J.H. By and Through D.H. v. West Valley City
| Decision Date | 07 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 900052,900052 |
| Citation | 840 P.2d 115 |
| Parties | J.H., By and Through his guardian ad litem, D.H., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WEST VALLEY CITY, West Valley City Police Department, and Jene V. Lyday, individually and as a police officer of West Valley City, Defendants and Appellees. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Richard I. Ashton, Wayne H. Braunberger, David A. Wilde, Murray, for D.H.
James M. Dunn, Michael N. Zundel, Laurie S. Hart, Salt Lake City, for Lyday.
Allan L. Larson, Richard A. Van Wagoner, Salt Lake City, for West Valley City and West Valley Police Dept.
Plaintiff J.H. appeals from an order of the Third Judicial District Court of Utah granting summary judgment to defendants West Valley City and West Valley City Police Department ("West Valley") and dismissing J.H.'s claims against those parties. We affirm.
J.H. filed claims against West Valley and defendant Jene V. Lyday for alleged injuries arising from sexual abuse that Lyday committed upon J.H. in April of 1986. Lyday was employed as a police officer by West Valley City Police Department at the time of the abuse. J.H. filed claims against West Valley for violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon the City's "deliberate indifference" toward the rights of J.H. and the other citizens of West Valley City, for liability under the theory of respondeat superior, for negligence in hiring Lyday and later installing him as advisor to a law enforcement explorer post organized by the City, and for negligently placing Lyday in a position of trust and authority without adequate supervision. West Valley filed a motion for summary judgment, which was heard on October 30, 1989. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds that J.H. had failed to state a prima facie case against West Valley under any of his theories of recovery, that there was no genuine issue of material fact, and that West Valley was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because the summary judgment did not dispose of pending claims against Lyday, the trial court certified the disposition for appeal under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. J.H. thereafter made a timely appeal to this court.
Our review of this case follows established standards for determining the appropriateness of summary judgment. Regarding questions of law, this court accords no deference to the trial court and reviews the trial court's decisions for correctness. 1 In reviewing factual issues, this court views the evidence and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 2 Our recital of the facts is based upon that standard.
Lyday was hired by the West Valley City Police Department in July of 1980 as part of West Valley's original recruitment of police officers. He was hired by Chief of Police David Campbell and Assistant Chief of Police Gerald Maughan. Prior to his position with West Valley, Lyday had served as a police officer for the Salt Lake City Police Department for seven years. During his tenure with the Salt Lake City Police Department, he became acquainted with both Campbell and Maughan, who also served in that department. Campbell was also personally acquainted with Lyday through a mutual religious affiliation.
As part of the application process, Lyday was required to take a physical agility test and a written test. He was interviewed by Campbell and Maughan and was required to fill out a personal statement form that the hiring officers reviewed. This form required that Lyday reveal any prior conduct that would disqualify him from police work. A background investigation of Lyday and all other applicants included a search for prior criminal activity, a fingerprint analysis and criminal activity search with the FBI, a search of the applicant's driving and credit records, and a check for satisfactory prior employment. No attempt was made to verify the information on the personal statement form. No interviews were made of family, friends, or associates of Lyday. No psychological tests were performed to uncover violent tendencies or deviant characteristics. No other psychological or physical examinations were performed.
Attached to his motion in opposition to summary judgment, J.H. submitted the amended affidavit of Dr. Arthur Brown, a licensed marriage and family therapist and psychologist. Brown opined that if psychological tests had been performed on Lyday before he was hired or placed in charge of the explorer program, these tests would "most likely" have revealed Lyday's deviant characteristics.
Lyday was appointed to the Public Relations Department of the police department in 1984. As the officer in charge of public relations, he functioned as advisor to the Law Enforcement Explorer Scout Program ("the explorer program"). This program was instituted to improve public relations, encourage law enforcement careers among participants, and provide a positive program in the community for adolescents. Lyday's duties with respect to the explorer program included coordinating explorer education and training sessions, coordinating explorer activities and social events, supervising explorers when they were called upon to assist police officers in traffic control or other duties, coordinating a "ride along" program in which explorers were allowed to ride with West Valley police officers as they performed their regular duties, and coordinating explorer participation in public service activities such as safety presentations and mall demonstrations. Occasionally, after explorer activities, Lyday provided transportation home for some of the explorers in the program. He was paid for his coordination and supervision activities with this program. He included time spent with the explorers, whether for regular police activity or social activities or demonstrations, as part of his on-duty police time with West Valley. It is unclear whether time spent transporting explorers home from explorer activities was counted as on-duty time by Lyday.
When Lyday was placed in charge of the explorer program, he did not receive additional training or instruction on dealing with youths, nor was he required to undergo any additional testing or background check. As the explorer advisor, he was not observed or supervised by any other person during the performance of his duties.
J.H.'s involvement with the explorer program began in October 1985. He joined the explorer program because of his interest in police work and his desire to make police work his career. Upon acceptance into the program, J.H. was informed that he was to strictly obey all police officers working with the program. He was also told that the program was under Lyday's control. He and other members of the explorer program were advised to follow Lyday's directions and instructions or they could be dismissed from the program.
On April 10 and April 17, 1986, Lyday sexually molested J.H. The conduct occurred in a patrol car while Lyday was driving J.H. home following explorer activities. Lyday committed the acts after telling J.H. that he was teaching him standard and accepted relaxation techniques which police officers relied upon to deal with job-related stress. After the second molestation, J.H. notified his parents and the authorities of the abuse. The Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department and West Valley investigated the complaints. Lyday resigned from his position in May 1986. He was formally charged with two counts of forcible sexual abuse 3 and pleaded guilty to one count of attempted forcible sexual abuse. On October 7, 1987, J.H. filed the instant claims against Lyday and West Valley.
J.H.'s first claim is that his civil rights were violated by Lyday's conduct against him. He brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 4
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that under certain circumstances, a municipality may be sued as a "person" for violating a citizen's rights. In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 5 the Court held that to establish a claim for violation of civil rights against a municipality under section 1983, the violation complained of must arise out of the official acts of the municipality or under a governmental custom or policy, even though such custom may not have received formal approval through the body's decision-making channels. 6 Liability against a municipality will not lie merely on the basis of respondeat superior or on the unofficial acts of the municipality's employees. 7
Subsequent cases have clarified the requirements for establishing section 1983 liability against a municipality for the acts of its employees. First, the injury to rights must have been committed under color of state law. 8 There is no constitutional right to protection from the actions of private citizens. 9 To show that an injury was committed under color of state law, a plaintiff must show that the actor was either a public official who can be said to act for the municipality or an employee of the municipality who acted according to a law, custom, or usage known to and acquiesced in or condoned by the municipality. 10
In Canton v. Harris, 11 the Court held that a custom or usage may result from failure to train city police officers if that failure amounts to deliberate indifference to a known constitutional right of a plaintiff or the citizens of the municipality. 12 Further clarifying the meaning of the term "deliberate...
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