J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Nation

Decision Date14 January 2015
Docket NumberNo. CIV 12–0128 JB/WDS.,CIV 12–0128 JB/WDS.
Citation61 F.Supp.3d 1176
PartiesJ.H., on behalf of her minor child, J.P., Plaintiffs, v. Cee Kaye NATION, Principal; Alison Gonzales, Teacher; J.M. Sharkey, Bernalillo County Deputy; and Bernalillo County, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

Joseph P. Kennedy, Shannon L. Kennedy, Laura Schauer Ives, Kennedy Kennedy & Ives, LLC, Albuquerque, NM, for the Plaintiff.

Terri S. Beach, Miller Stratvert P.A., Luis E. Robles, Marcus J. Rael, Jr. Robles, Rael & Anaya, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants Bernalillo County and J.M. Sharkey.

Jeremy K. Harrison, Megan Muirhead, Modrall Sperling, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants Cee Kaye Nation and Alison Gonzales.

MEMORANDUM OPINION2

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Deputy Sharkey's Motion to Dismiss No. II: Dismissal of Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim, filed January 16, 2013 (Doc. 53)(“MTD”). The Court held a hearing on April 25, 2013. The primary issues are: (i) whether Plaintiff J.H., on behalf of her developmentally disabled child, J.P., can simultaneously bring claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States for Defendant J.M. Sharkey's alleged unlawful seizure of J.P.; (ii) whether Sharkey violated J.P.'s substantive due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when, immediately after J.P. had an altercation with another student at school, he handcuffed J.P. and transported her to the Juvenile Detention Facility; and (iii) whether J.P.'s substantive due-process rights were clearly established. First, J.H. cannot simultaneously bring claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for Sharkey's alleged unlawful seizure of J.P. Second, even if J.H. could bring a separate Fourteenth Amendment claim, Sharkey did not violate J.P.'s substantive due-process rights. Third, even if Sharkey violated J.P.'s substantive due-process rights, those rights were not clearly established, and Sharkey is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the Court will grant the MTD.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Consistent with the Court's duty to take the plaintiff's allegations as true when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court takes its facts from J.H.'s complaint. See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for Recovery of Damages Due to Deprivation of Civil Rights and Rights Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, filed June 28, 2013 (Doc. 85)(“Complaint”).3 J.H. and J.P. live in Bernalillo County, New Mexico. See Complaint ¶¶ 1–2, at 1. Throughout the events that the Complaint alleges, J.P. was an eleven-year-old student at Roosevelt Middle School, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. See Complaint ¶¶ 2–5, at 1; id. ¶ 25, at 3.

Because J.P. had experienced significant emotional difficulty at school in the past, she was placed on an Individualized Educational Plan (“IEP”). Complaint ¶¶ 14–22, at 2–3. IEPs are designed to address a developmentally disabled student's behavior if such behavior will interfere with learning. See Complaint ¶ 21, at 3. As part of her IEP, J.P.'s IEP team issued a Behavioral Intervention Plan (“BIP”) that detailed procedures which school officials had to follow before and during the use of physical restraints on J.P.; the Complaint does not describe the procedures other than by alleging that they “did not include handcuffing as an appropriate intervention.” Complaint ¶¶ 20–22, at 3; id. ¶ 29–31, at 4.

In the fall of 2011, J.P. was placed in a special education class that regularly included approximately five developmentally disabled students. See Complaint ¶¶ 25–26, at 4. J.H. informed Sharkey—a Deputy Sherriff of the County of Bernalillo and the school resource officer assigned to Roosevelt Middle School—that either restraining her daughter in handcuffs or arresting her daughter would violate her daughter's BIP. See Complaint ¶ 6, at 2; ¶ 38, at 5. On September 26, 2011, J.P. struck a student in her classroom. See Complaint ¶¶ 27–28, at 4. The classroom teacher, Alison Gonzalez contacted Sharkey. See Complaint ¶¶ 25–28, at 4. Gonzales tried to restrain J.P. by grabbing her around the waist. See Complaint ¶¶ 30–32, at 4. Sharkey grabbed J.P. “in violation of the proper method of restraint detailed in [J.P.'s] BIP.” Complaint ¶ 33, at 4. Having “decided to press charges against the child for kicking” her teacher, Sharkey “placed J.P. in handcuffs and walked her out of the classroom,” and then “transported the 11 year old disabled child to the Juvenile Detention Center in his patrol unit,” where she “was held ... for several hours.” Complaint ¶¶ 34–37, at 4–5. “Eventually, J.P.'s handcuffs were removed and she was placed in a small cell with only a floor mat to sit on.” Complaint ¶ 39, at 5. J.H. was informed of these events only after Sharkey placed J.P. in handcuffs and moved her to the Detention Center. See Complaint ¶ 38, at 4–5. Defendant Sharkey never notified J.P.'s mother, J.H., that her daughter had been arrested, charged with battery and taken to the Detention Center in violation of her BIP.” Complaint ¶ 40, at 5.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

J.H. commenced this lawsuit in New Mexico state court on December 5, 2011; Sharkey's co-Defendants removed the case to federal court on February 9, 2012. See Notice of Removal (Doc. 1). On June 28, 2013, J.H. filed the Second Amended Complaint. See Complaint at 1. The Complaint alleges seven causes of action, only one of which is relevant to this Memorandum Opinion and Order: a claim that the Sharkey violated J.P.'s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Complaint ¶¶ 60–65, at 7–8. J.H. asserts that New Mexico statutes regulating the handling of a mentally disabled child create a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Complaint at ¶ 63, at 7–8. J.H. argues that Sharkey violated that interest in two ways: first, by handcuffing J.P., and, second, by transporting her to the Juvenile Detention Center. See Complaint at ¶¶ 62–65, at 7–8.

1. The MTD.

On January 16, 2013, Sharkey moved the Court to dismiss J.P.'s substantive due-process claim. See MTD passim. Sharkey asserts the defense of qualified immunity, arguing that the Complaint does not allege that he violated a clearly established right that the Due Process Clause protects. See MTD at 7–14. In his view, only the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures protects any rights that he allegedly violated. See MTD at 7–14.

2. The Response.

J.H. responded to the MTD on February 11, 2013. See Plaintiff's Response to Deputy Sharkey's Motion to Dismiss No. II: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim, filed February 11, 2013 (Doc. 61)(“Response”). In J.H.'s view, “the restraint of a mentally ill child for transport to a jail was clearly a violation of the child's right to be free of liberty deprivations through the use of restraints.” Response at 7. Citing cases involving restraints placed upon those with mental difficulties, J.H. argues that the proper standard for evaluating this claim is whether the state actor properly exercised “professional judgment.” Response at 3–4 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) ; Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1182 (1st Cir.1983) ; M.H. v. Bristol Bd. of Educ., 169 F.Supp.2d 21, 31 (D.Conn.2001) ). J.H. argue that [t]he State of New Mexico has created a comprehensive statutory scheme that requires police officers to refrain from restraining mentally ill children and providing them with treatment or evaluation.” Response at 3. For example, J.H. points to various sections of the New Mexico Children's Code that limit the circumstances in which law enforcement can physically restrain or detain a child. See Response at 4–6 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32A–2–2(A) ; 32A–2–3(B), (H), (J); 32A–2–10; 32A–6A–3). J.H. contends that New Mexico statutes restricting the restraint, transport, and confinement of a delinquent child give rise to a liberty interest that the Due Process Clause protects, and that “the restraint and transport of an eleven year old mentally ill child violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free of restraints.” Response at 6. In sum, J.H. argues that Sharkey violated J.P.'s rights under both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause, and, because she “does not have to choose whether she vindicates one right or another, she may vindicate both constitutional rights simultaneously.” Response at 1.

3. The Reply.

Sharkey replied to the Response on February 20, 2013. See Deputy Sharkey's Reply to Response to Motion to Dismiss No. II: Dismissal of Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim, filed February 20, 2013 (Doc. 64)(“Reply”). Sharkey reiterates that “controlling precedent requires analysis of Plaintiff's ... claims under the objective reasonableness and probable cause standard of the Fourth Amendment and not the substantive due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Reply at 3. Sharkey further emphasizes other cases which hold that a state actor does not forfeit his qualified immunity defense merely because he has violated state statutory law, and that the issue for suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is whether the conduct violates the standards of federal law, and not of state law. See Reply at 5–7. Sharkey argues that, even if he violated New Mexico law governing the treatment of developmentally disabled children, the state-law violations did not, alone, violate J.P.'s clearly established constitutional rights. See Reply at 6–11. Sharkey contends that he is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity. See Reply at 6–11.

4. The April 25, 2013, Hearing.

The Court held a hearing on the MTD on April 25, 2013. See Transcript of Hearing (taken Apr. 25, 2013)(Doc. 105)(“Tr.”). Sharkey underscored that he acted as a law enforcement officer when he responded to what he believed to be...

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