J.M. v. Henderson
| Decision Date | 30 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:09-cv-855 |
| Parties | J.M., a minor child, by and through his next friend P.M., Plaintiff, v. Richard Henderson, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by publishing Plaintiff's juvenile sex offender status. He brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), as well as state law.
Defendants move for summary judgment. ECF No. 27. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants' summary judgment motion to the extent that it dismisses all of Plaintiff's claims against the Pike County Sheriff's Department with prejudice, dismisses all of Plaintiff's federal claims against Defendants Richard Henderson ("Henderson"), Beverly Ferrazzi ("Ferrazzi") and Notification is Prevention Foundation ("N.P.F.") with prejudice, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims asserted against the latter Defendants.
When the Complaint was filed, Plaintiff J.M. was a seventeen-year-old who resided in Pike County, Ohio. Defendant Henderson is, and was at all relevant times, Sheriff of Pike County. Defendant Pike County Sheriff's Department is the division ofcounty government responsible for, inter alia, overseeing registration obligations and community notification for sex offenders residing in Pike County. Defendant Ferrazzi is the administrative secretary for the Communications Division of the Pike County Sheriff's Department. Defendant N.P.F. is a non-profit corporation that assists state and local governments in establishing and maintaining sex offender notification systems.
J.M. was convicted of two counts of rape. On April 29, 2008, the Pike County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, classified J.M. as a Tier III sex offender in accordance with Ohio Revised Code § 2152.83(C)(1). The juvenile court also classified J.M. as a juvenile offender registrant. On the day of his disposition and classification, the juvenile court gave J.M., and his parents, written notice of his registration duties which indicated he was a Public Registry Qualified Juvenile Offender Registrant, subject to community notification. Defs.' Reply Attach. 1, 5, ECF No. 36-1.
The Pike County Sheriff's Department placed J.M.'s information on Ohio's electronic sex offender registration and notification website ("eSORN"). Ferrazzi then instructed N.P.F. to send postcards to J.M.'s community containing information about J.M.'s sex offender status.
In April 2009, J.M. filed an action for a writ of mandamus in the Fourth District Court of Appeals of Ohio seeking an order ending the community notification of his sex offender status.1 Pl.'s Resp. Opp'n 10, ECF No. 33.
On June 23, 2009, N.P.F. sent postcards to the community with J.M.'s name, photograph, incorrect age, and sex offender status. On July 9, 2009, N.P.F. sent new postcards to the community with J.M.'s correct birth year but otherwise the same information as in the first notice.
On July 15, 2009, the Pike County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, created a journal entry ordering all community notification concerning J.M. to cease immediately.2 Pl.'s Resp. Opp'n Attach. 5, ECF No. 33-1. The Pike County Sheriff's Department received a copy of that journal entry on July 23, 2009. Defs.' Reply Attach. 2, ECF No. 36-1. Also on July 23, 2009, Angie Miller, a public defender who represented J.M., faxed the order requiring all notification of J.M.'s status to stop to Alicia Irmscher, the executive director of N.P.F. There are no allegations any of the Defendants continued to alert the community of J.M.'s sex offender status after July 23, 2009.
The standard governing summary judgment is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), which provides: "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The Court must grant summary judgment if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's caseand on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); Pittman v. Cuyahoga County Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 640 F. 3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 2011).
When reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, who must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial, and the Court must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587; Pittman, 640 F. 3d at 723. The Court disregards all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury would not be required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2009).
Thus, the central issue is '"whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Pittman, 640 F. 3d at 723 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
Defendants argue that the Pike County Sheriff's Department is entitled tosummary judgment on all claims against it because it is not sui juris. Plaintiff does not respond to that argument. Under Ohio law, a county sheriff's department is not an entity capable of being sued. Bay v. Clermont Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 09 CV 00855, 2009 WL 2495774, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2009). Therefore, the Court grants the Pike County Sheriff's Department summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims.
Plaintiff advances three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, Plaintiff argues Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights because he did not receive the appropriate hearing and notice before the community was notified of his status as a sex offender, and because the notification contradicted a court order. Second, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to privacy. Third, Plaintiff contends Defendants' actions constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Section 1983 states in pertinent part:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceedings for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, a plaintiff must show that a person acting under color of law deprived him of his rights secured by the United States Constitution or its laws. Berger v. City of Mayfield Heights, 265 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2001).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims because Henderson and Ferrazzi acted pursuant to a court order. Plaintiff argues that Defendants acted contrary to a court order and violated Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional right to privacy and therefore qualified immunity is unavailable to Defendants.
When a state official acts in accordance with a facially valid court order, the official is entitled to qualified immunity. Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 848 (6th Cir. 1994). In Bush, the operators of a non-secure detention home brought an action against the referee of the county juvenile court and the court administrator based on the placement of a juvenile in the plaintiffs' detention home. Id. at 844. The administrator determined that the juvenile was not dangerous based on the findings in the referee's order and therefore placed him in the non-secured facility. Id. It was later discovered that the juvenile had a history of violence and the referee's findings had been in error. Id. at 845. The Sixth Circuit held that the administrator who had placed the juvenile was entitled to qualified immunity because he relied on the referee's court order in making his placement decision. Id. at 848. Therefore, the administrator was entitled to at least qualified immunity.3 Id. See also Smith v. Leis, 407 F. App'x 918, 929 (6th Cir. 2011) ().
Plaintiff contends that Defendants were not acting pursuant to a court order in notifying the community about J.M.'s sex offender status. The copies of the 2008 juvenile court order provided to the Court, however, verify that the written notice included a community notification requirement. On April 29, 2008, the Pike County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division classified J.M. as a juvenile offender registrant. Id. The order states that "the child and his parents [were given] written notice of the child's registration and verification duties." Id. By referencing the written notice, the order...
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