Irvin v. Laxmi, Inc., s. S95A1665

Decision Date05 February 1996
Docket NumberNos. S95A1665,S95X1666,s. S95A1665
Citation467 S.E.2d 510,266 Ga. 204
PartiesIRVIN et al. v. LAXMI, INC. LAXMI, INC. v. IRVIN et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Title to land. Appeal from the Rabun County Superior Court; Hon. Robert B. Struble, Trial Judge.

Frank W. Armstrong III, Stewart, Melvin & Frost, Gainesville, for appellants.

Carol A. Walker and Nicki Noel Vaughan, Gainesville, for appellee.

FLETCHER, Presiding Justice.

In this appeal, adjoining property owners dispute the scope of express easements to a private alley and a parking lot. The trial court ruled that Laxmi, Inc., as holder of the easement, may bury a propane tank in the alley and erect curbing in the parking lot. Because the easements do not grant the unrestricted right to construct curbing and the trial court did not determine the alley's location, we reverse and remand.

In 1967, Irvin's predecessor-in-title conveyed by warranty deed a 0.18 acre lot and easement to Laxmi's predecessor-in-title to permit a motel expansion near the corner of Highway 441 and Warwoman Road in Clayton, Georgia. 1 The warranty deed easement gave Laxmi the right "to use the 20-foot private alley ... in common" with Irvin. On the same day, a separate agreement between the same parties conveyed the Z-3 Easement, which created a perpetual easement for Laxmi to use a parking area in common with Irvin on land south of the 0.18 acre lot and adjacent to Rickman Street and prohibited Irvin from building within 200 feet east of the parking area to provide additional common parking space. In 1970, another document granted Laxmi the Q-4 Easement to "construct and maintain curbing, sidewalks, signs, and shrubbery" on the land west of the 0.18 acre tract to Highway 441. After both owners began improving their properties in 1995, they filed declaratory judgment actions concerning the extent of the easements. The trial court ruled that Laxmi may bury its propane tank in the private alley and construct the proposed curbing in the parking lot. Irvin appeals these rulings and, in the cross-appeal, Laxmi challenges the trial court's failure to define the alley.

1. In interpreting an express easement, the rules of contract construction apply. The construction of a contract is a question of law for the court. 2 The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the parties' intent. 3 Parol evidence may not be considered unless the written instrument is ambiguous. 4

Under the Z-3 Easement, Laxmi may not install curbing that is unnecessary, limits access to the street, or obstructs parking. The agreement granted Laxmi "a perpetual easement in common with [Irvin] to use the entire parking area ... for the purpose of parking cars of customers" on the parking area shown on a 1967 plat. The instrument required Laxmi to base and pave the parking area and install all necessary curbs and gutters and gave Irvin the responsibility to shape all entrances from the highway on the west and street on the south side of the parking area. The agreement also provided that "access to said parking area from the street on the south side thereof shall be at all times available."

(a) Construing this language, we conclude that the unambiguous terms of the Z-3 Easement prevent Laxmi from constructing any curbing along the property line that divides the two parking lots fronting on Rickman Street. Since that proposed curbing would obstruct access to parking, it is not permitted as a matter of law.

(b) Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the Q-4 Easement does not amend the Z-3 Easement to permit Laxmi's curbing plan because the two easements deal with separate...

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    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 4, 2019
    ...provision.47 4 G Props., LLC v. GALS Real Estate, Inc ., 289 Ga. App. 315, 316, 656 S.E.2d 922 (2008) ; see Irvin v. Laxmi, Inc ., 266 Ga. 204, 205 (1), 467 S.E.2d 510 (1996) ("Parol evidence may not be considered unless the written instrument is ambiguous."); de Castro v. Durrell , 295 Ga.......
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    • June 27, 2017
    ...is a question of law for the court. The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the parties' intent." Irvin v. Laxmi, Inc. , 266 Ga. 204, 205 (1), 467 S.E.2d 510 (1996) (citations omitted). See also Pichulik v. Ball , 270 Ga.App. 656, 660 (1), 607 S.E.2d 247 (2004).EDC purported to co......
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    • March 1, 2022
    ...manifest that the writing was not intended to speak the whole contract, then parol evidence is admissible[.]"); Irvin v. Laxmi, Inc. , 266 Ga. 204, 205 (1), 467 S.E.2d 510 (1996) ("Parol evidence may not be considered unless the written instrument is ...
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