclaims on May 12, 2019 in the bankruptcy court, and the motions to dismiss were not filed until August 30, 2019 in the trial court. According to Green Wise, the motions were untimely in light of section 20-12-119(c)(5)(B), which provides that "subsection (c) shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim that is dismissed by the granting of a motion to dismiss that was filed more than sixty (60) days after the moving party received service of the latest complaint, counter-complaint or cross-complaint in which that dismissed claim was made." The trial court entered an order denying the motion to alter or amend on November 14, 2019, and Green Wise filed a notice of appeal to this Court on December 16, 2019.
Issues
On appeal, Green Wise challenges the trial court's judgment only as it relates to Appellee.3 Green Wise raises several issues, which we consolidate and restate as follows: 1. Whether the trial court erred in declining to allow Green Wise to voluntarily dismiss its claims pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01.
2. Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Appellee pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c).
3. Whether Green Wise is entitled to its attorney's fees incurred on appeal.
Additionally, Appellee and Third-Party Defendants4 raise the following issues, which we also restate as follows: 4. Whether this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal.
5. Whether Green Wise's appeal is frivolous, such that Appellee and Third-Party Defendants are entitled to damages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.
6. Whether the trial court erred in declining to assess any attorney's fees against Mr. Johnson, in favor of both Appellee and Third-Party Defendants, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c).
Discussion
I.
As a threshold issue, Appellee contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Green Wise's appeal. "Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the authority of a particular court to hear a particular controversy." Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d 674 (Tenn. 1994)). "Subject matter jurisdiction relates to the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court." Landers, 872 S.W.2d at 675 (citing Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. 308, 10 Wall. 308, 19 L.Ed. 931 (1870)); see also In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tenn. 2012) ("A court derives subject matter jurisdiction, either explicitly or by necessary implication, from the Constitution of Tennessee or from a statute enacted by the Tennessee General Assembly or Congress."). This Court must possess subject matter jurisdiction in order to review a case, and subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d at 489. Because orders and judgments entered by courts lacking subject matter jurisdiction are void, "issues regarding a court's subject matter jurisdiction should be considered as a threshold inquiry, and...
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