Ison v. Mayor

• Decision Date: 18 June 1896
• Parties: ISON. v. MAYOR, ETC., OF GRIFFIN.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

98 Ga. 623

25 S.E. 611

ISON.

v.MAYOR, ETC., OF GRIFFIN.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 18, 1896.

Liquor License — Revocation—Action for Damages.

1. Inasmuch as a license to sell spirituous liquors is neither a contract nor a property right in the licensee, but a mere permit to do what would otherwise be an offense against the general law, it is, when granted by a municipal corporation, subject at all times to the police powers of that corporation; and the latter, in the absence of any charter restriction upon its authority in this respect, may, in the exercise of those powers, revoke the license at any time.

2. Every person who obtains such a license accepts it under the conditions above expressed, is therefore chargeable with knowledge that it is liable to be revoked, and consequently cannot maintain against the municipality an action for damages occasioned by a revocation, even when the licensee has done no overt or unlawful act which would afford cause for revocation.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Spalding county; M. W. Beck, Judge.

Action by R. Z. Ison against the mayor and council of Griffin. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

John J. Hunt and Dismude & Mills, for plaintiff in error.

Hammond & Cleveland, for defendants in error.

LUMPKIN, J. The mayor and council of Griffin granted Ison a license to sell spirituous liquors. He proceeded to erect a building in which to sell the same, purchased fixtures for use therein, bought a stock of liquors, engaged help, and otherwise incurred expense in preparing to carry on business under his license. Thereupon the city authorities summarily revoked the license, and he brought his action against the municipal corporation, alleging he had sustained damages of various kinds, the nature of which will be readily inferred from the foregoing brief statement of the facts. The case turns upon the question whether or not such an action is maintainable. We have reached the conclusion that it is not. In Brown v. State, 82 Ga. 224, 7 S. E. 915, this court held that such a license was not a contract by the state, county, or city with the licensee, but simply a permit to do business under the license, which was revocable at any time. To the same effect, see Sprayberry v. City of Atlanta, 87 Ga. 120, 13 S. E. 197, in which it was further ruled that the granting of a license by a municipal corporation to sell liquor was an exercise of police power. The identical question presented by the case at bar was per-hans involved in that of Whaley v. City of Columbus, 89 Ga. 781, 15 S. E. 694, but not decided, for the reason that the plaintiff's declaration did not set forth with sufficient clearness and distinctness the cause of action intended to be stated. Our view of the nature of a liquor license is strongly supported by numerous and most respectable authorities. "The doctrine is too well established to be longer called in question, that a license of this character, whether revocable in terms or not, is neither a contract nor property, in any constitutional sense, but is subject at all times to the police powers of the state government." La Croix v. Commissioners, 50 Conn. 328, citing Board v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 667, in which Wright, J., observed: "These licenses to sell liquors are not contracts between the state and the persons...