J. C. Lewis Motor Co. v. Mayor, etc., of City of Savannah, 18554

• Decision Date: 11 May 1954
• Docket Number: No. 18554,18554
• Citation: 210 Ga. 591,82 S.E.2d 132
• Parties: J. C. LEWIS MOTOR CO., Inc., et al. v. MAYOR, etc., OF CITY OF SAVANNAH.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 132

82 S.E.2d 132

210 Ga. 591

J. C. LEWIS MOTOR CO., Inc., et al. v. MAYOR, etc., OF CITY OF SAVANNAH.

No. 18554.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 11, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. 'When a judgment refusing an interlocutory injunction is brought to the Supreme Court for review, the trial judge is authorized to grant a supersedeas upon such terms as may by him be deemed necessary to preserve the rights of the parties until the judgment of the Supreme Court can be had. [Code, § 55-202]. It is left, however, in the sound legal discretion of the judge to grant or refuse it. West v. Shackelford, 138 Ga. 163, 74 S.E. 1079.' Prater v. Barge, 139 Ga. 801(1), 78 S.E. 119.

(a) The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a supersedeas in this case.

2. This is not a case where two or more dealers had placed bids for the furnishing of indentical vehicles, but is one where a Ford dealer and a Chevrolet dealer had each submitted a bid for furnishing his product, the two bids in controversy covering different makes of automobiles, thus calling for a discretionary decision as to whether the difference in the products would justify the difference in price. As was said in City of Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga. 789, 791, 36 S.E. 932, 933, 51 L.R.A. 335, courts 'should never undertake to substitute their judgment, in matters of judgment, for that of the city's governing authorities.'

3. 'When a municipal corporation is, by its proper officers, acting within the scope of its powers, a court of equity will not, at the instance of the tax-payers of the corporation, interfere to restrain or control its action, on the ground that the same is unwise or extravagant. To sustain such interference, it must appear, either that the act is ultra vires or fraudulent and corrupt.' Wells v. Mayor, etc., of City of Atlanta, 43 Ga. 67(2).

4. 'The business affairs of a municipality are committed to the corporate authorities, and the courts will not interfere except in a clear case of mismanagement or fraud.' McMaster v. Mayor, etc., of City of Waynesboro, 122 Ga. 231(5), 50 S.E. 122. See also Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 206 Ga. 753, 58 S.E.2d 823; Code, § 69-203.

5. 'Where a municipal board is authorized to do a particular act in its discretion, the courts will not control this discretion, unless manifestly abused, nor inquire into the propriety, economy, and general wisdom of the undertaking, or into the details of the manner adopted to carry the matter into execution.' Chipstead v. Oliver, 137 Ga. 483(2), 73 S.E. 576. See also Ashley v. City of Greensboro, 206 Ga. 800, 805, 58 S.E.2d 815.

6. Applying the foregoing principles of law to the pleadings and evidence in this case, the trial judge did not err for any reason assigned in denying the temporary injunction.

This was a proceeding to enjoin the City of Savannah from consummating the purchase of ten Chevrolet automobiles, for use by the Police Department, brought by a Ford dealer, without naming the Chevrolet dealer as a party, in which J. C. Lewis, Jr., as a taxpayer and citizen, was allowed to intervene.

On December 23, 1953, the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah authorized the Board of Purchase and Supervisor of Purchases to advertise for bids for the purchase of ten new automobiles of the Ford, Chevrolet, or Plymouth class, for the Police Department, which was done, with a statement in the advertisement that the 'Board of Purchase reserves the right to reject any or all bids without formality'; and J. C. Lewis Motor Company, Inc., the local Ford dealer, submitted a bid.

On January 22, 1954, a meeting of the Board of Purchase was scheduled for 12 o'clock. At this meeting the City Comptroller, who is not a member of the Board of Purchase, opened all of the sealed bids, and it was determined that the bid of the plaintiff was lower than that of the Chevrolet dealer, the latter's bid being $13,711.12, whereas the plaintiff's bid was $13,319, a difference of $392.12, or $39.21 per vehicle. However, no quorum of the Board of Purchase was present and no award was made. Later, during the same day, a meeting of the Committee as a Whole, which acts as the Police Committee, was held at the City Hall. At this closed meeting, which was attended by all the Aldermen, and the City Comptroller, but the Supervisor of Purchases was absent, the Board of Purchase awarded the contract to the Chevrolet dealer. Aldermen other than those who are members of the Board of Purchase in attendance acquiesced in the action taken.

The original petition of J. C. Lewis Motor Company, Inc., filed on January 29, 1954, sought to enjoin: (1) the purchase of certain motor vehicles; (2) favoritism and discrimination against plaintiff in the purchasing of motor vehicles, and (3) to set aside and have declared illegal and void a certain contract awarded January 22, 1954, for the purchase of ten motor vehicles, in accordance with which award the Supervisor of Purchases, upon requisition submitted by the Police Department, had already proceeded to order the ten automobiles. A rule nisi was issued along with a temporary restraining order.

On February 3, 1954, J. C. Lewis, Jr., as a taxpayer and citizen, was allowed to intervene as a party plaintiff, and on the same date the original petition was amended to show that the petitioner owns considerable real estate within the City of Savannah, pays a substantial amount of taxes thereon each year, as well as business licenses and personal-property taxes, and alleged that the injury which has been done to petitioner's business, and which will continue to be done unless proper relief is granted by the court, is irreparable.

The petition alleges that the contract for purchase of ten automobiles upon which bids were opened on January 22, 1954, is void and illegal because: (a) The contract award was not made in the manner provided by laws of Georgia and of the city, the laws of the city being duly adopted ordinances of the city, attached to the petition as an exhibit and known as sections 7-101 to 7-114 of the Code of Savannah of 1945; (b) defendants abused any discretion which they had by reason of their constant discrimination; (c) because defendants failed to award a contract to the lowest bidder; (d) because defendants have...