J. F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Spears

• Decision Date: 18 June 1910
• Citation: 25 S.D. 624,127 N.W. 643
• Parties: J. F. ANDERSON LUMBER COMPANY, Plaintiff and respondent, v. JAMES SPEARS et al., Defendant and appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

25 S.D. 624, 127 N.W. 643 (1910)

J. F. ANDERSON LUMBER COMPANY, Plaintiff and respondent v JAMES SPEARS et al.,

Defendant and appellant

South Dakota Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Davison County, SD

Hon. Frank B. Smith, Judge

Affirmed

T. J. Spangler

Attorney for appellants.

A. E. Hitchcock

Attorney for respondent.

Opinion filed June 18, 1910

CORSON, J.

This action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover judgment against James Spears, the defendant, for building material sold to him by the plaintiff, and to subject a certain lot and improvements thereon, in the city of Mitchell, to the payment of the amount of said judgment. Findings and judgment being in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants have appealed from the same, and from the order denying a new trial.

The complaint is in the usual form, and the sixth allegation of the complaint is as follows:

"That at the times hereinbefore indicated, at which the plaintiff furnished the said building material to the defendant, the said defendant, James Spears, was the owner of said premises and in possession thereof. That on or about the 12th day of January, 1899, the said James Spears purchased said premises of Isaac Spears. That for the convenience of himself the said James Spears caused said property at the time of said purchase to be deeded to Frank Spears, who was then a minor. That said Frank Spears at no time had any interest in said property, and the said James Spears was the exclusive owner thereof."

And the plaintiff demands judgment against the said James Spears for the amount so claimed, and that the same be adjudged to be a lien upon the premises described in the complaint.

Two questions only are presented and discussed in defendants' brief, viz: (1) The alleged error of the court in overruling defendants' objection to the introduction of evidence under the complaint. (2) That the court erred in denying defendants' motion, at the close of plaintiff's evidence, for a dismissal of the action as to all of the defendants.

At the commencement of the trial the defendants objected to the introduction of any evidence on the part of the plaintiff, on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. It is contended by the defendants and appellants that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, in that it affirmatively appears from the sixth paragraph of the complaint that Frank Spears was the legal owner of the property sought to be charged with the lien, and that the allegations in the complaint show that the contract was made personally with the defendant James Spears, who was not the owner of the premises, and that it was not shown that the said James Spears had authority as the agent of the defendant Frank Spears, to enter into the contract with the plaintiff, entitling the plaintiff to any mechanic's lien upon the said property for the materials so furnished by it to the said James Spears. The objection of the defendants to the evidence offered on the part of the plaintiff under the complaint was overruled by the court, and the appellants contend that for the error in so overruling the objection the judgment in this case should be reversed. It will be observed, however, that it is alleged in the paragraph referred to that the defendant James Spears is the owner of the lot on which the material was used; that the said James Spears had purchased said property from Isaac Spears, and that for the convenience of the said James Spears the property was deeded to Frank Spears, who was then a minor. We are of the opinion that the complaint is sufficient, as against an objection made at the trial that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Courts do not favor objections to complaints as not sufficiently stating a cause of action, taken at the time of the trial, where ho demurrer has been interposed thereto previous to the trial; and hence all inferences that can properly be drawn from the complaint to support the same will be indulged in. McCormick Harvester Co. v. Faulkner, 7 S.D. 363, 64 N.W. 163, 58 Am.St.Rep. 839; Johnson v. Glidden, 11 S.D. 237, 76 N.W. 933, 74 Am.St.Rep. 795; Stutsman Co. v. Mansfield, 5 Dak. 78, 37 N.W. 304; Anderson v. Alseth, 6 S.D. 566, 62 N.W. 435; Johnson v. Burnside, 3 S.D. 230, 52 N.W. 1057; Strait v. City of Eureka, 17 S.D. 328, 96 N.W. 695.

In the latter case this court, in discussing a similar objection, says:

"One who pleads to the merits, and goes to trial without demurring, greatly impairs his right to question the sufficiency of the facts stated in a complaint by objecting to the introduction of any evidence. It is only when a pleading is incapable of being made good by amendment that the court should entertain the objection here relied upon. ... To sustain a complaint first objected to at the trial on the ground that facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action are not stated, this court will indulge every reasonable presumption." It will be noticed that it is alleged that James Spears purchased said premises, and that for convenience of himself he caused said property at the time of said purchase to be deeded to Frank Spears. Clearly, therefore, under this allegation In the complaint, the court would presume, upon an objection to the complaint made at the trial, that as James Spears purchased the property he paid the consideration therefor, and therefore, under the provisions of section 303 of the Civil Code, became the equitable owner of the same. That section reads as follows:

"When a transfer of real property is made to one person, and the consideration therefor is paid by or for another, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or for whom such payment is made."

While, therefore, the legal title was, under the allegations of...