J.B. v. Amerson
| Decision Date | 30 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 1:11–1182–RBP.,CV 1:11–1182–RBP. |
| Citation | 890 F.Supp.2d 1299 |
| Parties | J.B., a minor, who sues by and through his Mother and next friend, Stacy BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Larry AMERSON and Deputy Ward, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Elizabeth Peyton Faulk, Anthony B. Bush, Lewis Bush & Faulk LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.
J. Randall McNeill, Kendrick E. Webb, C. Richard Hill, Jr., Jamie Helen Kidd, Webb & Eley PC, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.
This cause comes to be heard on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the defendants on May 25, 2012, and orally argued by the parties at a recorded hearing on July 26, 2012.1
While Shakespeare suggested in The Merchant of Venice that a good deed “ ‘shines' in a naughty world,” others have said that “no good deed goes unpunished.” 2 Sheriff Amerson's good deed was to volunteer to conduct a community service program (not one of his prescribed duties) attempting to steer juveniles away from disorderly conduct and more serious conflicts with law enforcement, and to aid public schools in this pursuit. The plaintiff was voluntarily enrolled by his mother in a program Amerson created called “Success Academy” or “Suspended Student Program.” The program was distinguished, in writing, from so-called “scared straight” programs.
After some initial legal jousting, the remaining issue in this case has become whether the plaintiff suffered from more than de minimis force by defendant Amerson in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In other words, did Amerson apply excessive force to the plaintiff? What happened with regard to the only remaining issue in this case is substantially established by a video of the interaction between Amerson and the plaintiff,3 the depositions of plaintiff and his mother, and documents maintainedby the Coosa Valley Youth Services and Juvenile Detention of the State of Alabama.
Under Rule 56(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to “go beyond the pleadings” to establish that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (). “On summary judgment, ‘[i]f there is conflict between the plaintiff's and the defendant's allegations or in the evidence, the plaintiff's evidence is to be believed and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in his favor.’ ” Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, 207 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir.2000)). However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir.1989)). Moreover, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505).
Amerson argues that there is no evidence of a Constitutional violation because, among other reasons, the alleged force was de minimis and not excessive. He argues that, in any event, he is entitled to a dismissal of claim(s) based on qualified immunity.
“Qualified immunity operates ‘to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful.’ ” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). Therefore, “[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1424 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Indeed, officers are entitled to qualified immunity unlessthe “supposedly wrongful act was already established to such a high degree that every objectively reasonable official standing in the defendant's place would be on notice that what the defendant official was doing would be clearly unlawful given the circumstances.” Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1244–45, 182 L.Ed.2d 47 (2012). Therefore, “ ‘[b]ecause qualified immunity shields government actors in all but exceptional cases, courts should think long and hard before stripping defendants of immunity.’ ” GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1366 (11th Cir.1998)(quoting Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ. Bd. of Trs., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir.1994)).
To receive qualified immunity from suit, “the government official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir.2007). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is not appropriate by showing that (1) “the government official's conduct violated a Constitutional right” and (2) the Constitutional right was “clearly established” by preexisting federal law at the time of the action. Id. (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151). A court need no longer follow the rigid two-prong approach introduced in Saucier. The Supreme Court has provided that “judges of the district courts ... should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
“ ‘Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful action generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.' ” Messerschmidt, 132 S.Ct. at 1244–45 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). In the Eleventh Circuit, “the law can be ‘clearly established* for qualified immunity purposes only by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state where the case arose.” Jenkins v. Talladega Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir.1997) (en banc) (internal citations omitted). To be “clearly established,” pre-existing law must provide “fair warning” to the defendant government official that his conduct was illegal. Messerschmidt, 132 S.Ct. at 1244–45. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[w]hen an excessive force plaintiff shows that the official's conduct lies so obviously at the very core of what the Constitution prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of case law, the official is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.” Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir.2000).
The Supreme Court has provided that a plaintiff's excessive force claim is “properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's ‘objective reasonableness' standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).4 The objective reasonableness standard requires the court to “carefully balance ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against ‘the countervailing governmental interests at stake.’ ” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865).See also Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir.2012). The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “[i]n determining the reasonableness of the force applied, we look at the fact pattern from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene with knowledge of the attendant circumstances and facts, and balance the risk of bodily harm to the suspect against the gravity of the threat the officer sought to eliminate.” Id. at 1251 (quoting McCullough v. Antolini, 559...
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