Izydore v. Tokuta

• Decision Date: 04 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. COA14–1220.,COA14–1220.
• Citation: 775 S.E.2d 341,242 N.C.App. 434
• Parties: Robert A. IZYDORE, Plaintiff, v. Alade TOKUTA, Caesar Jackson, Bernice D. Johnson, North Carolina Central University, and The State of North Carolina, Defendants.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

242 N.C.App. 434

775 S.E.2d 341

Robert A. IZYDORE, Plaintiff,

v.Alade TOKUTA, Caesar Jackson, Bernice D. Johnson, North Carolina Central University, and The State of North Carolina, Defendants.

No. COA14–1220.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Aug. 4, 2015.

Ekstrand & Ekstrand LLP, Durham, by Robert C. Ekstrand, for plaintiff-appellant.

Attorney General, Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General, Stephanie A. Brennan, for defendant-appellees.

HUNTER, JR., ROBERT N., Judge.

Robert A. Izydore ("Plaintiff") appeals from a 22 July 2014 order dismissing his amended complaint asserting seven causes of action and seeking injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and a declaration he be entitled to Professor Emeritus status from the North Carolina Central University ("NCCU"). After careful review, we affirm the trial court's order in its entirety.

I. Factual & Procedural History

On 12 February 2014, Plaintiff, a retired university professor, filed an amended complaint against Alade Tokuta ("Professor Tokuta"), in his individual and official capacity; Caesar Jackson ("Professor Jackson"), in his individual and official capacity; Provost Bernice Johnson ("Provost Johnson"), in her individual and official capacity; the State of North Carolina ("State"); and NCCU (collectively, "Defendants"), arising from Defendants' decision to deny Plaintiff's nomination for Professor Emeritus status. Plaintiff's complaint reveals the following facts.

Plaintiff taught chemistry at NCCU for thirty-eight years before retiring in September 2009. In May 2009, Dr. John Meyers and Chair Shawn Sendlinger called a faculty meeting to nominate Plaintiff for Professor Emeritus status and submitted his nomination portfolio. Pursuant to NCCU nomination guidelines, Plaintiff's nomination was forwarded to a committee of eight chairs and directors of NCCU's College of Science and Technology, which approved Plaintiff's nomination in May 2012. Plaintiff's nomination was then forwarded to the NCCU Faculty Senate, where it was unanimously approved in December 2012. These actions were concordant with NCCU's nomination guidelines. Plaintiff alleges his nomination was then "erroneously" forwarded by Provost Johnson to NCCU's Academic Planning Council ("APC") for consideration, "thereby failing to follow the governing procedures in place when Plaintiff's nomination for Professor Emeritus was initiated." At the APC meeting held on 13 February 2013, Plaintiff's nomination was debated and denied.

During the debate, Plaintiff alleges Professor Tokuta made knowingly false and defamatory statements about him to the APC, "with the malicious intent to cause Plaintiff's nomination to be denied, thereby depriving Plaintiff of his good name and reputation in his professional community, as well as Professor Emeritus status." Plaintiff also alleges Professor Jackson "made statements endorsing Tokuta's defamatory statements and [similarly] published other [knowingly] false and defamatory statements" about him to the APC for the purpose of causing his nomination to be denied. Plaintiff complains he was not permitted to be present at the APC meeting and, therefore, he was unable to defend against the professors' allegedly defamatory statements which resulted in the APC denying his nomination. Plaintiff further complains he was not afforded a "post-deprivation, name-clearing hearing."

Plaintiff alleges he was "entitled to Professor Emeritus status pursuant to the rules governing the conferral of Professor Emeritus status at NCCU." Plaintiff alleges that at NCCU,

Professor Emeritus status is not merely honorific. Rather, ... [it] confers ... an array of tangible benefits, including but not limited to the right to use NCCU facilities, offices, laboratories, equipment, and other valuable resources. Those resources are necessary to enable [Plaintiff] to continue to pursue his professional calling as a research scientist, to continue to publish the results of his research, and to continue to participate in other dimensions of his professional calling.

On 12 February 2014, Plaintiff filed his claims for relief. On 17 July 2014, Plaintiff amended his complaint, asserting seven causes of action: (1) deprivation of property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution against all Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (2) stigmatization in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against Professors Tokuta and Jackson in their individual capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (3) entity liability against NCCU and the State pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (4) slander per se against Professors Tokuta and Jackson in their individual and official capacities, the State, and NCCU; (5) slander per quod against Professors Tokuta and Jackson in their individual and official capacities, the State, and NCCU; (6) violations of the North Carolina Constitution against NCCU and the State; and (7) punitive damages. Plaintiff sought (1) a declaratory judgment that he be "entitled to Professor Emeritus status under the governing standards and procedures;" (2) injunctive relief "forbidding NCCU and the State" from denying him Professor Emeritus status and "forbidding Defendants from engaging in the same or similar defamatory conduct concerning the Plaintiff in the future;" (3) compensatory damages; (4) punitive damages; and (5) pre- and post-judgment interest and all costs of the action.

In response, all Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (2), and (6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. This matter was heard on 17 July 2014 at the Durham County Superior Court before the Honorable Orlando F. Hudson. By order filed 22 July 2014, the trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety and denied all of Plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to all seven of his causes of action.

The standard of review of an order granting a 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a claim for which relief can be granted under some legal theory when the complaint is liberally construed and all the allegations included therein are taken as true. On a motion to dismiss, the complaint's material factual allegations are taken as true. Legal conclusions, however, are not entitled to a presumption of validity. Dismissal is proper when one of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiff's claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff's claim.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Corneal, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 767 S.E.2d 374, 377 (2014) (citation omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court "accept[s] all the well-pleaded facts, not conclusions of law, as true[,]" Privette v. Univ. of N. Carolina at Chapel Hill, 96 N.C.App. 124, 132, 385 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1989) (citations omitted), and is "not required ... to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Strickland v. Hedrick, 194 N.C.App. 1, 20, 669 S.E.2d 61, 73 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This Court "conducts a de novo review of the pleadings to determine their legal sufficiency and to determine whether the trial court's ruling on the motion to dismiss was correct." Page v. Lexington Ins. Co., 177 N.C.App. 246, 248, 628 S.E.2d 427, 428 (2006) (brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted).

B. Constitutional Claims

Plaintiff advances his first ("Deprivation of Property in Violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment"), second ("Stigmatization in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment"), and third ("Entity Liability") claims under the rubric of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his procedural due process rights.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws

[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2014) (emphasis added). Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred[,]" Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979), "identification of a constitutionally protected right is a prerequisite of plaintiff's right to sue under § 1983." Clayton v. Branson, 170 N.C.App. 438, 452, 613 S.E.2d 259, 269 (2005) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff also advances his sixth claim ("Violations of the North Carolina Constitution and Conspiracy") directly under the Constitution of North Carolina, alleging "[t]he same conduct that gives rise to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for violations of the United States Constitution also violate the parallel provisions of the North Carolina Constitution." Therefore Plaintiff's first, second, third, and sixth claims will be addressed together as a claim for violation of his federal and state procedural due process rights.

The Due Process Clause of "[t]he Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in pertinent part: ‘No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]’ " Wang v. UNC–CH Sch. of Med., 216 N.C.App. 185, 201, 716 S.E.2d 646, 656–57 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "Both the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution provide protection against deprivation of liberty or property interests secured by the Bill of Rights or created by state law without adequate procedure, such as notice and an opportunity to be heard." Toomer v. Garrett, 155...