Irwin v. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co.

• Decision Date: 22 October 1925
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 519
• Parties: IRWIN v. ALABAMA FUEL & IRON CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

110 So. 566

215 Ala. 328

IRWIN v. ALABAMA FUEL & IRON CO.

7 Div. 519

Supreme Court of Alabama

October 22, 1925

Rehearing Denied Dec. 9, 1926

Appeal from Circuit Court, Shelby County; E.S. Lyman, Judge.

Action by Mary B. Irwin, as administratrix of the estate of Will Clelland, deceased, against the Alabama Fuel & Iron Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The facts are stated by the court.

W.A Denson and G.R. Carter, both of Birmingham, for appellant.

Percy Benners & Burr, of Birmingham, for appellee.

Statement.

BOULDIN J.

Mary B Irwin, as administratrix of the estate of Will Clelland, deceased, sues to recover damages for the death of her intestate in a mine explosion. Decedent was an employee of defendant, Alabama Fuel & Iron Company, and the negligence counted upon is the failure to provide a reasonably safe place in which to perform the duties of his employment.

Defendant pleaded accord and satisfaction evidenced by written agreements of compromise and release executed by Mary Agnes Clelland, the widow, and R.L.M. Burt, a former administrator of the estate of said decedent. Briefly stated, the plea avers that the widow, being at the time the sole distributee of decedent's estate, entered into an agreement to accept $2,000 in full satisfaction of the demand now sued upon, and, in the event an unborn child of decedent should be born alive and survive one month, an additional sum of $250 should be paid for the use of the child; that accordingly $1,000 was paid to the widow, who executed her release and assignment of all further interest in the claim to defendant; that contemporaneously R.L.M. Burt was duly appointed and qualified as administrator, and thereupon $1,000 was paid to him and a release executed by him; that after the birth of the child the additional sum of $250 was paid to the administrator as agreed, and he thereafter accounted for and paid the $1,250 held by him for the use of the child into the probate court.

Plaintiff, by replication, assails the compromise and release for fraud. Briefly stated, the replication avers that Burt, the administrator, a confidential servant and employee of defendant, was appointed at its instance, acted under its advice and control, and fraudulently settled the claim for an inadequate sum in the interest of defendant; that said administrator had been removed by order of the probate court because of such fraudulent settlement. The probate proceedings are made exhibit to the replication.

Defendant, by rejoinder, pleaded res adjudicata as to the alleged fraud set up in the replication. Briefly, the rejoinder alleges that the infant child, Willie May Clelland, by her next friend, Mary B. Irwin, filed her bill in the chancery court against this defendant and Burt, individually and as administrator, seeking, among other things, to set aside, annul, and hold for naught the alleged fraudulent settlement entered into by the administrator, which cause proceeded to a final decree for defendant. The rejoinder further alleges that in the chancery suit the infant child sued by her next friend, Mary B. Irwin, who now sues as administratrix; that Mary Agnes Clelland, widow of decedent, ratified the settlement on her part and retained the money paid her, and the infant child is the only person interested in the pending suit.

The bill, answer, and decree in the chancery cause are made exhibits to the rejoinder. The bill alleged with sufficient detail the death of complainant's father under conditions rendering defendant liable in damages; that the proper measure of damages was much in excess of that paid the administrator; then sets up the alleged fraudulent appointment of the administrator, the making of the collusive settlement in substance as set up in the replication above; that the administrator had filed his accounts and vouchers for a settlement of said estate, seeking to have the probate court confirm the fraudulent settlement and discharge him from further accounting; that complainant is without adequate remedy at law to avoid the fraud about to be consummated; that in a suit to recover proper damages defendant would plead the alleged settlement as a good defense at law. The bill prayed for the removal of the administration into the chancery court, for an injunction against further proceedings in the probate court, that the fraudulent settlement be set aside, annulled, and held for naught, and this defendant be enjoined from setting up the settlement and release in defense of any action at law for the damages due. The answer denied in detail the allegations of fraud in the settlement. Briefly stated, it averred nonliability in the first instance; that the settlement was negotiated openly and fairly with the widow of decedent under the advice and assistance of her father, W.W. Irwin; that the administrator was appointed by agreement to consummate the settlement in a lawful manner; that the amount paid in compromise of the claim was adequate, and the releases, made exhibit to the answer, were executed in good faith, without fraud or collusion.

The decree, of date March 11, 1915, reads:

"This cause was submitted at said term of this court for final decree on pleadings and proof as noted by the register, and by order of the court held for decree in vacation. Upon consideration thereof, the court is of the opinion that complainant is not entitled to relief in this suit. It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that complainant's suit in this cause be and the same is hereby dismissed out of this court, and that Mary B. Irwin, the next friend of complainant, pay the cost of this suit, to be taxed by the register, for which let execution issue."

Plaintiff, by apt grounds of demurrer to the rejoinder, challenges the sufficiency of the chancery proceedings as a conclusive adjudication of the issue of fraud in the settlement. The demurrer being overruled, plaintiff filed several surrejoinders. Their substance and effect are sufficiently shown in the opinion. Defendant's demurrer to the surrejoinders being sustained, plaintiff, because of the adverse rulings of the court upon the pleadings, took a nonsuit, and prosecutes this appeal to review such rulings.

Opinion.

It sufficiently appears from the foregoing statement that the primary inquiry is: Was the decree in the chancery suit conclusive and pleadable in this action as res adjudicata of the issue of fraud in the settlement and compromise made with the former administrator?

The doctrine of res adjudicata rests upon the primary principle that matters once adjudicated are settled and determined. Certain essential elements must concur in a valid adjudication. Judgments in personam require the presence of parties, who have their day in court. As to all other persons, strangers to the suit, the judgment has no effect; as an adjudication of their rights, it is as if no judgment exists. Hence, the well-known rule that when a judgment in one suit is set up as evidence of the adjudication of matters involved in a later suit, the parties to the two suits must be the same--that is, the parties sought to be concluded must have been the same in both suits. There must be identity of parties as the law defines parties in this connection. Another element is identity of subject-matter. The question at issue in the second suit must have been at issue in the former suit and adjudicated therein.

In some cases it is said the point must have been directly in issue and the case decided upon that point. Such limitation must be taken in connection with the particular case in which it is applied. Thus, the rule is also generally announced that a judgment is conclusive, not only of questions actually litigated, but also of questions within the general issue to be tried, and which might have been litigated. For illustration, if a suit is brought on a promissory note, the defendant brought into court, and judgment recovered by plaintiff, it is conclusive of all defenses. If defendant pleads payment and nothing else, and the cause is tried on that issue, so long as the judgment stands unreversed it is conclusive of the execution of the note, though no plea of non est factum be interposed--conclusive that there was no want or failure or illegality of consideration, though no plea raised these issues. The scope of the issue made by the complaint in such case is whether defendant is lawfully indebted to plaintiff as evidenced by the note sued upon, and the judgment concludes that issue. This simple illustration is clear enough; but more difficult questions arise in suits at law and equity involving complicated issues of law and fact, wherein matters may be only collaterally involved and not necessary to the decision of the cause. We enter upon no wide discussion of the shadings of the law as applied in such cases.

Another essential of a valid judgment is that it is the judicial action of a court with power to act in the premises--a court of competent jurisdiction. The court must first have jurisdiction of the class of controversies involved. A suit in ejectment in the probate court, or a suit to foreclose an equitable lien in a law court, could eventuate in no binding judgment for want of jurisdiction in general. But the court must also have jurisdiction of the parties and of the special subject-matter it seeks to act upon. The controversy, the res, whatever its nature, must come within the court's power to act, and be acted upon. Closely connected is the rule that the decision must be upon the merits. So, if the case goes out of court for nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties, or because no case is made of which the court has jurisdiction, there is no adjudication of the controverted issues. Of this...