Ives v. City of Willimantic
| Decision Date | 03 June 1936 |
| Citation | 121 Conn. 408,185 A. 427 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | IVES v. CITY OF WILLIMANTIC. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Windham County; Carl Foster, Judge.
Action to recover damages for breach of contract by Lewis W. Ives against the City of Willimantic for breach of contract. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
No error.
John A. Danaher and John Buckley, both of Hartford, for appellant.
Samuel B. Harvey and Arthur T. Kelley, both of Willimantic, for appellee.
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, AVERY, and BROWN JJ.
The city of Willimantic owned a reservoir and icehouses on its shores, with equipment for harvesting ice, which under its charter it was authorized to distribute to its inhabitants. For many years prior to 1929 the plaintiff had distributed the ice harvested by the defendant under an operating agreement with it which ran from year to year. On January 10 1929, the parties executed an agreement covering the sale of ice harvested by the defendant to the plaintiff and its distribution by him for a term of five years, with an option in the plaintiff to renew the agreement for a further period of five years. The agreement provided that the city " does hereby bargain and sell unto the party of the second part [the plaintiff], such quantity of ice (together with the right to carry the same until January 1 1934) as the City owns or shall harvest [in] that period of time in the ice houses on the premises near the Pumping Station" at the price of $1.25 per ton; also that the plaintiff should " cause the ice to be harvested and oversee the same on terms and at prices to be agreed upon." The plaintiff agreed to pay at that rate for the ice removed by him from the icehouses each month and that he would dispose of it during the term of the agreement to the inhabitants of the city only at a maximum price of 50 cents per hundredweight.
For the purpose of carrying out the contract the plaintiff provided trucks and other equipment for the storage and delivery of ice in accordance with its terms. There was no ice harvested in 1932 or 1933 because of a lack of freezing conditions to render a crop harvestable. In the fall of 1933 the defendant sought to procure from the plaintiff a cancellation of the contract and to buy his rights thereunder, but the plaintiff refused to agree to a cancellation, and thereafter exercised his option to renew it for the additional term of five years. In January, 1934, the parties executed a further agreement reciting that the city at its annual meeting had appropriated only $1,000 for the harvesting of ice, which was not sufficient to fill the icehouses to their capacity, and providing that, when that sum was exhausted, the plaintiff might harvest such additional ice at his own expense as he might see fit, and that he should pay $1.25 for the first 800 tons of ice taken from the icehouses and 20 cents a ton for ice taken in excess of that amount. It also provided that the agreement should be binding only for the current season of 1934, and that it should not impair the rights of the parties for the extended term under the original agreement. In the summer of 1934 defendant's icehouses were destroyed by fire, the defendant has not rebuilt them and has not harvested any ice from its reservoir since August, 1934.
The question presented upon this appeal involves the construction of the contract of January 10, 1929. The plaintiff claims that under it the defendant was bound to harvest ice, the quantity to be measured by the reasonable needs of its inhabitants, and that it breached its contract by its failure to do so since the season of 1934. The defendant contends that the contract did not require it to harvest any particular quantity of ice, and that if none was harvested it was under no obligation to the plaintiff. The defendant agreed to sell the plaintiff such quantity of ice as it " shall harvest" during the term of the agreement. It did not expressly agree to harvest any ice. The plaintiff's contention is that, though not...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
L.G. Defelice, Inc. v. Fireman's Ins. Co.
...unless it arises by necessary implication from the terms of the agreement. Bria, at 631, 220 A.2d 29 (citing Ives v. City of Willimantic, 121 Conn. 408, 411, 185 A. 427 (1936)). It appears that a similar conclusion cannot be drawn in this case, given that McGee stated that he and Campbell n......
-
Connecticut Co. v. Division 425 of Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Emp. of America
...was expressed in fact. First Ecclesiastical Society of New Britain v. Besse, 98 Conn. 616, 623, 119 A. 903; Ives v. City of Willimantic, 121 Conn. 408, 411, 185 A. 427; Rabinowitz v. Connecticut Importing Co., 136 Conn. 468, 472, 72 A.2d 485. If the defendants had intended to agree that the......
-
Orange Improvements Partnership v. Cardo, Inc.
...language used, interpreted in light of the parties' situation and circumstances surrounding the transaction. Ives v. City of Willimantic, 121 Conn. 408, 411, 185 A. 427 (1936). 1. Actual and Constructive As a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction, this Court applies state substant......
-
Sturman v. Socha
..." Leonard Concrete Pipe Co. v. C.W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 178 Conn. 594, 598, 424 A.2d 277 (1979), quoting Ives v. Willimantic, 121 Conn. 408, 411, 185 A. 427 (1936). In situations where the parties have their agreement in writing, " 'their intention is to be determined from its language ......