Iverson v. Bradrick

• Decision Date: 25 September 1909
• Citation: 104 P. 130,54 Wash. 633
• Parties: IVERSON v. BRADRICK.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

104 P. 130

54 Wash. 633

IVERSON v. BRADRICK.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

September 25, 1909

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Henry L. Kennan, Judge.

Action by S. Iverson against A. V. Bradrick. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Perkins & Honefenger and S. Iverson, for appellant.

H. M Stephens, for respondent.

CROW J.

On February 10, 1908, the plaintiff, S. Iverson, obtained a judgment in the superior court of Spokane county against White Pine Lumber Company, a corporation, upon which an execution was issued and returned nulla bona. Thereafter the plaintiff filed an affidavit alleging that A V. Bradrick was indebted to the White Pine Lumber Company, and obtained a writ of garnishment against Bradrick. The garnishee defendant, answering, alleged that he did not at the time of the service of the writ, or at any time since, have in his possession or under his control any property or effects of the judgment debtor. This answer being denied, the cause came on for hearing on the evidence and the issues thus raised. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the garnishee defendant challenged its sufficiency. The challenge being sustained, final judgment was entered in Bradrick's favor, from which the plaintiff has appealed.

The respondent has interposed a motion to dismiss, contending that the notice of appeal was not served upon the White Pine Lumber Company, the judgment debtor. It was served upon the respondent as the prevailing party. The White Pine Lumber Company is not a necessary party to this appeal; the issues before us arising exclusively between the appellant and the respondent as garnishee. Sipes v. Puget Sound Electric Ry. Co., 50 Wash. 585, 97 P. 723; Wilson v. Puget Sound Electric Ry. Co., 50 Wash. 596, 97 P. 727. The motion to dismiss is denied.

The controlling question before us is whether the respondent's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was properly sustained. The appellant's contention is that the respondent subscribed for 100 shares of the capital stock of the White Pine Lumber Company, that he paid for 80 shares only, and that he was still indebted to the corporation in the sum of $2,000, his entire subscription for the remaining 20 shares. The respondent urges several reasons for sustaining the judgment of dismissal. We only find it necessary to discuss his contentions that he is not a stockholder, that he has not been one at any time since February, 1904, and that he is not indebted to the corporation for any unpaid stock subscription. Assuming for the purposes of this appeal that respondent never paid any part of his subscription for the 20 shares, although he contends that he made payment in full, we find the undisputed facts to be that in 1901 he originally subscribed and later paid for 80 shares of the capital stock, of the par value of $100 per share; that in March or April, 1902, the capital stock of the corporation was increased; that he then subscribed for 20 additional shares; that a certificate for 100 shares was then issued to him; that later it was cancelled; that two new certificates for 50 shares each were issued to him in lieu thereof; that thereafter, in February, 1904, he for a valuable consideration then paid, sold, indorsed, and delivered these two certificates to one W. J. Harris, who in March, 1904, caused them to be delivered to the corporation for cancellation; that the stock book of the corporation contains the canceled certificates, and also shows the stub of a new certificate issued to Harris; that at the time of respondent's sale to Harris the corporation was a going and prosperous concern, but that its milling plant was afterwards destroyed by fire; that the appellant acquired the claim on which his judgment was entered after respondent ceased to be a stockholder; and that his claim was...