Rainbow Hous. Corp. v. Town of Cromwell

• Decision Date: 01 September 2021
• Docket Number: SC 20506
• Parties: RAINBOW HOUSING CORPORATION et al. v. TOWN OF CROMWELL
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

340 Conn. 501

264 A.3d 532

RAINBOW HOUSING CORPORATION et al.

v.TOWN OF CROMWELL

SC 20506

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 11, 2020

Officially released September 1, 2021^*

Proloy K. Das, with whom were Kari L. Olson and, on the brief, Joseph D. Szerejko, Hartford, and Chelsea R. Sousa, Simsbury, for the appellant (defendant).

Pascal F. Naples, with whom, on the brief, were Timothy S. Hollister and Lilia N. Hrekul, Hartford, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Elliott B. Pollack, Michael J. Marafito and Johanna S. Katz, Hartford, filed a brief for Connecticut Community Non-Profit Alliance, Inc., as amicus curiae.

Cody N. Guarnieri, Glastonbury, filed a brief for MARC Community Resources, Inc., as amicus curiae.

Lloyd L. Langhammer, Norwich, filed a brief for the town of Colchester et al. as amici curiae.

Cody N. Guarnieri, Glastonbury, filed a brief for Adelbrook Community Services, Inc., as amicus curiae.

William Tong, attorney general, and Clare E. Kindall, solicitor general, filed a brief for the state of Connecticut as amicus curiae.

Kathleen M. Flaherty, Newington, filed a brief for Connecticut Legal Rights Project, Inc., et al. as amici curiae.

Brian C. Courtney filed a brief for the Corporation for Independent Living as amicus curiae.

John F. Sullivan, assistant town attorney, filed a brief for the town of Manchester as amicus curiae.

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

ECKER, J.

General Statutes § 12-81 (7)¹ generally exempts from taxation real property owned by a tax-exempt charitable organization and used exclusively for charitable purposes; see General Statutes § 12-81 (7) (A) ; but excludes from that exemption "housing subsidized, in whole or in part, by federal, state or local government ...." General Statutes § 12-81 (7) (B). The subsidized housing exclusion contains an exception for "temporary housing" used primarily for certain enumerated charitable purposes, including "housing for ... persons with a mental health disorder ...." General Statutes § 12-81 (7) (B) (iii). This appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court correctly determined that property used for a residential mental health treatment program was tax exempt under § 12-81 (7) on the grounds that it does not provide housing subsidized by the government and that any housing provided is temporary. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as stipulated by the parties, are undisputed. The plaintiffs, Rainbow Housing Corporation (Rainbow Housing) and Gilead Community Services, Inc. (Gilead), are both tax-exempt charitable organizations for federal tax purposes and subsidiaries of Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc., doing business as Oak Hill, an entity organized to provide support to people with disabilities. Rainbow Housing owns a residential property at 461 Main Street in Cromwell known as Valor Home, which it leases to Gilead for the purpose of providing "a broad range of high quality health care and recovery support services to individuals with the goal of supporting the individual's independent living in the community." Gilead pursues this goal at Valor Home through its "[s]upervised [a]partment [program]," which is an "intensive, community-based [program] designed to serve a specific cohort of clients ([eighteen] years of age and older) with severe mental illness, with or without co-occurring disorders, needing a supportive supervised living environment, [who] are not able to function in the milieu of a traditional group home setting."

Valor Home houses up to five men at a time, all of whom pay a monthly rental fee. The Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (department) helps fund Valor Home's supervised apartment program. Pursuant to Gilead's contract with the department, Valor Home provides, among other services, "psychiatric clinical services" and "community-based skill building instruction and other rehabilitative activities," including, but not limited to, "[t]eaching, coaching and assisting with daily living activities," "[a]ssistance with location and access of safe, affordable housing of [the resident's] choice, [and] providing education and support regarding tenant rights and responsibilities ...." Overall, Gilead receives approximately 75 percent of its funding from the department and "relies [on] donations from the public to make up the difference."

Prior to 2017, the defendant, the town of Cromwell, granted Valor Home a property tax exemption under § 12-81 (7). In 2017, the plaintiffs filed a timely and complete quadrennial renewal form, otherwise known as an M-3 application. See General Statutes § 12-81 (7) (A) (ii). In the M-3 application, the plaintiffs represented that Valor Home was exempt from taxation on the October 1, 2017 grand list because "[t]he primary use of [the] property is not housing" but, instead, to "[p]rovide support services for ... clients with mental illness." Shawna Baron, the assessor for the defendant, denied the plaintiffs' application for a property tax exemption.²

The plaintiffs timely filed an appeal with the defendant's Board of Assessment Appeals (board) pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-89 and 12-111 (a). The board denied the plaintiffs' appeal, and the plaintiffs filed the present action in the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-89, 12-117a and 12-119, claiming that the defendant improperly denied their application for a property tax exemption. Both the plaintiffs and the defendant moved for summary judgment and stipulated to the relevant facts and related exhibits.

The plaintiffs claimed that Valor Home was exempt from taxation under § 12-81 (7) because the plaintiffs are organized exclusively for charitable purposes, Valor Home is used exclusively for the plaintiffs' charitable purpose of serving individuals with severe mental illness, Valor Home does not provide government subsidized housing or low and moderate income housing, and the housing provided is temporary, transitional, and impermanent. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of Dan Osborne, the chief executive officer of Gilead, who averred that "[o]ccupancy at [Valor Home] is temporary and transitional insofar as the individuals who live at [Valor Home] ... live there [only] until they no longer need the services provided by Gilead. There is no specific term by which an individual must leave [Valor Home]; the term is entirely dependent [on] the individual's treatment progress. Once the individuals are capable of living more independently through the services and supports [provided] by Gilead, they move out of [Valor Home]."

In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued that Valor Home was not tax-exempt under § 12-81 (7) because it provides housing that is subsidized in part by the department and because the housing is not limited to a finite length of time and, therefore, is not temporary. In support, the defendant relied on the stipulated fact that Valor Home is funded by the department and an affidavit from Baron explaining that she had "determined that [Valor Home] does not qualify for a charitable tax exemption pursuant to ... § 12-81 (7) because [the] plaintiff[s] failed to establish that [Valor Home] is used for eligible temporary housing."

The trial court held a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, at which counsel for both parties assured the court that there were no disputed factual issues and that the sole question was whether Valor Home was exempt from taxation under § 12-81 (7) as a matter of law. Following the hearing, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's motion. This appeal followed.³

On appeal, the defendant renews the claims raised below, namely, that Valor Home is not tax-exempt under § 12-81 (7) because it provides subsidized housing that is not limited to a finite length of time and, thus, is not temporary. After amici curiae filed their briefs,⁴ the defendant filed a supplemental brief in which it adopted a new claim, raised for the first time by the amicus curiae town of Manchester. Specifically, the defendant claims that the plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the denial of their M-3 application because they failed to provide the assessor with sufficient information to demonstrate that Valor Home was exempt from taxation under § 12-81 (7).

I

We first address the defendant's claim that the plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the denial of their M-3 application because they failed to provide sufficient information to demonstrate that Valor Home qualified for a property tax exemption under § 12-81 (7). The defendant points out that, "[i]n response to the application questions regarding the average stay of residents at the property, rents, amount of income received from rent, and whether the rent was subsidized by the government, the plaintiffs answered ‘N/A,’ " and "[n]one of the supporting documentation required in conjunction with the application was supplied ...." The defendant contends that, in light of the plaintiffs' failure to provide the assessor with this information, the plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the denial of their application pursuant to our holding in J.C. Penney Corp., Inc. v. Manchester , 291 Conn. 838, 970 A.2d 704 (2009).⁵ We disagree.

Aggrievement is a component of standing, which is essential to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. See, e.g., Andross v. West Hartford , 285 Conn. 309, 321, 939 A.2d 1146 (2008). Statutory aggrievement under §§ 12-89, 12-117a and 12-119 "exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 322, 939 A.2d 1146. Although the defendant failed to preserve its aggrievement claim in...