Irvine v. Cook
| Decision Date | 30 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:22-cv-00218-BLW |
| Parties | TONY A. IRVINE, Plaintiff, v. DUSTIN COOK, the CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, and JOHN DOES I - X, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
B Lynn Winmill U.S. District Court Judge.
Before the Court are Plaintiff Tony A. Irvine's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 7), and Defendants' Motion to Deny Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) (Dkt. 9). The Court heard oral argument on December 12, 2022, and the motions are ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Irvine's motion for partial summary judgment against Defendant Dustin Cook and deny Defendants' Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery.
On July 14, 2020, Defendant Idaho Falls Police Officer Dustin Cook received a call from dispatch advising him of a “disturbance between two males in the north end of the Walmart parking lot near the Longhorn Steak House in Idaho Falls.” Case Report, Ex. 1 to Wood Decl., Dkt. 7.3 at 5; Cook Decl. ¶ 2, Dkt. 13-1. Dispatch conveyed that the disturbance was “physical” and that “a bat was involved.” Cook Decl. ¶ 4, Dkt. 13-1. When Officer Cook arrived at the scene in his police vehicle, he observed “one male with a bat in his hands with it cocked over his shoulder, and “the other male in question standing about 10 yards away from [the man with the bat] yelling.” Case Report, Ex. 1 to Wood Decl., Dkt. 7.3 at 5. “There was another male sitting on the ground near the male with the bat.” Id. As Cook exited his patrol car, he ordered the man with the bat to put it down, and he did. Case Report, Ex. 1 to Wood Decl., Dkt. 7.3 at 4; Cook Decl. ¶ 8, Dkt. 13-1.
Office Cook then “ordered the man who was yelling to stay where he was so that [he] could investigate the disturbance.” Cook Decl. ¶ 9, Dkt. 13-1. The man did not respond to the command and “started to ride away.” Case Report, Dkt. 7.3 at 4; Cook Decl. ¶ 9, Dkt. 13-1. Officer Cook “then ran after [the man] telling him to stop,” but the man continued to ride away on his bicycle. Case Report, Dkt. 7.3 at 4; Cook Decl. ¶ 10, Dkt. 13-1. Cook then “prevented him from leaving by pushing him from his bicycle.” Cook Decl. ¶ 10, Dkt. 13-1; Case Report, Dkt. 7.3 at 4.
After pushing the man off his bicycle, Officer Cook left him with another officer and went to speak with the man who had been holding the bat. This man told Cook that he hit the other man with the bat on the arm because the man had been yelling at him, and he felt threatened. Case Report, Dkt. 7.3 at 5. Two witnesses backed up story of the man with the bat, telling Officer Cook that the man with the bat “had acted in self-defense after the man who had been yelling confronted them.” Cook Decl. ¶ 12, Dkt. 13-1.
After speaking with the man with the bat, Officer Cook spoke to the man who had attempted to ride away on his bike and who was now being detained by the other officer. This man was the plaintiff, Tony Irvine. Irvine told Cook that he did not know he was there or why the man had pulled a bat on him. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. Irvine admitted he had a verbal altercation with the other man, and then the man pulled a bat on him. Id. ¶ 16. Irvine informed Cook that the other man had hit him on the wrist with the bat. Id. ¶ 17.
Another witness recounted that the man with the bat had retrieved it from his vehicle and “started talking like he was an army tough guy and put up with no shit.” First Witness Statement, Dkt. 7.3 at 10. The witness said the man with the bat had previously thrown Irvine's bike out of the way, which is what provoked the verbal altercation. Id. When the man pulled out the bat, this witness reported that Irvine laughed and made a snide comment. Id. The man swung the bat at Irvine, who put up his arm to block it. Id. Irvine became upset and started yelling, according to this witness, and the man “was twirling the bat like was going to hit [Irvine] again.” Id. Irvine then said he was “out of [there]” and started pushing his bike toward Tobacco Connection. Id. There is no indication that Cook spoke to this witness at the time of the altercation, but it is undisputed that Irvine was 10 yards from the man with the bat at the time Cook arrived at the parking lot.[1]
Another witness who was at the Walmart parking lot at the time of the altercation submitted a statement asserting that he saw Irvine “riding across the parking lot and a police officer came running up behind him and tackled him off his bike.” Second Witness Statement, Dkt. 7.3 at 13. This witness says that Irvine “was just sitting down riding slow by Tobacco Connection.” Id. “There were no sirens or yelling.” Id. “Looked like Tony didn't even know they were there.” Id. “Ran up behind him and tackled him.. ..like he was America's Most Wanted fugitive.” Id. Id. According to this witness, Irvine did not get up until the paramedics came and helped him up, and then Irvine just left eventually, pushing his bike. Id.
Officer Cook did not issue any citations to either Irvine or the other man for disturbing the peace for fighting, and Irvine was never charged because of the incident. Case Report, Dkt. 7.3 at 6. Irvine declined medical attention and left. Id. Irvine maintains he suffered a collapsed lung and significantly displaced rib fractures spanning eight ribs, “which required complicated surgery involving open reduction and internal fixation of various ribs.”
On May 28, 2022, Irvine filed his Complaint against Defendants Dustin Cook and the City of Idaho Falls, alleging federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizures and use of excessive force. On August 18, 2022, Defendants filed their Answer, and on that same day, Plaintiff Tony Irvine moved for partial summary judgment, seeking summary judgment on his Fourth Amendment claims against Officer Cook in his individual capacity for unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force. In response, Defendants have moved to deny Irvine's motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(d).
Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or defense, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims ....” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 323-24 (1986). It is “not a disfavored procedural shortcut,” but is instead the “principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.” Id. at 327. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). There must be a genuine dispute as to any material fact - a fact “that may affect the outcome of the case.” Id. at 248.
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the Court must not make credibility findings. Id. at 255. Direct testimony of the non-movant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). On the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988).
The Court must be “guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. If a claim requires clear and convincing evidence, the question on summary judgment is whether a reasonable jury could conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the claim. Id.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001)(en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir.2000).
This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor. Deveraux, 263 F.3d at 1076. The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show “by her [ ] affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file” that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
However, the Court is “not required to comb through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). Instead, the “party opposing summary judgment must direct [the Court's] attention to specific triable facts.” Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003).
Only admissible evidence may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Fed.R.Civ.P 56(e). In determining admissibility for summary judgment purposes, it is the contents of the evidence rather than its form that must be considered. Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2003). If the contents of the...
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