E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia

• Decision Date: 07 April 1993
• Citation: 622 A.2d 1388,424 Pa.Super. 449
• Parties: E.J.M. and H.M. and E.M. v. ARCHDIOCESE OF PHILADELPHIA, the Church of Christ the King, and Franciscan Fathers of Green Bay, A/K/A Order of Friars Minor of the Roman Catholic Church and Father Terrance Pinkowski C/O Franciscan Fathers of Green Bay, A/K/A Order of Friars Minor of the Roman Catholic Church. Appeal of E.J.M.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1388

622 A.2d 1388

424 Pa.Super. 449

E.J.M. and H.M. and E.M. v. ARCHDIOCESE OF PHILADELPHIA, the Church of Christ the King and Franciscan Fathers of Green Bay, A/K/A Order of Friars Minor of the Roman Catholic Church and Father Terrance Pinkowski C/O Franciscan Fathers of Green Bay, A/K/A Order of Friars Minor of the Roman Catholic Church Appeal of E.J.M.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Dec. 8, 1992.

Filed April 7, 1993.

Laurence S. Berman, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Martin G. Malloy, Philadelphia, for Franciscan Fathers, appellee.

Bruce W. McCullough, Philadelphia, for Archdiocese of Philadelphia, appellee.

Before CAVANAUGH, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.

BECK, Judge:

This appeal requires us to decide whether, under the circumstances of this sexual assault and battery case, the discovery rule should be applied to toll the running of the applicable statute of limitations.

The appeal is taken from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Franciscan Fathers of Green Bay, on the ground that the action was instituted after the expiration of the statute of limitations and that the discovery rule should not be applied to toll the running of the statute of limitations. We find no error in this determination and affirm.

In August 1989, appellant E.J.M. instituted suit against the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, The Church of Christ the King, the Franciscan Fathers of Green Bay, and Father Terrance Pinkowski. The complaint alleged that appellant, a member of a devoutly Catholic family, began to attend weekly prayer groups at defendant Church of Christ the King in late 1976. At that time, appellant was fourteen years old. Defendant Father Pinkowski was the leader of the prayer group. Father Pinkowski was also a teacher at Archbishop Ryan High School, an institution operated by defendant Archdiocese of Philadelphia and attended by appellant. Father Pinkowski lived at the Friary of defendant Franciscan Fathers of Green Bay, the order to which Father Pinkowski belonged.

The complaint further alleged that shortly after appellant began to attend Father Pinkowski's prayer group, he also began attending a weekly mass at the Friary and soon formed an intention to become a Catholic priest. Father Pinkowski then undertook the role of spiritual leader to appellant and became intimately acquainted with appellant's family. Appellant alleges that he both admired and trusted Father Pinkowski. Tragically, appellant also alleges that Father Pinkowski abused this trust by sexually molesting appellant on countless occasions in the period from 1976 through 1981.

Although appellant reached the age of majority in 1980 and concedes that the alleged abuse ended in 1981, he did not institute suit against any of the defendants until late 1989. Appellant's proffered reason for his delay is that he did not become aware of the psychological and emotional injuries he suffered as a result of the alleged abuse until late 1988. Appellant alleges at that time he realized the psychological damage that had been inflicted on him. Because appellant's contentions regarding what he knew and did not know concerning his injuries at the time the abuse was occurring are crucial to our decision, we quote those portions of appellant's affidavit in opposition to summary judgment that are relevant to this issue:

In the course of preparing me for the priesthood defendant Father Pinkowski committed against me (what I now know to be) sexual abuse. At the time of the acts he told me that this therapy was necessary for my spiritual growth and preparation for ordination, and that it would rid me of pride unpleasing to God.

5. Because of the aspiration I had to be a priest and the exalted position in which priests were regarded within my family, I did not believe or consider that defendant Father Pinkowski's actions with me were wrong. My mindset was that--because he was a priest--he had to be right about this therapy and training being necessary for me to become a good priest. I dealt with my confusion about this therapy by rationalizing that there was something wrong with me. I thought I had a problem.

. . . . .

6. I was married on June 25, 1988. In late April or early May 1988 I began making wedding preparations. My parents expected that defendant Father Pinkowski would be invited. They were shocked when I told them that I did not want him to attend my wedding. They told me that if he was not invited to the wedding that they would not come. I then revealed to them that I did not want him to come to the wedding because of what he had done to me, which I then explained to them.

7. Prior to this time I had never told anyone what had happened and I never considered that defendant Father Pinkowski's actions were abusive and injurious to me. I felt I was at fault. I felt guilty and sinful.

A little over a year after appellant's alleged realization concerning the damage he had suffered as a result of Father Pinkowski's actions, he filed the instant lawsuit. He pleaded causes of action for sexual assault and battery, clergy malpractice, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Father Pinkowski. ¹ He also sought to hold appellee Franciscan Fathers liable for Father Pinkowski's actions on a theory of respondeat superior. Finally, he pleaded a separate cause of action for negligent hiring and supervision against appellee.

On October 24, 1991, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the applicable statute of limitations had expired long before appellant filed suit. Appellant responded by arguing that the discovery rule should be applied to toll the statute of limitations until 1988 when he allegedly first became aware of the psychological injury he had suffered as a result of Father Pinkowski's actions. On February 19, 1992, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee, having rejected appellant's discovery rule argument. This timely appeal followed.

Our standard of review of this appeal is as follows:

On review of an order granting summary judgment, we must determine whether the moving party has established that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035(b). Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466, 468-69 (1979). In making this determination, we must examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, who is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co. v. Nenna & Frain, Inc., 320 Pa.Super. 291, 467 A.2d 330 (1983). All doubts as to the existence of a factual dispute must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party and the entry of summary judgment is appropriate only in the clearest of cases. Thompson Coal, supra.

Mentzer v. Ognibene, 408 Pa.Super. 578, 597 A.2d 604, 607 (1991).

Appellant's action against appellee is controlled by the statute of limitations contained in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524, which provides in pertinent part:

The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within two years:

(1) An action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution or malicious abuse of process.

(2) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another.

....

Our Supreme Court has very recently described how the discovery rule can operate as an exception to the application of a statute of limitations, as follows:

It is the duty of the party asserting a cause of action to use all reasonable diligence to properly inform himself of the facts and circumstances upon which the right of recovery is based and to institute suit within the prescribed period. Shaffer v. Larzelere, 410 Pa. 402, 405, 189 A.2d 267, 269 (1963). "Thus, the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises; lack of knowledge, mistake or misunderstanding do not toll the running of the statute of limitations." Pocono International Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 503 Pa. 80, 84, 468 A.2d 468, 471 (1983).

Generally, once the prescribed statutory period has expired, the complaining party is barred from bringing suit. The "discovery rule," however, is an exception to that rule, and its application tolls the running of the statute of limitations. The "discovery rule" provides that where the existence of the injury is not known to the complaining party and such knowledge cannot reasonably be ascertained within the prescribed statutory period, the limitations period does not begin to run until the discovery of the injury is reasonably possible. Schaffer [410 Pa.] at 406, 189 A.2d at 270. The "discovery rule" arises from the inability of the injured party, despite the exercise of reasonable diligence, to know of the injury or its cause. Pocono [503 Pa.] at 85, 468 A.2d at 471. Its purpose is to exclude the period of time during which the injured party is reasonably unaware that an injury has been sustained so that people in that class have essentially the same rights as those who suffer an immediately ascertainable injury. Pounds v. Lehman, 384 Pa.Super. 358, 363, 558 A.2d 872, 874 (1989).

Whether the statute has run on a claim is usually a question of law for the trial judge, but where the issue involves a factual determination, the determination is for the jury. Smith v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 397 Pa. 134, 142, 153 A.2d 477, 481 (1959). Specifically, the point at which the complaining party should reasonably be aware that he has suffered an injury is generally an issue of fact to be determined by the jury; only where the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ may the commencement of the limitations period be determined as a matter of law. Sadtler v. Jackson-Cross Co., 402 Pa.Super. 492, 501, 587 A.2d 727, 732 (1...