J.M. & Estate of Hamilton v. City of Milwaukee & Christopher E. Manney

• Decision Date: 12 April 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 16-CV-507-JPS.
• Citation: 249 F.Supp.3d 920
• Parties: J.M. and Estate of Dontre Hamilton, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE and Christopher E. Manney, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

249 F.Supp.3d 920

J.M. and Estate of Dontre Hamilton, Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF MILWAUKEE and Christopher E. Manney, Defendants.

Case No. 16-CV-507-JPS.

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.

Signed April 12, 2017

Alexander Flynn, Alex Flynn & Associates SC, Jeffrey D. Patza, Jerome A. Konkel, Jonathan S. Safran, Samster Konkel & Safran LLC, Milwaukee, WI, Ian M. Wallach, The Law Offices of Ian Wallach PC, Los Angeles, CA, Jovan L. Blacknell, Law Office of J. Blacknell, Culver City, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Susan E. Lappen, Patrick J. McClain, Milwaukee City Attorney's Office, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendants.

ORDER

J.P. Stadtmueller, U.S. District Judge

1. INTRODUCTION

This litigation arises from the death of Dontre Hamilton ("Hamilton") on April 30, 2014. On that date, Hamilton was shot and killed by Defendant Christopher E. Manney ("Manney"), an officer with the Milwaukee Police Department ("MPD"), after a physical altercation between the two. Plaintiffs, Hamilton's estate and his surviving minor child, filed suit against Manney and the City of Milwaukee (the "City") on April 27, 2016. (Docket # 1).

On February 1, 2017, the parties each filed motions for summary judgment. (Plaintiffs, Docket # 45; Defendants, Docket # 48). As of March 15 and March 17, 2017, each respective motion became ripe for decision. See (Briefing on Plaintiffs' motion, Docket # 56 and # 75; Briefing on Defendants' motion, Docket # 78 and # 88). As Plaintiffs' motion is narrower than Defendants', the Court will address it first. The Court discusses the facts relevant to the respective motions separately, to ensure that the proper standard of review is preserved for each.

2. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides the mechanism for seeking summary judgment. Rule 56 states that the "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see Boss v. Castro , 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016). A "genuine" dispute of material fact is created when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-movant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc. , 815 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir. 2016). In assessing the parties' proposed facts, the Court must not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility; the Seventh Circuit instructs that "we leave those tasks to factfinders." Berry v. Chicago Transit Auth. , 618 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2010). Internal inconsistencies in a witness's testimony "create an issue of credibility as to which part of the testimony should be given the greatest weight if credited at all." Bank of Ill. v. Allied Signal Safety Restraint Sys. , 75 F.3d 1162, 1170 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Tippens v. Celotex Corp. , 805 F.2d 949, 953 (11th Cir. 1986) ). The non-movant "need not match the movant witness for witness, nor persuade the court that [their] case is convincing, [they] need only come forward with appropriate evidence demonstrating that there is a pending dispute of material fact." Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp. , 24 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1994).

3. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION

Plaintiffs seek judgment on their second cause of action, which asserts that Manney unreasonably searched Hamilton in the course of events preceding his death. (Docket # 1 at 38).

3.1 Relevant Facts

The operative facts of Plaintiffs' motion are largely undisputed; the parties' disagreement is chiefly legal. On October 15, 2014, Milwaukee Chief of Police Edward A. Flynn ("Flynn") fired Manney for "failure to have reasonable suspicion prior to conducting a pat-down search," and "failure to adhere to training and procedures regarding Use of Force considerations." (Docket # 49–1 at 1). That same day, Flynn filed a complaint with the Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners ("FPC") regarding Manney's discharge.¹ The complaint stated, inter alia , that Manney "failed to adhere to [department policy on pat-down searches] when he failed to have reasonable suspicion that [Hamilton] was armed with a weapon and posed a threat to him or others prior to conducting a pat-down search, and acted contrary to training he received on February 22, 2012, specific to the engagement of homeless individuals." (Docket # 49–2 at 4).²

Manney appealed his discharge on October 17, 2014. The FPC held a hearing on the matter spanning from March 19 to March 23, 2015. Plaintiffs state that the FPC hearing "was essentially a court trial between Manney and the MPD." (Docket # 55 at 11). Defendants maintain that there were differences between the hearing and a standard trial, including that the commissioners were entitled to ask questions of witnesses, and that the matter was based on an appeal of a disciplinary order and was conducted according to procedures mandated by state law. Id. at 11–12. Defendants further assert that the MPD was not a party to the proceeding, but rather it was solely between Manney and Flynn. Id.

The hearing officer himself stated that "this process is conducted very much like a court trial." (Docket # 49–4 at 6). The hearing proceeded in two phases: first, to determine "whether there was in fact a rule violation" by Manney as asserted by Flynn, and second, whether "the discipline [was] appropriate based on the circumstances of what happened and based on Officer Manney's history with the department, his career, his performance, etc." Id. at 7–8. Both sides were represented by counsel, gave opening and closing statements, and offered evidence. The parties introduced exhibits and elicited witness testimony on direct and cross examination. Manney himself testified at both phases of the hearing.

The FPC upheld Flynn's action by unanimous written decision on April 28, 2015 (the "FPC Decision"). The FPC Decision posed various "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law" addressing the parties' presentations at the hearing. The FPC agreed with Flynn that Manney lacked reasonable suspicion before conducting a pat-down search of Hamilton. Defendants assert that the FPC Decision relates to compliance with MPD rules, not the Fourth Amendment, and reassert that Flynn and the FPC's decisions were based on incorrect sets of fact. (Docket # 55 at 15). The FPC Decision noted that it "must find by a preponderance of the evidence that there is just cause to sustain the charges." (Docket # 49–9 at 8). The FPC then applied seven standards mandated by statute to assist in making that determination, and found each standard was met by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 8–12. Defendants point out that the FPC had additional considerations beyond those seven standards, including the seriousness of Manney's rule violations, Manney's work history, and damage to the public's trust in the MPD. Id.

Manney appealed the FPC Decision to the Milwaukee County Circuit Court (the "Circuit Court") in accordance with state law. Manney and the FPC were the parties to the appeal. Both parties filed briefs with the Circuit Court. Manney also filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Circuit Court, which was similarly briefed. The Circuit Court issued its decision on both in a combined order on July 22, 2016.

Therein, it described Manney's argument against MPD policy, namely that he felt "it imposes an extra limitation on a police officer's right to conduct a weapons pat-down, a limitation that isn't imposed by the state statute or constitutional law principle that authorize such searches." (Docket # 49–12 at 6). MPD policy mandates that to conduct a pat-down search, an officer must believe that 1) the target poses a threat to the officer's safety, and 2) the target possesses weapons. Id. at 6. Manney asserted that only the first element was required by the Supreme Court's applicable precedent, Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The Circuit Court disagreed, citing Terry 's holdings that an officer must suspect "that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous." Id. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868. It further found that Wisconsin law is consistent with Terry . (Docket # 49–12 at 7). The Circuit Court concluded that MPD policy did not conflict with the constitutional prerequisites of a pat-down search, and thus the FPC did not apply an improper legal standard to its decision in that regard. Id. at 8.

As to the facts of Manney's appeal, the Circuit Court discussed the parties' vigorous disputes thereof. Id. at 9–13. The Circuit Court noted that it was not at liberty "to weigh the evidence anew; the [FPC's] choice of which evidence to accept [or reject] is conclusive." Id. at 9–10. It ultimately concluded that the Decision had an adequate factual basis. Id. at 13. Manney appealed that order on August 11, 2016, but only as it related to his petition for a writ of certiorari. See Christopher E. Manney v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs for the City of Milwaukee , 2016–AP–1598, Case History, available at : https://wscca.wicourts.gov. That appeal is still pending. Id.

3.2 Analysis

Plaintiffs argue that, in light of the Decision and Manney's unsuccessful appeals thereof (the "Discharge Proceedings"), Manney must be precluded from contesting whether he had reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down search of Hamilton. The direct basis for their motion is the Circuit Court's July 22, 2016 judgment and order (the "Judgment"). This Court must give a state court judgment preclusive effect just as it would a federal judgment, and because the Judgment was issued by a Wisconsin court, it must apply Wisconsin's law on preclusion. See First Weber Group, Inc. v. Horsfall , 738 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2013) ; Donald v. Polk County , 836 F.2d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1988).

Issue preclusion prevents a party from...