M.H. v. Bristol Bd. of Educ.

• Citation: 169 F.Supp.2d 21
• Decision Date: 29 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. 3:98CV867.,3:98CV867.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: M.H. By, Through and with His Parents and Next Friends, Mr. and Mrs. H. Plaintiffs, v. BRISTOL BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.

Page 21

169 F.Supp.2d 21

M.H. By, Through and with His Parents and Next Friends, Mr. and Mrs. H. Plaintiffs, v. BRISTOL BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:98CV867.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

August 29, 2001.

David C. Shaw, Andrew Alan Feinstein, Richard T. Roznoy, Law Offices of David C. Shaw, Hartford, for M. H., by & through his parents & next friends, Mr & Mrs H., plaintiffs.

Scott M. Karsten, Sack, Spector & Karsten, West Hartford, Christopher Brigham, Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C., New Haven, for Bristol Bd of Ed, Katherine Bourgault, Walter Ives, Edward Maher, Lisa Palangi, Katie Wininger, Michael Wasta, Betty Marchesi, defendants.

RULING ON THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COVELLO, Chief Judge.

This is an action for damages. It is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,¹ the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. ("IDEA"),² and common law tenets concerning assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. The plaintiff, a disabled minor with Down's syndrome, alleges that the defendant, the Bristol board of education, and its employees violated his rights in connection with his education in the Bristol school system. The defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.³

The issues presented are: (1) whether the plaintiff may assert a cause of action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon violations of the IDEA; (2) whether the use of physical and mechanical restraints on the plaintiff, a disabled student, which was not authorized by the plaintiff's individualized education plan and was without parental consent, violated the student's substantive due process rights; (3) whether the plaintiff received an adequate remedy following the deprivation of his property and liberty interests to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process; (4) whether the plaintiff has sufficiently shown that a policy or custom of the defendant board of education caused his injury; (5) whether the plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated the personal involvement of the supervisory defendants in his alleged injuries; (6) whether the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (7) whether the individual defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity for the plaintiff's state law causes of action.

The court concludes: (1) that a plaintiff may bring a cause of action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon violations of the IDEA; (2) that the use of physical and mechanical restraints on the plaintiff constitutes a violation of the plaintiff's substantive due process rights where there is no evidence that such action was taken pursuant to standards of professional judgment; (3) that the plaintiff received an adequate post-deprivation hearing in state administrative actions to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process; (4) that the plaintiff has not sufficiently shown that the defendant board of education's policy or custom caused his alleged injury for purposes of municipality liability (5) that the plaintiff has not sufficiently shown the personal involvement of some of the individual defendants for purposes of supervisory liability; (6) that the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity; and (7) that the individual defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity for the plaintiff's state law causes of action.

For the reasons stated herein, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

FACTS

Examination of the complaint, affidavits, pleadings, exhibits, supplemental materials, and Rule 9(c) statements discloses the following undisputed, material facts:

At all times relevant to this case, the plaintiff, M.H., was a fourteen-year old student in the sixth grade at Memorial Boulevard Middle School in Bristol, Connecticut. M.H. has Down's syndrome and is severely mentally retarded. He is essentially non-verbal and possesses an IQ of less than 36. The Bristol board of education has provided M.H. with special education services since 1985. Under the provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. ("IDEA"), the Bristol board of education is required to develop an individualized education plan for M.H. This plan is developed during regular planning and placement team ("PPT") meetings in which M.H.'s parents, Mr. and Mrs. H., participate.

During the 1995-96 school year, the defendants, Lisa Palangi, a special education teacher, and Betty Marchesi, a paraprofessional, were assigned to work with M.H. On or about May 7, 1996, Palangi spit water onto M.H.'s face and stated "this is spitting," in response to M.H.'s acts of misbehavior. Marchesi was present in the classroom at the time and witnessed this spitting incident. Neither Palangi nor Marchesi reported this incident to their supervisors. When M.H. returned home that day from school, his mother observed that his hair was "soaking." Palangi sent a note home with M.H. which stated that she and M.H. had been playing hairdresser and she gave him a new hairstyle. On May 8, 1996, one Elizabeth Knoblauch, a paraprofessional working at the school, overheard Marchesi talking about the incident. Knoblauch then reported the incident to the defendant, Katherine Bourgault, the supervisor of special education.

On May 10, 1996, the defendant, Edward Maher, superintendent of schools, sent Palangi a letter advising her that she was being suspended without pay. That evening, Palangi telephoned Mr. and Mrs. H. at home and told them she had "squirted" water in M.H.'s face the week prior. Palangi explained that she was in danger of being fired, and asked Mr. and Mrs. H. to speak to school officials on her behalf.

On May 13, 1996, school officials conducted a meeting to discuss Palangi's employment. Palangi, Maher, and the defendant, Walter Ives, the principal of Memorial Boulevard Middle School, were present at the meeting, along with other school and union representatives. Although Mr. and Mrs. H. were not present for portions of the meeting, they were allowed to speak and stated that Palangi had been a "good teacher," and that she had "helped their son a great deal." After the meeting, Mrs. H. learned more details about the May 8th incident, including the fact that Palangi had intentionally spat on M.H.'s face, and had not "squirted" water at him as previously reported to her. Mrs. H. discovered that Marchesi had witnessed the spitting incident and that neither she nor Palangi had reported the incident to school officials. In addition, Mrs. H. learned that Palangi had often restrained M.H. in a chair during the school day as a means of controlling him when Marchesi was not present in the classroom. Palangi restrained M.H. with a belt around his waist which was then secured to a chair. When Marchesi would return to the classroom, Palangi would release M.H. Mr. and Mrs. H. both stated that they were not previously informed of the use of restraints nor had they consented to such measures.

Sometime thereafter, the defendant, Katie Wininger, a special education teacher, was assigned to M.H. as Palangi's replacement. On May 21, 1996, Mrs. H. visited the school and observed Wininger physically restraining M.H. Specifically, Wininger held both of M.H.'s arms from behind and forcibly restrained him. M.H. resisted, and a physical struggle ensued until Mrs. H. stepped in and calmed down M.H. Later that day, Mrs. H. wrote a letter to the defendant, Michael Wasta, director of pupil personnel services, describing the incident and voicing her concerns about the use of physical force. Mrs. H. sent a copy of the letter to Maher. Neither defendant responded to the letter. On May 24, 1996, Palangi resigned from her position.

On June 12, 1996, Wininger sent home a note to Mr. and Mrs. H., advising them about an incident involving M.H. during a fire drill at the school. When the fire alarm sounded, M.H. had become agitated and had to be physically removed from the building by Wininger and Marchesi. M.H. attempted to bite both women. In the altercation, both of M.H.'s arms were bruised. School officials knew prior to the incident that M.H. was agitated by fire alarms, but it is unclear whether his teachers were warned of the drill on that day.

On June 24, 1996, Mr. and Mrs. H. met with school officials for a PPT meeting. At that meeting, Bourgault showed Mr. and Mrs. H. a handwritten "behavior management plan" dated May 30, 1996, which was drafted based on a May 18, 1993 case report completed by a consultant (the "CREC report").⁴ Mr. and Mrs. H. objected to those portion of the behavior management plan which permitted the use of physical restraint. The school officials agreed to put those measures on hold. Mrs. H. presented photographs of the bruises to M.H.'s arms resulting from the June 12th fire drill and requested that a report be filed about the incident.

On June 25, 1996, Mr. and Mrs. H. requested a state administrative hearing to discuss the school's summer program for M.H., pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415⁵ and Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10-76h.⁶ On July 23, 1996, Mr. and Mrs. H. wrote to the defendant, Bourgault, about their concerns that their May 21st letter to the defendant, Wasta, about the spitting incident and the bruises M.H. suffered during the June 12th fire drill, went unanswered. On July 23, 1996, Mr. and Mrs. H. requested a second administrative hearing to determine whether M.H. was receiving a free and appropriate education in the least restrictive environment pursuant to the IDEA provisions.

On August 9, 1996, a final decision and order was issued in the first state administrative hearing. On October 18, 1996, a final decision and order was issued in the second state administrative hearing. Mr. and Mrs. H. then brought two separate actions in the...