Izzo v. Kirby

• Decision Date: 04 March 1968
• Parties: Thomas IZZO, Petitioner, v. James KIRBY as Commissioner of Welfare of Suffolk County, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 994

287 N.Y.S.2d 994

56 Misc.2d 131

Thomas IZZO, Petitioner, v. James KIRBY as Commissioner of Welfare of Suffolk County, et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Suffolk County, Part I.

March 4, 1968.

[56 Misc.2d 132] Katz & Lava, West Babylon, for petitioner.

George W. Percy, Jr., Riverhead, Attorney for Suffolk County, for respondents, Kirby and Gross.

MEMORANDUM

JACK STANISLAW, Justice.

Petitioner moves for an order directing the Suffolk County Welfare Commissioner to issue a letter to petitioner's employer, pursuant to Section 137--a of the Social Services Law (formerly known as Social Welfare Law), to cease and desist from taking money out of his gross weekly salary under an income execution served by the Sheriff of Suffolk County. Section 137--a exempts the earnings of a recipient of public assistance or care supplementary to his income pursuant to the Social Services Law, from attachment by an income execution. Petitioner asserts his right to the letter, by reason of the fact that he is a recipient of medical assistance for the needy ('Medicaid'), under Title 11 of Article 5 of the Social Services Law. The proceeding is in the nature of mandamus and the application may be granted upon a showing of a clear legal right to the relief requested, provided the record leaves no scope for the exercise of a reasonable discretion (Pruzan v. Valentine, 282 N.Y. 498, 27 N.E.2d 25; Solomon v. Public Service Commission, 286 App.Div. 636, 146 N.Y.S.2d 439).

The chronological sequence of events which gave rise to the application is as follows: on December 26, 1966, the Chemical Bank, New York Trust Company recovered a judgment against petitioner in the amount of $2,380.91; an income execution, with respect to that judgment, was served on petitioner's employer on September 15, 1967; on September 22, 1967, his employer commenced to withhold income from his wages pursuant to the income execution; and a few weeks later, on November 15, 1967, petitioner applied for Medicaid assistance. We note that the judgment creditor, Chemical Bank, New York Trust Company, on whose behalf the income execution was served, is not designated a party respondent, although its rights would clearly be directly affected by the outcome of this proceeding. The application, however, will be considered despite the non-joinder. Attached to the petition is a copy of a 'Medical Service Identification' card issued to petitioner by the Suffolk County Department of Welfare. Petitioner alleges that he is 'receiving medical assistance' by reason of the issuance of the card, but the supporting papers are devoid of any indication that petitioner or his family are actually receiving medical care or treatment. The card is merely proof of eligibility for Medicaid assistance. The program is broad. It includes services performed by physicians, dentists, nurses, optometrists, podiatrists; care, treatment, maintenance and nursing services performed at hospitals, nursing homes, infirmaries and other medical institutions; outpatient hospital and clinic services; home health care and nurses' services; drugs, sickroom supplies, eyeglasses, dentures and prosthetic appliances; physical therapy; laboratory and x-ray services; as well as transportation necessary to obtain such care and services (Social Services Law § 365--a(2)). 'Medical assistance' under the act is defined as payment of part or all of the cost of such care, services and supplies (Id.). Such payment is usually made directly to the party performing the service.

There is no statement in the moving papers, indicating the nature of petitioner's household, the size of his family, the extent of his property, or the amount of his income. A person may qualify for Medicaid, 'although not receiving nor in need of public assistance or care for his maintenance under other provision of (the) chapter', if he lacks sufficient income and resources 'to meet all the costs of medical care and services available under this title' (Social Services Law, § 366, subd. 1 (a)(4)). In determining eligibility, the following income and resources of the applicant are not considered: a homestead; essential personal property; life insurance in the face amount of one thousand dollars or liquid resources in the amount of five hundred dollars for each person, as a burial reserve; savings in amounts equal to at least one-half of the appropriate income exemptions allowed; income taxes; health insurance premiums; payments made pursuant to court order; and income in such amounts as may be established by rules of the New York State Board of Social Welfare, making allowance for the number of wage earners in a household and the number of family members in the family dependent on such income (Ibid, paragraph 2(a)). It is reported that a family of four, with a Net annual income of $6,000.00 or less may be eligible for Medicaid. Such a family, therefore, may own a house, have bank accounts of over $3,000.00 plus any of the additional resources listed above and still qualify for Medicaid assistance.

Under Section 2, subdivision 20, of the Social Services Law, the term 'public assistance and care' is defined to include 'medical assistance for needy persons'. Section 137--a of the law exempts the earnings of a person from income execution 'while he is in receipt of public assistance or care supplementary to his income pursuant to this chapter, or while he would otherwise need such assistance or care * * *.' Although the latter section does not specifically Direct the issuance of a letter by a public welfare official to such person's employer, it does provide that: 'Any employer who shall withhold or pay over to a person presenting an income execution * * * any portion of the earnings of such a recipient * * * after receiving notification in writing from a public welfare official that the employee is receiving public assistance or care, or that he would become in need of public assistance or care if the * * * income execution * * * were enforced, shall be liable in an action by such recipient for the amount so paid or withheld * * *.' The direction, therefore, for the issuance of such a letter may fairly be implied. Thus, a literal construction of the statutes relied on (Sections 2(20) and 137--a of the Social Services Law), would appear to indicate that petitioner is entitled to the relief requested and that the language of Sections 2(20) and 137--a is too plain to call for judicial construction. The apparent significance of language however, is not necessarily controlling. 'It is always presumed, in regard to a statute, that no unjust or unreasonable result was intended by the Legislature. Hence if, viewing a statute from the standpoint of the literal sense of its language, it works such a result, an obscurity of meaning exists, calling for judicial construction' (In re Meyer, 209 N.Y. 386, 389, 103 N.E. 713, 714, L.R.A.1915C, 615). The question to be decided on this application, therefore, is whether the legislature intended that section 137--a shall apply to All persons who are eligible for assistance under the Medicaid program. The answer is neither specifically defined by the act (Title 11 of art. 5 of the Social Services Act) nor established by case law.

Respondent Suffolk County Department of Social Services opposes the application on the ground it has been advised by the Department of Social Services of the State of New York (the agency responsible for the administration of Medicaid) that Section 137--a does not apply to recipients of Medicaid who receive no other form of public assistance. More specifically, the New York State Board of Social Welfare has sent written notification to all local welfare commissioners of its policy not to apply Section 137--a 'to persons whose medical expenses are paid under the medical assistance for needy persons program if they are not also in receipt of cash grants under a public assistance program'. Respondent advises that approximately 40% Of the State's population are eligible for Medicaid assistance; thus, failure to abide by the policy aforesaid, would, in effect, exempt 40% Of the State's population from the rights afforded by law to judgment creditors. Respondent advises that the extension of Section 137--a to recipients of Medicaid could lead to 'insurmountable problems of administration' within its own agency and further contends that, in enacting the Medicaid program, the legislature did not intend to disturb creditors' rights with respect to so large a percentage of the State's population.

The Medicaid program (Title 11, Sections 363 through 369 of the Social Services Law art. 5) became effective in 1966. During the same year, Section 2, subdivision 20 (which defines 'public assistance and care') was modified to include the term 'medical assistance for needy persons' (indicating a clear reference to Title 11). But Section 137--a has not been modified since 1964, two years prior to the enactment of Title 11. Thus, there is no specific indication that Section 137--a was intended to apply to all persons eligible for Medicaid assistance.

The New York State Board of Welfare, in its statement of policy, which negates such intention, distinguishes the intent of the term 'in receipt of', as used in Section 137--a, from 'in receipt of medical assistance', as applied to persons whose medical expenses are paid under the Medicaid program. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that 'public assistance and care' has been specifically defined to include 'medical assistance for needy persons' (Section 2, subdivision 20) and ...