Irving v. Dist. of Columbia
| Decision Date | 09 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-3818 (RDM) |
| Parties | LEONITE IRVING, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Leonite Irving, proceeding pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants the District of Columbia, Muriel Bowser, Quincy L. Booth, and the Warden of the District of Columbia jail, alleging that their deliberate indifference to an episode of inmate violence of which he was the victim violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Dkt. 1 at 2-5 (Compl.). Defendant District of Columbia (hereinafter "the District") moves to dismiss, Dkt. 10, arguing that (1) Irving's Complaint fails to state a claim under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); and (2) the "Court should abstain from considering [the remaining claims in] Plaintiff's Complaint because he has a duplicative dispute pending in [D.C.] Superior Court," Dkt. 10 at 6.1
For the reasons that follow, the District's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
As it must, the Court accepts Irving's factual allegations as true for purposes of evaluating the District's motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Court is further mindful that "pro se pleadings should be liberally construed," Nichols v. Vilsack, No. 13-cv-1502, 2015 WL 9581799, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2015) (quotation marks omitted), and that Irving must be afforded "the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged," Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
On March 18, 2019, Irving was repeatedly stabbed by a fellow inmate at the D.C. jail where he was then incarcerated. Dkt. 1 at 3 (Compl. ¶¶ 1-3). The attack took place in Irving's housing unit, and when he "tried to run and get away" from his assailant, Irving found the "sally port gates were closed," preventing his escape. Id. at 3-4 (Compl. ¶¶ 2-4). The unit officers stationed nearby meanwhile refused to intervene and instead "stood [] and watched" Irving's assault. Id. (Compl. ¶ 5). By the time the attack ended, Irving "had received 8 stab wounds[] to his body and head." Id. (quotation marks omitted). He was then "rushed to [an] outside hospital" where he received "numerous stitches to close the stab wounds." Id. (Compl. ¶ 7).
On December 20, 2019, Irving filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming (1) that Defendants exhibited "deliberate indifference to the serious risk of inmate[-]on[-]inmate violence that threatened [his] safety and proximately caused his injuries," and (2) that their deliberate indifference violated both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution.Id. at 3, 5 (Compl.). At the same time, Irving filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. 2, which the Court granted, Dkt. 4.2
On March 4, 2020 Irving moved for appointment of counsel, Dkt. 5 at 1, and to amend his Complaint such that "all Defendants be sued in [their] [i]ndividual as well as the[ir] [o]fficial [c]apacit[ies]," id. at 2. On June 30, 2020, the District notified the Court that Irving's instant suit "appear[ed] duplicative of [a] case filed in Superior Court of the District of Columbia, where [Irving] is represented by counsel." Dkt. 9 at 1. Accordingly, the Court denied Irving's motion for appointment of counsel "without prejudice pending a determination of whether this case is duplicative of the pending case in Superior Court in which Plaintiff is represented by counsel." Minute Order (July 17, 2020). As the Court explained, "[u]ntil that question is resolved, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff is 'unable to retain counsel by other means[] and the degree to which the interests of just[ice] will be served by appointment of counsel.'" Id. (quoting Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp., 228 F. Supp. 3d 28, 47 (D.D.D. 2017)).
Shortly after the Court denied Irving's motion for appointment of counsel, the District filed the instant motion to dismiss. Dkt. 10. Because Irving was proceeding pro se, the Court notified him that he was "entitled to file a memorandum and supporting evidence in response" to the District's motion. Dkt. 12 at 1. The Court further informed Irving that if he "fail[ed] to respond to [the District's] motion in the time provided, the Court may (1) treat the motion as conceded; . . . (2) rule on [the] motion based on [the District's] arguments alone and withoutconsidering Plaintiff's arguments; or (3) dismiss Plaintiff's claims for failure to prosecute." Id. . Finally, the Court noted that "if Plaintiff 'files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.'" Id. (quoting Xenophon Strategies, Inc. v. Jernigan Copeland & Anderson, PLLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 61, 72 (D.D.C. 2017)).
On August 28, 2020, Irving filed his opposition to the District's motion to dismiss. Dkt. 13. The District filed its reply to Irving's opposition on September 10, 2020. Dkt. 16. The District's motion to dismiss, Dkt. 10, is thus now ripe for the Court's consideration.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations contained in the complaint. A complaint must contain "'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although "detailed factual allegations" are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must furnish "more than labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Instead, the complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (citations omitted). If the complaint's allegations fail to meet this standard, the court must dismiss the action. Id. To be sure, complaints by pro se litigants areheld to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nevertheless, even a pro se litigant must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Accordingly, "a pro se complaint, like any other, must present a claim upon which relief can be granted," as required by Rule 12(b)(6). Henthorn v. Dep't of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citation omitted)).
The Court will first consider whether abstention is proper and will then address whether Irving's Monell claim is adequately pled under Rule 12(b)(6).
The District argues that the "Court should abstain from considering Plaintiff's Complaint [in its entirety] because [Irving] has a duplicative dispute pending in Superior Court (Irving v. District of Columbia, 2020 CA 001777 B)." Dkt. 10 at 6. In support of that argument, the District points to the Colorado River abstention doctrine, by which "a district court may abstain from exercising jurisdiction in circumstances of parallel, duplicative litigation." Foster-El v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 67, 71 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)).
When deciding whether to abstain under Colorado River, a district court should consider several factors, none dispositive: "(1) whether one court assumed jurisdiction . . . first; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (4) the order of jurisdiction in the concurrent forums; (5) whether the case involves federal law; and (6) whether the state-court proceeding can adequately protect the parties' rights." Id. (citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460U.S. 1, 25-26 (1983)). Importantly, however, the propriety of Colorado-River abstention '"does not rest on a mechanical checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.'" Edge Inv., LLC v. District of Columbia, 927 F.3d 549, 554 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16) (emphasis added). The balance is so weighted, the Supreme Court explained in Colorado River itself, because of the "virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them." 424 U.S. at 817; see also Edge Inv., 927 F.3d at 553 n.3 (collecting cases). Consequently, "the [general] rule is that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the [f]ederal court having jurisdiction." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted). In turn, "dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding" is warranted only in the face of "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 818; see also Hoai v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., 866 F.2d 1515, 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1989) .
The District argues that those exceptional circumstances are present here because "[t]he facts of this case and Plaintiff's Superior Court case are the same and the...
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