J.C. Penney Corp. v. Town of Manchester
Decision Date | 02 June 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 18141.,18141. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | J.C. PENNEY CORPORATION, Inc. v. TOWN OF MANCHESTER. |
Elliott B. Pollack, with whom, on the brief, was Laura A. Bellotti, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Geoffrey Naab, town attorney, with whom was Brian J. Murphy, assistant town attorney, Manchester, for the appellee (defendant).
NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and McLACHLAN, Js.
The plaintiff, J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc., appeals1 from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its tax appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-117a2 and 12-119.3 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) the plaintiff did not meet the applicable tax filing requirements, and, therefore, was not aggrieved and could not litigate its overvaluation claim; (2) the plaintiff used an improper valuation standard; and (3) the defendant, the town of Manchester (town), properly used the modified cost approach method of assessment. We disagree with the plaintiff's first claim, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment.4
The present case arises out of the plaintiff's 2005 property tax declaration for personal property stored at its 2,000,000 square foot warehouse located at 1339 Tolland Turnpike in the town. The personal property at issue included industrial machinery and equipment, furniture and fixtures, electronic data processing equipment and supplies. General Statutes § 12-40 instructs a town to issue notice "requiring all persons therein liable to pay taxes to bring in a declaration of the taxable personal property belonging to them on the first day of October in that year...." A taxpayer, however, can submit its personal property tax declaration on or before the first day of November without penalty. General Statutes § 12-41(d). Prior to November 1, 2005, the plaintiff's senior property tax manager, Richard Wright, sent an e-mail to the town's assessor asserting that the plaintiff was having difficulty preparing its 2005 declaration and requesting a thirty day extension. The town's assessor responded that the plaintiff must file a declaration by November 1, 2005, but that the town would grant the plaintiff an extension to file an amended declaration without penalty. Accordingly, the plaintiff filed its declaration of taxable personal property, dated October 27, 2005, with a listed valuation of $17,095,039. On December 5, 2005, the plaintiff filed an amended declaration. That declaration listed the same total valuation as the October declaration, and included the following caveat: "[The plaintiff's] 2005 amended declaration of its personal property at 1339 Tolland Turnpike in [the town] is believed by [the plaintiff] to include many assets which are no longer located in this facility and may have not been located there for several years. They have been included in this declaration in good faith because [the plaintiff] lacks adequate records to be able to eliminate nonexistent assets without conducting a physical inventory. [The plaintiff] expects to conduct such an inventory within the next [sixty to ninety] days.
If this inventory confirms the foregoing, [the plaintiff] reserves the right to appeal to the [town board of assessment appeals (board)] and to pursue all available rights.
The town did not respond to the plaintiff's position statement in its amended declaration. Instead, the town's assessor proceeded to assess the plaintiff's personal property on the basis of its amended declaration.5 In addition, after a review of prior declarations of the plaintiff, the assessor determined that the plaintiff had omitted $4,019,747 of personal property from the amended declaration and added that amount to the total valuation. See General Statutes § 12-53. According to the town, therefore, the total value of the plaintiff's personal property as of October 1, 2005, was $21,114,786. Thereafter, the plaintiff challenged the assessor's valuation in an appeal to the board, which denied the plaintiff's request to reduce the valuation of its personal property.
In the meantime, the plaintiff had employed an appraiser, Kenneth P. Katz, to conduct a comprehensive audit of the personal property stored at its warehouse. After completing the inventory, which, according to the plaintiff, required seven weeks, Katz produced two potential valuations based on different methodologies: approximately $10,778,000 for "fair market value in continued use" and approximately $1,219,000 for "fair market value in exchange." Although Katz' report was dated June 30, 2006, the town did not receive a copy of the report until October or November of 2006, nearly one year after the statutory filing deadline of November 1, 2005.
On May 4, 2006, prior to the completion of Katz' report, the plaintiff appealed from the board's decision to the Superior Court pursuant to § 12-117a. In a two count complaint, the plaintiff claimed that the assessor improperly and incorrectly determined the value of its personal property6 and that the tax imposed on the basis of that improper valuation was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the statutes for determining the valuation of personal property. On January 30, 2007, the town filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to establish that it was aggrieved by the town's actions because the plaintiff had failed to provide an accurate and complete declaration and to exhaust its administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion.
The case subsequently was tried to the court. On November 13, 2007, the court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal because the plaintiff had "failed to comply with the tax statutes pertaining to the annual valuation of personal property," and, therefore, the plaintiff "was in no position to contest the valuation placed on its personal property. ..."7 On January 2, 2008, the town filed a motion for articulation of the trial court's judgment, seeking a further finding that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate aggrievement by failing to prove that its property was overassessed. In response to the town's motion, the trial court articulated that, "[b]ecause the plaintiff failed to file a proper and timely declaration ... the assessor was obligated to act on the best information available to him" and that "[g]iven the court's rejection of [Katz'] late ... valuation ... the plaintiff failed to prove that it was an aggrieved party for the purpose of this tax appeal." This appeal followed.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Leonard v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 264 Conn. 286, 294, 823 A.2d 1184 (2003).
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Breezy Knoll Assn., Inc. v. Morris, 286 Conn. 766, 775-76, 946 A.2d 215 (2008).
The critical document in the present case is the plaintiff's amended declaration, filed with the assessor on December 5, 2005. There are, in effect, two ways in which to characterize the...
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