J.E.B. v Danks, No. A08-2175.

• Decision Date: 22 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. A08-2175.
• Citation: 785 N.W.2d 741
• Parties: J.E.B., et al., Appellants, v. Debra DANKS, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

785 N.W.2d 741 J.E.B., et al., Appellants, v. Debra DANKS, Respondent. No. A08-2175. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 22, 2010.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Based on the plain language of the statute, immunity under Minn.Stat. § 626.556, subd. 4 (2008), applies where: (1) the person knows, has reason to believe, or suspects that abuse occurred, and (2) the report of abuse is made in good faith.

2. The traditional summary judgment standard applies to determine whether a reporter under Minn.Stat. § 626.556, subd. 4, is entitled to summary judgment based on statutory immunity. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the report was made in good faith, summary judgment was inappropriate.

3. Statutory immunity under Minn.Stat. § 626.556, subd. 4, bars only claimsbased on actual reports of abuse made to the proper officials.

Paul D. Peterson, Jordan A. Handrich, Harper & Peterson, P.L.L.C., Woodbury, MN; and Bradford S. Delapena, Bradford Delapena, Ltd., St. Paul, MN, for appellants.

Daniel L. Palmquist, Amy Walsh Kern, Leonard, Street and Deinard, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

This case involves the statutory immunity provision of the Reporting of Maltreatment of Minors Act, codified at Minn.Stat. § 626.556 (2008). In January 2007, appellants, members of the B. family, brought suit against respondent Debra Danks, alleging slander per se, libel, false reporting under Minn.Stat. § 626.556, intrusion upon seclusion, and public disclosure of private facts. In their complaint, appellants claimed that Danks filed a false report with county child protection workers alleging that appellants' son was sexually abusing their daughter and that Danks spread false rumors in their community to the same effect. The district court granted summary judgment to Danks on the grounds that she was entitled to statutory immunity under Minn.Stat. § 626.556, subd. 4(a)(1).¹ The court of appeals affirmed. J.E.B. v. Danks, No. A08-2175, 2009 WL 2498747, at *1 (Minn.App. Aug.18, 2009). Because we conclude that there is a genuine dispute of material fact, we reverse and remand.

During the course of an April 2006 playdate between the B. family's daughter and Danks' daughter, the two girls played a game called "secrets." Neither girl testified as to what was said during the secrets game. But Danks told Mrs. B. that she believed, from Danks' daughter's reports of the secrets game, that the B. family's son was sexually abusing the B. family's daughter. Mrs. B. was upset, but both women testified in their depositions that the conversation ended with a hug and a promise that B. family would consult a therapist. The B. family had a series of counseling sessions through a community counseling center beginning just a few days later. The counselor determined that the B. family's son's actions toward his sister were not sexual in nature and that he had not sexually abused his sister.

About three weeks after the secrets game, Mrs. B. called Danks to thank her for coming forward with the information and to let Danks know that Mrs. B. "was very thankful it wasn't what [Danks] was claiming it to be." According to Danks, Mrs. B. explained that the incident between brother and sister was not sexual abuse but simply the brother's attempt during roughhousing to give his sister a "wedgie." Mrs. B. testified in her deposition that Danks did not believe her that there was no sexual abuse and continued to insist that Mrs. B. was not telling the counselor the whole truth. Mrs. B. further testified that Danks wanted to speak directly with the counselor and asked questions that Mrs. B. deemed overly intrusive, which Mrs. B. declined to answer.

Danks testified at her deposition that she remained concerned after the call from Mrs. B. because Danks felt Mr. and Mrs. B. were not taking their daughter's statements seriously enough and had not given the counselor sufficient information tomake a full assessment. Shortly after the conversation, Danks learned that the daughter of another friend was planning to spend the night at appellants' home. Danks drafted a letter to Mr. and Mrs. B., expressing her ongoing concerns regarding the B. family's handling of the allegations of sexual abuse. Danks shared the letter with the friend whose daughter was planning to spend the night at appellants' home and asked that friend for advice on how Danks should proceed. Danks also videotaped an interview with her own daughter in which the girl responded to Danks' questions about the secrets game.

Danks never sent the letter she had initially drafted, but she did send Mr. and Mrs. B. an email substantially similar to it. Danks' email stated in part:

What you likely cannot see right now is that I simply have no responsible alternative. The crux of the issue and the reason I continue to be unwillingly stuck in the center of this is this: ABUSE OCCURRED. And even though you are in therapy you are continuing to deal with it as if it were a distortion, a misunderstanding, or a lie. You are refusing to accurately report to your therapist that actual acts of abuse did happen. Neither of your children affected by the abuse ... will be treated appropriately without full disclosure. You are making decisions about the safety of children, yours and others, as if no abuse occurred.

In the same email, Danks expressed her concerns about other children spending the night at appellants' home, asking whether it must "become [her] responsibility to tell parents of these children" and expressing that she felt she "did the wrong and unethical thing by leaving it to [appellants]." Danks called Mrs. B. "hostile and abusive" and, even though no report of the alleged abuse had yet been made, stated that if appellants had "handled this as an abuse issue, a report to the department of child protection would never have been necessary." In her deposition, Danks explained that after she sent the email, she decided to "let it go" and not make a report to authorities.

Shortly after receiving Danks' email, appellants began to feel ostracized by their friends and acquaintances. Appellants came to believe that Danks had communicated her suspicions to others. On appellants' behalf, an attorney wrote a letter to Danks on June 29, 2006, asking her to cease and desist from public comment regarding her suspicions of abuse, to provide the names of the people she had already told, and to provide a disclaimer acceptable to appellants retracting the statements made.

In her deposition, Danks denied communicating her suspicions to others in the community, other than her husband and the friend to whom she had earlier shown the draft letter. Danks testified that, once she sent the email to Mr. and Mrs. B., she had decided not to report the suspected abuse to authorities. But, after receiving the attorney's June 29, 2006, letter, Danks contacted a lawyer, the county attorney's office, and county child protection for information about the immunity available to those who report suspected child abuse.

In early August 2006, Danks contacted county child protection again, this time to file a formal report of abuse. According to the child protection screener who took her report, Danks reported that Mr. and Mrs. B.'s daughter "was still being sexually abused by her brother, that the family hadn't done anything about it, and that she was concerned for the safety of the little girl." An intake investigator, who interviewed Mrs. B.'s daughter and spoke with Mrs. B. and the B. family's counselor, determined that there was no maltreatment,that no protective services were needed, and that Danks' report of abuse was false.

Appellants filed a complaint against Danks alleging slander, libel, making a false report, intrusion upon seclusion, and public disclosure of private facts. Following discovery, Danks moved for summary judgment on all five claims. The district court granted Danks summary judgment, determining that Danks was entitled to statutory immunity under Minn.Stat. § 626.556, subd. 4, and that this immunity barred all appellants' claims. The district court explained its reasoning as follows:

Plaintiffs argue that the timing of the Defendant's report raises a fact issue for determination by a jury on the question of Defendant's good faith. Normally, Plaintiffs' position would be correct. However, as discussed above, in cases where the trial court needs to determine if statutory immunity applies, mixed questions of fact and law are left to the discretion of the trial judge in the interest of judicial economy.

The district court also concluded that Danks was entitled to her costs and attorney fees under Minn.Stat. § 626.556, subd. 4(d) (providing that "court may award" attorney fees and costs to reporter of abuse).

Appellants challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment on three different grounds before the court of appeals. First, appellants argued that the district court applied the wrong summary judgment standard and engaged in judicial factfinding inappropriate on summary judgment. Second, appellants argued that the immunity conferred by Minn.Stat. § 626.556 does not apply to the B. family's common law claims. Third, the appellants argued that the district court erred in awarding Danks attorney fees.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. Danks, 2009 WL 2498747, at *1. The court of appeals agreed with appellants that a district court has no authority to engage in factfinding in the immunity context, but affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment under the traditional summary judgment standard. Id. at *3 & n. 1. The court of appeals also held that the district court did not err in treating statutory immunity under Minn.Stat. § 626.556, subd. 4, as broad enough to bar all of appellants' claims. Id. at *8. Finally, because the district court had reserved ruling on Danks' fee petition pending appeal, the court of appeals remanded for a...