Ivey v. State
| Decision Date | 20 May 1938 |
| Docket Number | 12245. |
| Citation | 197 S.E. 322,186 Ga. 216 |
| Parties | IVEY v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Error from Superior Court, Warren County; C.J. Perryman, Judge.
Forest Ivey was convicted of murder with a recommendation to mercy and he brings error.
Reversed.
Forest Ivey was tried separately and found guilty of murder, with a recommendation to mercy, under a joint indictment as a principal with George Johnson and Jesse Johnson, for the murder of James Evans, an eight-year old boy, who was a stepson of George Johnson. Jesse Johnson was a son of George Johnson by a former marriage. All of the persons were colored. The boy, living with his stepfather and mother, was according to the State's evidence, sent by his stepfather in the early morning on an errand requiring him to cross a creek running through a swamp. Later in the morning his body was found 'limber' with the face lying in the water of the creek, and with the fifth vertebra of the neck broken, about four feet above a foot-log, which crossed the creek 300 or 400 yards from a ford or bridge where a road crossed the creek. The banks of the creek were about three or four feet deep; the run about four or five feet wide; and the water 'did not come over the shoe-top.' George Johnson, the stepfather, had paid the premiums on two policies of insurance on the life of the deceased, payable to the mother, $184 of which was collected after the homicide, about $100 being paid to an undertaker. There was testimony that George Johnson was in financial difficulties at the time of the homicide, his personal properties being levied upon by the sheriff just before or just afterwards. Ike Williams testified that Jesse Johnson the son, came to see him before the homicide, told him that George Johnson, to father, had sent George 'that he had a job he would love for me to do, that he would give me $50 to do it;' that 'he had a little boy James in heavy insurance, and he would like to get me to bump him off for him, and I told him I could not do it;' that Jesse Johnson returned in five or six days, and asked if this witness had 'decided to do that job for him, and I told him no, I couldn't do it;' and that George spoke to him again, coming from church, 'and asked me was I ready to do the job, and I told him no.' This witness never saw Forest Ivey with Jesse Johnson at the times mentioned.
The theory and contentions of the State are that Forest Ivey was the actual perpetrator of the offense, as principal in the first degree; or, if not actually present, that he was constructively present, aiding and abetting Jesse Johnson as the actual perpetrator of the offense, and therefore a principal in the second degree; and that there was a conspiracy between all of the defendants to kill the deceased, under which all of the defendants were guilty of murder by the act of any one of them.
As to any actual perpetration of the offense by Ivey, or his participation therein, or in any conspiracy with the other defendants, the evidence for the State consisted of his own statements made to the sheriff and his statement made to the jury, coupled with testimony of John Berry. The statements of Ivey were that he met Jesse Johnson at a church on Sunday afternoon, the day before the homicide, went with him in an automobile belonging to George Johnson to Thomson, Georgia where they attended a picture-show, returning about 2 a. m. to Jesse's house, where they spent the night together; that early next morning they left in this car to go to Augusta, Georgia; that on reaching the bridge over the creek, where the body was found (300 or 400 yards below in a swamp), Jesse asked the defendant to let him out in order that he might meet his girl, and to drive the car on up the road to the fork, where he would rejoin the defendant; that this was done, and the defendant waited at the mail-box at the fork about a mile from the creek until Jesse returned and woke him up, after...
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Schmid v. State
... ... full knowledge that a crime has been committed, conceals it, ... and harbors, assists, or protects the person charged with or ... convicted of the crime.' In no sense can an accessory ... after the fact be an accomplice in the major crime. Ivey ... v. State, 186 Ga. 216, 197 S.E. 322. An accessory before ... the fact may or may not be an accomplice in the major crime, ... depending on the facts of the transaction. If he is absent ... when the major crime is committed but counsels and procures ... the same to be committed, he is, ... ...
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Schmid v. State, 32012.
...charged with or convicted of the crime." In no sense can an accessory after the fact be an accomplice in the major crime. Ivey v. State, 186 Ga. 216, 197 S.E. 322. An accessory before the fact may or may not be an accomplice in the major crime, depending on the facts of the transaction. If ......
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Manry v. State
... ... VIII, Constitution of ... Georgia, Code, § 2-108. (Italics [77 Ga.App. 46] ours.) ... The ... offense of accessory before the fact and the offense of ... accessory after the fact, constitute two separate and ... distinct offenses. This statement is supported by Ivey v ... State, 186 Ga. 216, 197 S.E. 322, 324, which, after ... defining the offense of accessory after the fact, continues ... as follows: 'This definition eliminates the idea of ... participation by a person guilty of such an offense in the ... perpetration of the major crime * * * as an ... ...
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Johnson v. State, 12897.
...of those cases the judgment was reversed for errors in the charge to the jury. Johnson v. State, 186 Ga. 324, 197 S.E. 786; Ivey v. State, 186 Ga. 216, 197 S.E. 322. Later, Jesse Johnson was tried and convicted, and we now have his case for review. The exception is to the refusal of a new t......