J. L. P., In Interest of

• Decision Date: 11 March 1980
• Docket Number: No. 41329,41329
• Citation: 600 S.W.2d 47
• Parties: In the Interest of J. L. P., a minor.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 47

600 S.W.2d 47

In the Interest of J. L. P., a minor.

No. 41329.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

March 11, 1980.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied

April 18, 1980.

As Corrected June 24, 1980.

Application to Transfer Denied July 15, 1980.

Judith B. Sklar, St. Charles, for appellant.

William J. Hannah, Pros. Atty., James J. Redmond, Asst. Pros. Atty., St. Charles, for respondent.

WEIER, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Juvenile Division of the St. Charles County Circuit Court finding J.L.P., then a fifteen year old juvenile, was in need of care and treatment under the Juvenile Code by virtue of stealing from his adoptive father. ¹ The trial court first determined the youth had committed the offense and after a later dispositional hearing, appellant was committed to the custody of the Division of Youth Services. We affirm the adjudication and the disposition of the youth by the court.

The appellant first contends the trial court erred in overruling a motion to suppress a confession made by the juvenile because there was not a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda ² rights. The trial court heard testimony presented by both the State and the appellant on the issue of voluntary waiver. A detective, the adoptive father of the youth and the deputy juvenile officer, all testified that the detective read the juvenile his rights and that the youth acknowledged he understood them, signed a waiver form and later confessed to the crime. The youth, however, testified that he signed the waiver while intoxicated ³ and in fear of physical intimidation by his adoptive father who was in the room at the time of the alleged waiver and interrogation. At the end of the suppression hearing the trial court overruled the appellant's motion, finding that the youth was informed of his rights and that he "freely, voluntarily and intelligently waived" them. Later, when the trial judge adjudicated the youth to be culpable of the act charged, he specifically read into the record that he was excluding the confession and instead based his judgment on other evidence presented by the State. Because the trial court determination was not founded upon the allegedly involuntary confession, we need not address the issue of whether there was, in fact, a knowing and intelligent waiver by the youth of his Miranda rights. ⁴

We next focus our inquiry onto the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence, excluding the confession by the youth, upon which to base an adjudication of stealing. The youth was adjudged a delinquent by reason of stealing under Section 560.156, RSMo. 1969; that is, he willfully took and carried away stereo equipment belonging to his adoptive father with the intention to permanently deprive the owner of the property. Evidence of this course of conduct was provided by the testimony of an eyewitness to the offense. Daniel Griffith testified that he was present and observed the youth punching in the screen door of the victim's house, entering the house and carrying out stereo equipment. The equipment was then loaded into a car and taken to a shop and pawned, the eyewitness being with the youth during the whole of the occurrence. The youth's parents had previously had the locks on the house changed. After the taking, when they arrived home, they found the door broken open, with glass over the floor back of the screen door. In addition, the youth admitted to his adoptive father during a telephone conversation prior to the police interrogation that he took the equipment and pawned it.

Juvenile proceedings are normally considered equitable for procedural purposes. Section 211.171(6), RSMo.1978; State ex rel. R.L.W. v. Billings, 451 S.W.2d 125, 126 (2) (Mo. banc 1970). In such proceedings, however, due process requires the standard of proof to be a reasonable doubt in the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). the record reflects the existence of such proof to support the judgment.

Related to this issue of substantial evidence of culpability is the claim on appeal that all elements, the corpus delicti, of the offense were not proven. Specifically, appellant alleges error in the trial court finding that there was sufficient proof of the requisite intent to adjudicate him guilty of the offense of stealing. The testimony shows that the youth illegally took stereo equipment. But he claims that the pawning of the items and the retention of the pawn ticket showed a lack of an intent to permanently deprive his adoptive father of the stereo. He maintains he had merely pawned the items to obtain money and intended to buy back the items and return them at a later date.

" 'Intent' is the purpose or design with which an act is done." State v. Harris, 313 S.W.2d 664, 670 (5) (Mo.1958), and it is ". . . seldom subject to proof by use of direct evidence, and it usually must be inferred from the circumstances." State v. Beckemeyer, 423 S.W.2d 687, 688 (1) (Mo.1968). See also, State v. Poor, 533 S.W.2d 245, 248 (5) (Mo.App.1976). The question of intent is an issue to be found by the fact-finder, in this instance, the trial court. State v. Everett, 448 S.W.2d 873, 877 (3) (Mo.1970). There was competent evidence to justify the trial court finding that the youth intended to permanently deprive his foster father of the stereo equipment by taking it from the home and thereafter pawning the items. The act of breaking in the screen and the door, entering the house, removing the equipment from the house, placing it in the automobile and then pawning it are direct evidence of wrongfully taking possession of the property, asportation and converting it to one's own use. Under these circumstances intent to deprive the rightful owner of the property may be inferred by the trier of fact. State v. Ahern, 546 S.W.2d 20, 21 (2) (Mo.App.1976). The manner in which the property was taken is evidence of an intent to steal it. State v. Sturgell, 530 S.W.2d 737, 739 (2) (Mo.App.1975). In addition to the manner in which the property was taken, testimony of Detective Uebinger established that Joe Griffith, the brother of Daniel Griffith, had accompanied the youth to the pawn shop, possessed the pawn ticket and had received half of the money. The juvenile then would have been unable to redeem the items had he so desired. From this it could be inferred that the youth had no intention of returning the items to his father. Furthermore, the act of pawning itself is an act of dominion over the property contrary to the rights of the lawful owner.

The next point of error concerns the dispositional determination that the youth be sent to the Missouri Division of Youth Services. It was contended that the juvenile office did not fully explore other alternatives and this commitment was not supported by the evidence. An investigation report of the juvenile officer was introduced in the evidence. The report traced the history of prior incidents involving the youth and included several "runaways" from home and an assault with a dangerous and deadly weapon. The services provided to the youth were also listed, which included residence at numerous psychiatric hospitals and centers and attendance at public and private out-patient psychiatric services. Additionally, there had been several private placements at children's homes and the Mid-Missouri Mental Health Center. The last placement had been the residence at the home of the adoptive parents as an adopted son. The report also revealed, beyond the youth's inability to remain at these homes, a behavior pattern characterized by impulsivity, poor judgment, aggressiveness, truancy and alcohol abuse, with behavioral and academic problems in school. The report stated that available treatment alternatives were considered. These reported findings were buttressed on direct examination of the witness and in cross-examination.

The Division of Youth Services is responsible "for the prevention and control of juvenile delinquency and the rehabilitation of children." Section 219.016 (RSMo.Supp.1975). Under authority of this section

". . . any child over...