Isenbart v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Kit Carson Cnty., Civil Case No. 11-cv-03240-LTB-BNB
| Decision Date | 25 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Case No. 11-cv-03240-LTB-BNB |
| Parties | TONYA ISENBART, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF KIT CARSON COUNTY, a body corporate and politic, TOM RIDNOUR, in his individual capacity, ROBERT FURROW, in his individual capacity, and WILLIAM KORBELIK, a private citizen, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
ORDER
This matter is before me on motions to dismiss filed by the Defendants seeking dismissal of the claims asserted against them by Plaintiff, Tonya Isenbart; specifically, I address: 1) Defendant [Sheriff Tom] Ridnour's Motion to Dismiss [Doc #21]; 2) Undersheriff Robert Furrow's Motion to Dismiss [Doc #22]; 3) Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Kit Carson County's Motion to Dismiss [Doc #19]; and 4) Defendant William Korbelik's Motion to Dismiss [Doc #20]. Oral arguments would not materially assist me in my determinations. After consideration of the parties' arguments, and for the reason stated, I GRANT the motions and I DISMISS this case.
The following are facts as alleged by Plaintiff in her Amended Complaint. [Doc # 7] Plaintiff was employed, starting in September 2007, as the Victim Advocate Program Director for Defendant Kit Carson County. She reported to Kit Carson County Sheriff, Ed Raps. InMarch of 2009, Plaintiff informed her then-husband, Defendant William Korbelik, that she intended to seek a divorce. Soon thereafter, she began dating Joe Isenbart - who was, at the time, the Undersheriff of Kit Carson County - and informed Sheriff Raps of their relationship. In October of 2009, Plaintiff and Mr. Isenbart moved in together and "intended to create a familial relationship."
Plaintiff alleges that sometime in 2010, Defendant Korbelik "persuaded [Defendant] Tom Ridnour to run against Sheriff Raps in the August 2010 Republican primary election" and in so doing convinced Defendant Ridnour that, if elected, he should terminate Plaintiff and Mr. Isenbart. Defendant Ridnour ultimately won the election for Sheriff of Kit Carson County. In mid-November Mr. Isenbart asked Defendant Ridnour whether he would have a job when Ridnour became the Sheriff, and he responded that either Mr. Isenbart or Plaintiff would "have to go." As a result, Mr. Isenbart tendered his resignation as Undersheriff.
Defendant Ridnour then became Sheriff of Kit Carson County on January 12, 2011, and appointed Defendant Robert Furrow to the position of Undersheriff. Three days later, on January 15, 2011, Plaintiff "provided the County with a document informing it that [she] and Joe Isenbart considered themselves married" as of that date.
On March 3, 2011, Defendant Undersheriff Furrow informed Plaintiff that he had decided to terminate her. Plaintiff appealed the decision to Defendant Sheriff Ridnour, who upheld her termination. Plaintiff asserts that the purported grounds for her termination were pretextual, and that her termination was in fact improperly motivated by her relationship with Mr. Isenbart.
In her amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts a federal claim for Violation of SubstantiveDue Process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 ("§1983"). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that by entering into an "intimate dating, marital, and familial relationship" with Mr. Isenbart, Plaintiff "created a relationship protected as a fundamental right or liberty interest under the substantive due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment. And, "by subjecting Plaintiff to unjustified discipline and termination, Defendants intended to interfere with her [protected] relationship with Joe Isenbart." She asserts that Defendants' decision to discipline and terminate her "was motivated by her exercise of the fundamental right to intimate association" and that "no compelling governmental interest was present to justify the discipline and discharge of Plaintiff because of her intimate relationships." In addition, Plaintiff also asserts state law claims against Defendants for: Intentional Interference with Contract; Intentional Interference with Prospective Business Advantage; Civil Conspiracy; and Violation of Lawful Off-Duty Activity State (Colo. Rev. State § 24-34-402.5). Defendants have filed the motions to dismiss at issue here in which they contend that Plaintiff's federal claim asserted under §1983 must be dismissed and, in turn, her remaining claims be dismissed on the basis that I should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims.
In their motions, Defendant Sheriff Ridnour and Undersheriff Furrow assert that Plaintiff's §1983 claim asserted against them must be dismissed based on their defense of qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)); see also Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1134 (10th Cir. 2006).
Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying a "strict two-part test. " McBeth v. Himes, 598 F.3d 708, 716 (10th Cir. 2010)(quoting Bowling v. Rector, 584 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 2009)). A plaintiff can overcome the presumption of immunity only by carrying the heavy burden of showing both that: (1) the defendant in question violated one of her constitutional rights, and (2) the infringed right at issue was clearly established at the time of the allegedly unlawful activity such that "every reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing" violated the law. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2011)(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, __ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)). Failure to show either qualified immunity element is fatal to the plaintiff's cause. Kerns v. Bader, supra, 663 F.3d at 1180.
In applying the two-part qualified immunity analysis, I first address the question of whether Plaintiff adequately alleged that Defendants Ridnour and Furrow acted to violate Plaintiff's federally protected rights. In doing so, I "consider[ ] whether the facts taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff show that the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right" cognizable under §1983. Poolaw v. Marcantel, 565 F.3d 721, 728 (10th Cir. 2009). Thus, I first determine whether Defendants' actions - in terminating Plaintiff's employment allegedly because of her relationship with Mr. Isenbart - violated her right to freedom of intimate association.
Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute . . .subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive any person of liberty without due process of law and, as relevant here, it protects the right to the freedom of intimate association as "an intrinsic element of personal liberty." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3249, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) (); see also Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (10th Cir.1985).
It is beyond dispute that a marital relationship constitutes an intimate association. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640, 94 S.Ct. 791, 796, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974). In addition, the right of familial association is a substantive due process right, as recognized by the Tenth Circuit in Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners, supra, 768 F.2d at 1188-89. See also Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993)("[t]he freedom of intimate association is a substantive due process right, as is its subset, the familial right of association"). However, the Supreme Court has indicated that the right of association does not include a generalized right of social association. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed2d 18 (1989).
The question here is whether Plaintiff adequately alleged that her federally protected right to the freedom of intimate association was violated by the actions of Defendants Ridnour and Furrow in terminating her based on her relationship with Mr. Isenbart. My review ofPlaintiff's amended complaint is that she did. Specifically, she alleged that the freedom of intimate association is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the due process clause. And, by entering into "an intimate dating, marital, and familial relationship" with Mr. Isenbart, Plaintiff pleads that she created a such a relationship. Furthermore, she alleged that by subjecting her to unjustified discipline and termination, Defendants Ridnour and Furrow intended to interfere with her relationship with Mr. Isenbart and that they were motivated by her exercise of the fundamental right to intimate association. [Doc #7] While I agree with Defendants that the assertions set forth in Plaintiff's complaint are often conclusory, and may be inaccurate or incomplete, when they are viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, I find that her complaint alleges that Defendants Ridnour and Furrow violated Plaintiff's federally protected right by terminating her because of her relationship with Mr. Isenbart.
Having determined that the complaint adequately alleges that Def...
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