Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co.

• Decision Date: 25 September 1979
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 79-1265.
• Citation: 477 F. Supp. 142
• Parties: ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN and Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Plaintiffs, v. The BOEING COMPANY and Logistics Support Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

477 F. Supp. 142

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

and

Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Plaintiffs, v. The BOEING COMPANY and Logistics Support Corporation, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 79-1265.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

September 25, 1979.

Thomas G. Shack, Jr., Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

Carroll E. Dubuc, Washington, D. C., Keith Gerrard, Seattle, Wash., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

GESELL, District Judge.

Defendants have moved for an order transferring this action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)^*; alternatively they seek dismissal on grounds of improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction. The issues have been fully briefed on both sides. The Court concludes that this action should properly be transferred for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice; it therefore does not consider the motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs, a foreign government and its Air Force, seek to recover $75 million in damages from defendant corporations, an airplane manufacturer and its wholly controlled subsidiary doing business principally in the State of Washington. Plaintiffs allege that defendants' negligence caused the crash and total destruction of a 747 jet transport aircraft owned by plaintiffs and manufactured by defendant The Boeing Company ("Boeing"). The crash, which occurred in Spain in 1976, resulted in the deaths of all persons aboard the aircraft. Eight wrongful death actions were previously filed against Boeing in this Court; they were transferred to the Western District of Washington pursuant to § 1404(a) by Order of Judge Parker. Clements v. The Boeing Co., No. 77-0783 (D.D.C. July 7, 1977). That district undisputedly is one where the instant action "might have been brought."

Under § 1404(a), a moving defendant bears the burden of showing that the balance of convenience and the interest of justice are in his favor. SEC v. Savoy Industries, Inc., 190 U.S.App.D.C. 252, 257, 587 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C.Cir. 1978); Celanese Corp. v. Federal Energy Administration, 410 F.Supp. 571 (D.D.C.1976). With respect to factors of convenience, to parties and witnesses, the Court finds that defendants have satisfied this burden. Seattle, Washington, is the principal place of business for both defendants. Virtually all of the documents and witnesses connected with the design, manufacture, testing and sale of the subject aircraft, and the training of operations personnel, are located in the Seattle area. The wreckage of the aircraft itself also has been transported to the State of Washington. Defendants argue persuasively that a trial in the District of Columbia would exact a considerable toll in terms of travel cost, disruption of normal business operations, and interference with personal and family lives.

Although plaintiffs contend that additional witnesses will have to be called from Iran to testify on aircraft modification and maintenance, and from Spain to testify as observers of the crash, these persons will be inconvenienced by extensive travel regardless of the place of trial in this country. Plaintiffs have identified no persons residing in the District of Columbia who will be called upon to testify. The factor of convenience of the witnesses therefore clearly favors transfer.

Plaintiffs also assert a claim of inconvenience to themselves as parties, premised on their need to consult with embassy staff in Washington, D. C., and the correlative difficulty of making such staff available in Seattle to coordinate this litigation. The necessity for embassy personnel to be in Seattle on a continuing basis is highly speculative. Moreover, any difficulty resulting from such a shift in personnel is offset by the equal discomfort to defendant parties of a protracted legal proceeding in Washington, D. C. The inconvenience experienced by plaintiffs' counsel in the District of Columbia, in having to travel to Seattle or retain local counsel there, is of minor, if any, importance under § 1404(a). Poncy v. Johnson & Johnson, 414 F.Supp. 551, 558 (S.D.Fla.1976); Scheinbart v. Certain-Teed Products Corp., 367 F.Supp. 707, 710 (S.D.N. Y.1973). Accordingly, the overall balance of convenience favors defendants. See Allied International Prod. Ltd. v. Textron Indus., Inc., 382 F.Supp. 210, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Mitchell v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 350 F.Supp. 1325, 1327 (E.D.Pa.1972).

In weighing claims of convenience, the Court recognizes the diminished consideration accorded to a plaintiff's choice of forum where, as here, that forum has no meaningful ties to the controversy and no particular interest in the parties or subject...