Irwin v. Woodmansee

Decision Date25 May 1891
Citation16 S.W. 486,104 Mo. 403
PartiesIrwin, Appellant, v. Woodmansee et al
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court. -- Hon. M. G. McGregor, Judge.

Affirmed.

T. B Haughawout for appellant.

(1) It being admitted in this case that appellant is the owner of the paper title to the strip of land in question and that he had bought and paid for the same, the burden was on the respondent to prove an adverse and antagonistic possession of said land under color and claim of title by herself, and those under whom she claims, for ten years before the commencement of this action. Russell v. Davis, 38 Conn. 562; Boadley v. West, 60 Mo. 33. (2) There was no adverse possession shown in this case. The fence remaining where it was when David Woodmansee sold to S.D. Woodmansee in 1875 up to the time plaintiff bought in 1883, and could not be considered an act on the part of David Woodmansee indicating his intentions of holding adversely to S.D West v. Railroad, 59 Mo. 510; Brown v Cockrell, 33 Ala. 45; Lamb v. Coe, 15 Minn. 642; Irvine v. Adler, 43 Cal. 569. (3) Where a person owns a tract of land, and as in this case sells a part of the same to another by metes and bounds, with the understanding that they should both occupy to a certain line until the true line is ascertained by survey, there can be no adverse holding until after the true line is ascertained. University v. McCune, 28 Mo. 48; Kincaid v. Danney, 51 Mo. 552; Tanner v. Kellogg, 48 Mo. 118. (4) The affidavit of George Cunningham filed in support of the motion for a new trial shows that in the year 1883, at the time appellant bought this tract of land from S.D. Woodmansee, both David Woodmansee and S.D. Woodmansee pointed out to him the true line, nine feet north of the fence between the respective premises, and, therefore, shows conclusively that there never was an adverse occupancy of the land in question by David Woodmansee, and appellant's motion for a new trial should be sustained. (5) Nancy Woodmansee, in her testimony in this case, claims that the land in question was deeded to S.D. Woodmansee through mistake. This being the case, the statute of limitation did not commence to run until the mistake was discovered, which she testifies was the spring before the commencement of this suit. Grundy v. Grundy, 12 Mon. (Ky.) 269; Knowlton v. Smith, 36 Mo. 507; Thomas v. Babb, 45 Mo. 384; Gruhe v. Mills, 34 Iowa 148. (6) The evidence of Nancy DeMott, and Grant Woodmansee as to what land David Woodmansee intended to deed to S.D. Woodmansee in 1875, was clearly inadmissible as an attempt to change the recitals in a deed by oral testimony. Wildbahan v. Robidaux, 11 Mo. 659; Jennings v. Brizeadine, 44 Mo. 330; Hartt v. Rector, 13 Mo. 485; Orn v. How, 55 Mo. 328; King v. Fink, 51 Mo. 209.

E. O. Brown and C. A. Peterson for respondents.

(1) Where adjoining proprietors hold possession up to a given line but without claiming or intending to claim beyond the true line, wherever that may turn out to be, the possession will not be adverse to the true owner. But where, as in this case, one takes and holds exclusive possession up to a wall or fence, and claims to be the owner up to that wall or fence, his possession will be adverse. Cole v. Parker, 70 Mo. 372; Handlan v. McManus, 100 Mo. 124; Walbrunn v. Ballen, 68 Mo. 164; Hamilton v. West, 63 Mo. 93; Atchison v. Pease, 96 Mo. 566. (2) Where adjoining proprietors fix or agree upon a certain fence as a boundary line, and take possession accordingly, the agreement is binding on them and those claiming under them. Such an agreement is not within the statute of frauds. Jacobs v. Mosley, 91 Mo. 462; Taylor v. Zepp, 14 Mo. 482; Blair v. Smith, 16 Mo. 273; Turner v. Baker, 64 Mo. 218; Acton v. Dooley, 74 Mo. 63; Browne on Frauds, sec. 75; Krider v. Milner, 99 Mo. 145. (3) The appellate court in law cases has only the power to review the law declared by the trial court, and when that court is intrusted with both the facts and the law the appellate court must assume the facts to be as the trial court finds them, and the unvarying practice is not to disturb such finding. Warren v. Maloney, 39 Mo.App. 295; Handlan v. McManus, 100 Mo. 124; Hamilton v. Boggess, 63 Mo. 233; Gaines v. Fender, 82 Mo. 497.

OPINION

Brace, J.

This is an action in ejectment to recover a strip of land nine and one-half feet wide by four hundred and twenty-four and one-half long, in the city of Carthage, in Jasper county. The petition is in the usual form. The suit was originally brought against Nancy Woodmansee, tenant of Harriet Fabyan, who was made a party defendant on her own motion. The defense set up in the answer was the statute of limitations. The case was tried before the court without a jury and resulted in a judgment for the defendant, from which plaintiff appeals.

The suit was instituted on the tenth of June, 1887. David Woodmansee is the common source of title. In 1872 he purchased a three-acre lot in the city of Carthage and took possession thereof, fenced it, erected a house, and made other improvements on the north part of said lot, and built a fence running east and west through the lot, fencing off about an acre on the south side for a cattle lot. On the thirtieth of March, 1875, David Woodmansee conveyed to his son Solomon D., by metes and bounds, the south part of the lot. Solomon took possession of his part of the lot and occupied it to the line of this east and west fence until September, 1880, when he conveyed it, by the same description, to the plaintiff, who took possession and occupied it to the same line by tenants or in person until the spring of 1887, when he had a survey made of his lot and brought this suit.

It was admitted that the strip of land sued for was within the east and west boundary line called for in his deeds, which was about nine and one-half feet north of the line of said fence. The defendant Fabyan by mesne conveyance has acquired the legal title of David Woodmansee to the north part of said lot not conveyed to his son Solomon. The strip of land sued for, lying along and north of said fence, has, ever since the conveyance by David Woodmansee to his son Solomon, remained in the open, notorious, continuous, exclusive and actual possession and occupancy of the said David and his grantees, to the line of said east and west fence, and was so in the possession of the defendant when this suit was brought.

I. The only question in the case was whether such possession by the defendant and her grantors was adverse; this question of fact was fairly presented and passed upon by the court under a series of declarations of law in which no error is pointed out, and in which we have been unable to discover any. If any error was committed, it is in the finding of the courts on the facts. When, in an action at law, the facts as...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT