Ivins v. Louisville & N.R. Co.
| Decision Date | 17 January 1928 |
| Docket Number | 18197. |
| Parties | IVINS v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
Where it is uncertain from petition for defamation whether words complained of were written or spoken, but it is fairly probable that words were written, and plaintiff's intention was to sue for libel, amendment seeking to remove ambiguity is not objectionable as adding new cause of action and petition describing cause of action as slander may be amended by substituting word "libel."
Corporation is not liable for slander or oral defamation by agent, unless it affirmatively appears that agent was expressly directed or authorized by corporation to speak words in question.
In suit against corporation for slander by one of its agents petition, alleging utterances were expressly authorized and ratified by corporation, held demurrable for want of specific allegations as to when, where, and how slanderous words were authorized or ratified.
In suit against corporation for slander by its agent, allegations that plaintiff was discharged from corporation's employment, that corporation, after knowledge of slanderous matter, failed to repudiate same, that plaintiff's dismissal continues, and that corporation has refused plaintiff's application for reinstatement, are insufficient to show ratification by corporation of alleged slander.
In action against corporation for libel by its agent, it is not essential to cause of action that express or direct authority of agent to utter libel should be shown.
In suit against corporation for libel by its agent, allegation that libel was uttered by agent within scope of corporation's business and in course of agent's employment is sufficient to charge corporation under Civ. Code 1910, § 4413.
Written statement charging another with having committed a crime is libelous per se.
In action for libel, privilege of publication is matter for plea, and, being defensive, can be taken advantage of by demurrer only when all facts essential to defense affirmatively appear in plaintiff's petition.
In action of slander or libel, defense of "qualified privilege," to be complete, must show good faith interest to be upheld, statement properly limited in its scope, proper occasion and publication to proper persons, and absence of one or more of such elements will generally prevent party from relying on plea of privilege.
[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Qualified Privilege.]
In action for libel or slander, protection afforded privileged communications is lost, if publication was maliciously made.
In action by employee against railroad for libel, employee could not claim as special damage losses which he may have sustained by discharge as employee, where petition showed that discharge did not result as consequence of alleged libel, but was simultaneous wrong.
In action by employee against railroad for libel, allegation that, on account of publication of libelous matter, plaintiff's ability to obtain employment had been seriously impaired, and ability to earn money in any employment greatly reduced, was improper as basis for claim of general damages, and was demurrable as conclusion unsupported by specific statement of facts.
In action by conductor against railroad for libel uttered by railroad superintendent while investigating plaintiff's conduct, claim for special damages for attorney's fees, stenographer's hire, and traveling expenses, incurred while plaintiff was attempting to defend his good name, which were necessary and reasonable, and caused by libel, held subject to special demurrer as unsupported by specific statement of facts showing why expenses were incurred or that they were necessary.
In action for libel and slander, where petition stated good causes of action for libel, but failed to state good cause of action for slander, it was error to sustain general demurrers and dismiss petition as a whole.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; John D. Humphries, Judge.
Action by J. B. Ivins against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.
Harwell, Fairman & Barrett, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Tye, Peeples & Tye, of Atlanta, for defendant in error.
Syllabus OPINION.
1. Where, from the allegations in an action for defamation, it is uncertain whether the words complained of were written or spoken, that is, whether the plaintiff is suing for a slander or for a libel, but it is fairly probable from all the averments made that the words were written, and therefore that the plaintiff's intention was to sue for a libel, an amendment which seeks merely to remove the ambiguity is not objectionable as adding a new and distinct cause of action. In such a case a petition which describes the cause of action as a "slander" may be amended by substituting the word "libel." Verdery v. Barrett, 89 Ga. 349 (1), 15 S.E. 476; Armour & Co. v. Ross, 110 Ga. 403 (1), 35 S.E. 787; City of Columbus v. Anglin, 120 Ga. 785 (5), 48 S.E. 318; Albany v. Cameron Co., 121 Ga. 794 (1), 49 S.E. 798; Atlanta & W. P. R. Co. v. Ga. Ry., etc., Co., 125 Ga. 798 (1, 2) Atkinson v. Brantley,
15 Ga.App. 129 (1), 82 S.E. 773; Smith v. Rome, 16 Ga.App. 96 (1), 84 S.E. 734; 25 Cyc. 248. This is not to hold that a suit for slander may be converted by amendment into a suit for libel.
2. In the petition as amended, the plaintiff in several paragraphs sought a recovery for written words as libels, and in other paragraphs complained of distinct oral words as a slander. Under the decisions in this state, a corporation is not liable for a slander or oral defamation by an agent, unless it affirmatively appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized by the corporation to speak the words in question. Headley v. Maxwell Motor Co., 25 Ga.App. 26, 102 S.E. 374, and cases cited.
3. In a suit against a corporation for an alleged slander by one of its agents, where the petition alleged that the "utterances were expressly authorized and ratified by the defendant company," and where this averment was specially demurred to upon the ground...
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