J.K. v. Com., 89-P-179
Decision Date | 19 September 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 89-P-179,89-P-179 |
Citation | 28 Mass.App.Ct. 761,556 N.E.2d 107 |
Parties | J.K. v. COMMONWEALTH. |
Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Patricia Randall, for the plaintiff.
William A. Mitchell, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Patrick J. Moynihan, Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for Com.
Before WARNER, C.J., and ARMSTRONG and PERRETTA, JJ.
While walking home in Provincetown on the night of November 1, 1980, the plaintiff was accosted by two men who were lodged at a local inn by arrangement on behalf of the Commonwealth (defendant). The men were Commonwealth witnesses to a murder. For four hours, the men repeatedly raped the plaintiff. She brought this action under G.L. c. 258, alleging that the defendant had placed these men in Provincetown with knowledge that they were dangerous and without taking measures for their supervision or monitoring. On the undisputed facts, a Superior Court judge concluded that she was constrained to allow the defendant's motion for summary judgment. She did not, however, enter a judgment dismissing the case because she also concluded that her ruling raised a current and important question of law which she has reported to this court under G.L. c. 231, § 111, and Mass.R.Civ.P. 64, 365 Mass. 831 (1974): "whether the Trial Court was correct in deciding that, despite the Commonwealth's role in housing the plaintiff's assailants and its knowledge of their criminal records, no special relationship existed between the plaintiff and the Commonwealth; therefore the Commonwealth owed no special duty of care to the plaintiff beyond that which it owed to the general public." We conclude that the judge correctly allowed the defendant's motion and remand the matter to the Superior Court for entry of a judgment on her order.
We relate the undisputed material facts recited and relied upon by the judge in her memorandum of decision on the order. In September of 1980, Stanley Dutra and Michael Shagoury stood and watched two men known to them drown a man in a cranberry bog in Mashpee. They went to the Mashpee and State police and the district attorney and admitted their involvement in the crimes against that victim. They also appeared before the Barnstable County grand jury. Thereafter, the grand jury indicted Dutra and Shagoury for assault and battery of the man, and the other two men were charged with his murder.
A few weeks after the indictments were returned, Dutra and Shagoury expressed concerns about their safety to the district attorney's office. It was decided to send the men to Provincetown, and a State trooper assigned to that office made the arrangements for Dutra and Shagoury's relocation. Specifically, the trooper contacted the Provincetown chief of police, informed him that the district attorney's office wanted to relocate to Provincetown two witnesses to a homicide, and asked for hotel recommendations.
On the evening of October 31, the trooper brought Dutra and Shagoury to Provincetown and registered them at the Provincetown Inn. The registration form indicated that the bill was to be sent to the district attorney for the Cape and Islands District. On their first night in Provincetown, Dutra and Shagoury held a loud party in their room which prompted the manager of the inn to notify the chief of police. No one informed the district attorney's office, and the chief took no action in the matter. It was on the second night of their stay in Provincetown that Dutra and Shagoury repeatedly raped and sodomized the plaintiff and forced her to engage in oral sex with them. Their brutal attack began outside, but, when the plaintiff became so cold that she could not control her violent shivering, Dutra and Shagoury forced her into an unlocked van.
As of the date of the incident, Dutra's criminal record dated back to 1976, when he was a juvenile. As an adult, he had been convicted of a number of violent offenses: simple assault and battery, assault and battery on a police officer (multiple incidents), and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, a tire iron. Shagoury's record consisted of a number of property and violent offenses, all committed as a juvenile. 1
There are no allegations by the plaintiff that Dutra or Shagoury knew her prior to their attack or that there was any kind of relationship between her and them of which the defendant should have been aware. Liability is grounded upon the premise that the defendant had the duty to protect the plaintiff from the two men. The plaintiff claims a breach of that duty by reason of the defendant's failures: (1) to inform the Provincetown police and the inn management of the criminal charges pending against Dutra and Shagoury (assault and battery and robbery), as well as of their criminal history; (2) to request the inn management to notify the district attorney's office of any problems with the men; and (3) to request the Provincetown police to monitor or supervise them.
Section 10(b ) of G.L. c. 258, as inserted by St.1978, c. 512, § 15, removes from the scope of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act "any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer or public employee, acting within the scope of his office or employment, whether or not the discretion involved is abused." In determining whether this exception applies in a given situation, we are to be guided by those considerations discussed in Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977), "an opinion which played a major role as an incentive to the Legislature to enact the Tort Claims Act." Cady v. Plymouth-Carver Regional School Dist., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 211, 213, 457 N.E.2d 294 (1983). See Patrazza v. Commonwealth, 398 Mass. 464, 467, 497 N.E.2d 271 (1986).
As set out in Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. at 219, 366 N.E.2d 1210, the
These considerations led the court in Cady v. Plymouth-Carver Regional School Dist., 17 Mass.App.Ct. at 217, 457 N.E.2d 294, to conclude that the discretionary function exception applied to school authorities who allowed two students who had attacked the plaintiff student to return to school without having taken any precautionary measures to protect the plaintiff from further harm. Although that case involved facts far less egregious than those in the instant case, situations comparable to the present have been found to be within the cognate discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988). See, e.g., Bergmann v. United States, 689 F.2d 789 (8th Cir.1982), holding that an action for the wrongful death of a police officer murdered by an unsupervised person relocated under the Federal witness security program could not be maintained.
Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 19-20, 372 N.E.2d 196 (1977). We think that the defendant's decision to relocate Dutra and Shagoury to Provincetown without alerting local authorities to the details of the reasons for the move or requesting that they be supervised was a discretionary decision. Cady v. Plymouth-Carver Regional School Dist., 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 215, 457 N.E.2d 294, citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35, 73 S.Ct. 956, 967, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953). See also Patrazza v. Commonwealth, 398 Mass. at 468-469, 497 N.E.2d 271, quoting from United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 811-812, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2763-2764, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984), quoting from Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. at 35-36, 73 S.Ct. at 967-968. Compare A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 246, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (1988) ().
An additional basis, and the one relied upon by the judge, for allowing the defendant's motion is the plaintiff's inability, as matter of law, to ...
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