Irvine v. State Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 84-1938

• Decision Date: 09 August 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-1938,84-1938
• Parties: , 19 O.B.R. 12 IRVINE, Appellee, v. The STATE of Ohio, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW, Appellant, et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 15

19 Ohio St.3d 15

482 N.E.2d 587, 19 O.B.R. 12

IRVINE, Appellee, v. The STATE of Ohio, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW, Appellant, et al.

No. 84-1938.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Aug. 9, 1985.

Syllabus by the Court

An employee's voluntary resignation on the basis of health problems is without just cause within the meaning of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) when the employee is physically capable of maintaining a position of employment with the employer, but fails to carry her burden of proving that she inquired of her employer whether employment opportunities were available which conformed to her physical capabilities and same were not offered to her by the employer.

Claimant-appellee, Emma A. Irvine (hereinafter "claimant"), was employed as a Hospital Aide Supervisor I at the Northeast Ohio Developmental Center, Broadview Campus (hereinafter "N.E.O.D.C.") from November 20, 1978 through April 21, 1983. Claimant was on medical leave of absence from N.E.O.D.C. due to problems caused by coronary artery disease from May 4, 1982 through October 14, 1982. Claimant returned to work on light duty at that time, but again went on medical leave from December 21, 1982 until the date of her resignation on April 21, 1983. Claimant's resignation was prompted by the advice of two physicians, Drs. S.H. Crano and A.I. Narraway, that she cease any employment which was physically demanding or would cause mental stress. The doctors determined that claimant was physically able to return to work, but with the restriction that she perform only those jobs which did not require a great deal of standing, physical lifting, or other stressful activity. Claimant chose not to return to any type of work with N.E.O.D.C., however.

Claimant then applied to the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services for unemployment compensation benefits. Claimant's application for the week ending April 30, 1983 was denied pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) and 4141.29(A)(4)(a), on the grounds that her separation from N.E.O.D.C. was without just cause and that she was physically unable to work during the benefit week claimed. The Administrator's reconsideration decision affirmed this initial determination.

Claimant appealed these initial findings to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (hereinafter "board"). An evidentiary hearing was conducted before a referee of the board. The referee modified the Administrator's determination and found that because claimant could perform certain duties under the limitations noted above, she could work in full-time employment. Thus, claimant was no longer disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits on the basis of her inability to work. The referee, however, affirmed that portion of the Administrator's decision which determined that claimant quit work without just cause. In so holding, the referee noted that claimant's resignation precluded N.E.O.D.C. from placing her in a suitable job. Accordingly, unemployment compensation benefits were disallowed. The board subsequently denied claimant's application to institute further administrative appeal.

The decision of the referee as effectively affirmed by the board was timely appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County. The court determined that claimant had not carried her burden of proving that she had just cause for terminating her employment with N.E.O.D.C. Accordingly, the court held that the board's decision was neither unlawful, unreasonable, nor against the manifest weight of the evidence, and affirmed.

The court of appeals found that the requisite evidentiary standard had not been satisfied at the administrative level by the board. The appeals court stated that the referee's findings were not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, and concluded that claimant had just cause for terminating her employment relationship with N.E.O.D.C. Thus, the court of appeals held that claimant was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits, and reversed.

The court of appeals, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Carcione (June 5, 1980), Cuyahoga App. No. 41184, unreported, certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination.

Tuccillo, Wilson & Slater and James W. Slater, Akron, for appellee.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Dwight Tillery, Howard M. Sanders and Fred J. Pompeani, Columbus, for appellant.

WRIGHT, Justice.

The issue before this court is whether an employee has quit her work without just cause within the meaning of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) when that employee voluntarily resigns due to health problems although the employee is physically capable of pursuing and maintaining other available full-time employment with her employer and fails to do so.

R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) establishes the necessary criteria to obtain unemployment compensation benefits for those who leave their jobs. In pertinent part it provides:

"(D) * * * [N]o individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits * * *:

" * * *

"(2) For the duration of his unemployment if the administrator finds that:

"(a) He quit his work without just cause or has been discharged for just cause in connection with his work * * *."

The claimant has the burden of proving her entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits under this statutory provision, including the existence of just cause for quitting work. Shannon v. Bur. of Unemp. Comp. (1951), 155 Ohio St. 53, 97 N.E.2d 425 ; Canton Malleable Iron Co. v. Green (1944), 75 Ohio App. 526, 62 N.E.2d 756 ; 54 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d (1962), Unemployment Compensation, Section 35.

The term "just cause" has not been clearly defined in our case law. We are in agreement with one of our appellate courts that "[t]here is, of course, not a slide-rule definition of just cause. Essentially, each case must be considered upon its particular merits. Traditionally, just cause, in the statutory sense, is that which, to an ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act." Peyton v. Sun T.V. (1975), 44 Ohio App.2d 10, 12, 335 N.E.2d 751 .

The determination of what constitutes just cause must be analyzed in conjunction with the legislative purpose underlying the Unemployment Compensation Act. Essentially, the Act's purpose is "to enable unfortunate employees, who become and remain involuntarily unemployed by adverse business and industrial conditions, to subsist on a reasonably decent level and is in keeping with the humanitarian and enlightened concepts of this modern day." (Emphasis sic.) Leach v. Republic Steel Corp. (1964), 176 Ohio St. 221, 223, 199 N.E.2d 3 ; accord Nunamaker v. United States Steel Corp. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 55, 57, 206 N.E.2d 206 . Likewise, "[t]he act was intended to provide financial assistance to an individual who had worked, was able and willing to work, but was temporarily without employment through no fault or agreement of his own." Salzl v. Gibson Greeting Cards (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 35, 39, 399 N.E.2d 76 .

We are in basic agreement with the court of appeals below that, in determining "just cause" as that term is construed by Peyton and Salzl, supra, the source or cause of the physical inability to work may be of no import, "at least in the absence of evidence of the employee's culpability in sustaining or incurring the condition." ¹ We do not agree, however, with that court's finding that claimant had just cause for quitting her work, thereby entitling her to unemployment compensation benefits.

The determination of whether just cause exists necessarily depends upon the unique factual considerations of the particular case. Determination of purely factual questions is primarily within the province of the referee and the board. Upon appeal, a court of law may reverse such decisions only if they are unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Roach (1947), 148 Ohio St. 511, 518, 76 N.E.2d 79 . Like other courts serving in an appellate capacity, we sit on a court with limited power of review. Such courts are not permitted to make factual findings or to determine the credibility of witnesses. Hall v. American Brake Shoe Co. (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 11, 13, 233 N.E.2d 582 . The duty or authority of the courts is to determine whether the decision of the board is supported by the evidence in the record. Kilgore v. Bd. of Review (1965), 2 Ohio App.2d 69, 71, 206 N.E.2d 423 . The fact that reasonable minds might reach different conclusions is not a basis for the reversal of the board's decision. Craig v. Bur. of Unemp. Comp. (1948), 83 Ohio App. 247, 260, 83 N.E.2d 628 . Moreover, "[o]ur statutes on appeals from such decisions [of the board] are so designed and worded as to leave undisturbed the board's decisions on close questions. Where the board might reasonably decide either way, the courts have no authority to upset the board's decision." Charles Livingston & Sons, Inc. v. Constance (1961), 115 Ohio App. 437, 438, 185 N.E.2d 655 .

In the instant case, our review of the record supports the decision of the board denying claimant unemployment compensation benefits. We agree with the court of appeals below that claimant terminated her employment with N.E.O.D.C. on the advice of Drs. Crano and Narraway, and that claimant apprised N.E.O.D.C. of her medical condition and physical limitations. We do not agree with the court of appeals' finding that claimant attempted to work with N.E.O.D.C. to obtain a less demanding position or that claimant gave N.E.O.D.C. sufficient timely notice to afford it the opportunity of finding satisfactory alternative employment for her. In fact, the record indicates that the exact opposite is true. The referee expressly stated, in his decision, that:

"Claimant took the two doctors' releases to N.E.O.D.C. and immediately resigned her...